NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 LICENSEE CODE: O H D B S 1 ② LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ③ LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 ④ CAT ⑤

CON'T

0 1 REPORT SOURCE: L ⑥ DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 - 0 3 4 6 ⑦ EVENT DATE: 0 6 2 7 8 0 ⑧ REPORT DATE: 0 7 1 0 8 0 ⑨

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

0 2 (NP-32-80-09) While evaluating the inaccessible piping systems as required by IE Bulle-

0 3 tin 79-14, pipe support HCB-40-B1 was found not installed and CCA-8-H15 was found mis-

0 4 located. It was determined that the found condition was less conservative than

0 5 assumed in the accident analysis of the safety analysis report and is being reported

0 6 under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.i. There was no danger to the health and

0 7 safety of the public or station personnel.

0 8

0 9 SYSTEM CODE: X X ⑪ CAUSE CODE: B ⑫ CAUSE SUBCODE: C ⑬ COMPONENT CODE: S U P O R T ⑭ COMP. SUBCODE: B ⑮ VALVE SUBCODE: Z ⑯

⑰ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR: 8 0 — SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 4 8 / OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 1 REPORT TYPE: T — REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: F ⑱ FUTURE ACTION: Z ⑲ EFFECT ON PLANT: Z ⑳ SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z ㉑ HOURS ㉒: 0 0 0 0 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y ㉓ NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N ㉔ PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: Z ㉕ COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9 ㉖

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉗

1 0 The cause of the occurrence was an initial construction/installation error. HCB-40-B1

1 1 was never installed and CCA-8-H15 was mislocated. Under FCR 80-091 Supplement 6,

1 2 HCB-40-B1 will be added and CCA-8-H15 will be redesigned and relocated to its original

1 3 position under FCR 80-131 Supplement 3.

1 4

1 5 FACILITY STATUS: H ㉘ % POWER: 0 0 0 ㉙ OTHER STATUS ㉚: NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY: D ㉛ DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ㉜: IE Bulletin 79-14

1 6 ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z ㉝ CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z ㉞ AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY ㉟: NA LOCATION OF RELEASE ㊱: NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7 NUMBER: 0 0 0 ㊲ TYPE: Z ㊳ DESCRIPTION ㊴: NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8 NUMBER: 0 0 0 ㊵ DESCRIPTION ㊶: NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY ㊸

1 9 TYPE: Z ㊷ DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY

2 0 ISSUED: N ㊹ DESCRIPTION ㊺: NA NRC USE ONLY

8007150566

VR 80-103 NAME OF PREPARER: Charles Mekbel PHONE: 419-259-5608

GPO 917-926

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-32-80-09

DATE OF EVENT: June 27, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Pipe supports HCB-40-B1 and CCA-8-H15 not installed as designed

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 6, with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: While performing the walkdown and engineering evaluation for inaccessible piping systems required by IE Bulletin 79-14, the following was found:

Pipe support HCB-40-B1 on the component cooling water (CCW) supply to the control rod drive (CRD) mechanism coolers was not installed. This would have left approximately 21 feet of 3 inch pipe between the containment penetration and the isolation valve laterally unrestrained during an earthquake.

Lateral restraint CCA-8-H15 on the pressurizer relief inlet was located about 9 inches from its analyzed location. This descrepancy would have caused an overstressed condition in a welded attachment to this line during an earthquake.

During the detailed engineering evaluation of these descrepancies, it was determined that the found condition was less conservative than assumed in the accident analysis of the safety analysis report and is being reported under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.i.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the occurrence was an initial construction/installation error. HCB-40-B1 was never installed and CCA-8-H15 was mislocated.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. These restraints do not affect normal unit operation. Pipe support HCB-40-H1 is only required to resist loads resulting from a design basis earthquake. Lateral restraint CCA-8-H15, in its as-found condition, would not have been overstressed except during a design basis earthquake, since 98% of the restraints design load is seismic.

Corrective Action: Pipe support HCB-40-B1 will be added under FCR 80-091 Supplement 6. Lateral restraint CCA-8-H15 will be redesigned and relocated to its original position under FCR 80-131 Supplement 3. These descrepancies will be corrected prior to startup from the current refueling outage.

Failure Data: There have been no previous reported findings where the installation was not per design.

LER #80-048