



**Consumers
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Region III
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
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DOCKET 50-155 - LICENSE DPR-6 -
BIG ROCK POINT PLANT - RESPONSE TO
IE BULLETIN NO 80-17 - FAILURE OF
76 OF 185 CONTROL RODS TO FULLY INSERT
DURING A SCRAM AT A BWR

IE Bulletin No 80-17, dated July 3, 1980 required surveillance tests to verify that no significant amount of water exists in the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) and associated piping and that the SDV vent valves are operable and vent system is free of obstruction. These surveillances were to be completed within 3 days from the date of the bulletin.

The SDV system at Big Rock Point is significantly different from that at Browns Ferry Unit No 3 due to the number of control rod drives and the design for handling discharge water from the scram valves. The control rod drive system scram discharge piping consists of two scram dump headers, each receiving the discharge from 16 scram outlet valves. These two scram dump headers are connected together through a loop seal to the scram dump tank (175 gal). The purpose of the loop seal is to maintain the scram dump headers full of water (43 gal) to the scram outlet valves to prevent air leakage into the drives which could result in degradation of drive operation. The scram dump tank (SDT) discharges through a normally open drain valve and associated normally open vent valve to the enclosure clean sump. Dump tank instrumentation consists of level switches initiating a "hi-level" alarm at 10" below centerline (~ 7 gal) and "reactor scram" at 5/16" below centerline (~ 84 gal). The scram point selected is prior to a level which would prevent high speed insertion due to inadequate SDT volume. (Ref: FHSR 7.5.12) This trip prevents reactor operation without adequate SDT volume available for the scram function.

On July 4, 1980, the surveillance test required by item 1 of IE Bulletin No 80-17 was performed to verify the operability of the SDT system. All the requested

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bulletin actions were completed and results found acceptable. The following steps were taken to verify operability:

1. Initially SDT header drains downstream of the SDT drain isolation valve were opened with no drainage evident. This verified that the SDT was empty and that leakage past the scram outlet valves during the present operations cycle, if any, drained properly without accumulation.
2. The SDT was then filled above the alarm level by isolating the SDT drain and vent lines and initiating a one drive scram. This step also verified the operation of the "hi-level" alarm.
3. The SDT vent and drain isolation valves were opened. Total draining of the accumulated coolant (~15 gal) in the SDT to the enclosure clean sump took 15.8 seconds. This verified that both vent and drain valves functioned properly and discharge piping to the clean sump was free to obstructions.

Gregory C Withrow (Signed)

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