

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

MAY 2 8 1980

Report No. 50-327/80-18

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401

Facility Name: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Docket No. 50-327

License No. CPPR-72

Inspection at Sequoyah near Soddy Daisy, Tennessee

Inspector: L. Modengs

Approved by: Colo Herell

A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch

Date Signed

Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on May 12-13, 1980

Areas Inspected

This special, announced inspection involved 12 inspector-hours on site in the area of seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems (IE Bulletin 79-14).

Results

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent

*C. R. Brimer, Outage Director

*R. Guthrie, Civil Engineer Supervisor

*J. Beason, Civil Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, and QC inspectors.

NRC Resident Inspector

*S. D. Butler

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scop __dings were summarized on May 13, 1980 with those persons indica. In Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

 (Open) Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems (IE Bulletin 79-14)

A Confirmation of Action Letter (CAL) was issued by the NRC on April 29, 1980 so as to provide additional assurance to Region II on the licensee satisfying the requirements for IL Bulletin 79-14. The licensee selected as a representative sample, for items 2 and 3 of CAL, one isometric from eight safety-related systems plus ten supports from each of the remaining four safety-related systems inside containment. Approximately 265 supports were identified under this sample with field inspection completed on 223 supports. Of the 223 inspected only 50 were under final review by the Engineering Design (EN DES) group and 24 were identified to have some small discrepancies. All the discrepancies with the exception of two supports were accepted by EN DES as is, since there was no effect on the operability of the supports. The two supports identified to have a problem were SIS-1-H2O-86 and SIS-1-H2O-315. Support No. 86 was designed to have a horizontal restraint while support No. 315 was designed for both a vertical and a

horizontal restraint. The inspector found the restraints on these supports adjacent to each other to be reversed, support No. 86 had both vertical and horizontal restraints and support No. 315 had a horizontal support only. The inspector reinspected these two supports and verified their findings but also questioned the EN DES personnel on checking further the adjacent supports to support No. 315 and its isometric. It was not clear to the inspector the function of the support as called out by the design drawings and the actual supports found in the field. The inspector informed the management when a discrepancy is found as above further inspections surrounding the area in question would be required. The licensee concurred with this item.

The inspector reviewed all the final reviewed supports and the respective isometrics confirming indepth detail inspections that had been performed on these supports. The inspector witnessed inspection on the RHR package No. 39 and CVC package 52 systems that had been conducted by the QC inspection teams outside the containment in the Auxiliary Building. The inspector reviewed procedure MI-6.17 "Instructions for the Implementation of NRC IE Bulletin 79-14" which was used as the guide to the above inspections.

This IE Bulletin 79-14 remains open until all inspections and evaluations are completed and evaluated by the NRC.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.