


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
KERR-MCGEE NUCLEAR CORPORATION

KERR-MCGEE CENTER • OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73125

May 9, 1980

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REG. SECTION

*G. McCorkle*  
Mr. L. C. Rouse  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Advance Fuel Licensing Branch  
Silver Springs  
Washington D.C. 20555



Dear Mr. Rouse:

The Cimarron Standby Physical Security Plan has been revised as requested by Mr. T. J. Madeda of Region III during a security inspection on April 2 through 4, 1980.

The changes proposed strengthen access control at the Cimarron plutonium plant and therefore do not require prior license approval, in our opinion.

Please let me know if you need additional information.

Sincerely,

W.J. SHELLEY  
DIRECTOR, REGULATION & CONTROL

WJS:mkr

Attachment

cc: G. W. McCorkle - Physical Security Licensing Branch  
James Keppler - Region III  
G. J. Sinke  
A. W. Norwood

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The doors on the mechanical tunnel enter material access area No. 1 and according to 10 CFR 73 should be alarmed. This mechanical tunnel is actually a ventilation return tunnel for air removal from the processing rooms through ventilation ducts and is conducted to approximately the center of the building where it then exhausts to the second floor exhaust air fan room through a filter bank into the fan and exits on the roof. Since no entrance to the tunnel is available except through the wet processing and waste treatment area in the basement, an exception for installing intrusion alarms has been requested.

The doors in the material access area have been described under 2.1.1. The door to the vault-type room is constructed as shown on the attached sketch, SK-2940. Ventilation ports as shown were installed for ease of opening the door since the door is built to withstand a pressure difference of 5 psi when closed and locked. The door is locked with a combination padlock meeting current requirements of NRC regulations.

### 3. Access Control

#### 3.1 Badge System

Identification badges are provided to each employee which they will carry on their person at all times. For access onto the facility grounds an identification badge is inserted into a specially coded plastic card into a card reader at the front gate, the employee can open the front gate for entry onto the facility grounds. After gaining access to the facility grounds the employee must present his identification badge to a guard for entry into the plutonium plant.

#### 3.1.2

Plastic badge provided to the employee for identification contains his color portrait, identification, date of issue and is enclosed in a sealed plastic cover. The system is provided by Polaroid and attempts to tamper with the badge result in its destruction.

#### 3.1.3 Coding

The background color of the employee's photograph, which is on the identification badge, is color coded to indicate to the guard whether the employee is approved for access to vital areas and material access areas. Those approved will have a red and white stripe background. The other employees will have a plain white background and must be escorted for entry into vital areas and material access areas.

The Cimarron Facility Manager will provide the guard force with written lists identifying persons who are authorized to have access to the plutonium plant. These include three degrees of access authorization, as follows:

1. Unlimited Access (No escort required)

This group includes certain technical, managerial and supervisory KerrMcGee employees who are permitted entry at any time.

2. Duty Hours Only (No escort required)

This group includes assigned Cimarron Facility personnel other than those permitted unlimited access.

3. Authorized visitors require an escort who has approved access to the plant. Visitors may be other KerrMcGee employees, governmental personnel, or other persons with legitimate business reasons for having access.

Visitors film badges are coded by being a distinctively different color than the badges worn by employees who require no escort.

3.1.4 Control System

A register of badges, signed for by the employees, will be maintained by the plant Manager. Badges that are lost or misplaced will require issuance of a second badge and the filing by the employee of a description of probable method of loss. New badges will be reissued to the plutonium plant employees upon loss of 10% of the plutonium badges.

3.1.5 Utilization

Identification badge will be on the employees person at all times. Upon entry to the plant, they will present it to the guard. An identification badge is attached to the face of the film badge which will be clipped to the uniform pocket when dressing for entry into a radiation area.

3.2 Access Authorization

Access to the plant by employees is authorized by the Cimarron Facility Manager in writing. All persons permanently assigned to the plutonium plant are authorized for delivering or receiving SNM materials and trash. Each vehicle is examined by an authorized person and health physics personnel for clearance prior to departure. No personal vehicles are permitted in the protected area.

3.6.3 Material Access and Vital Areas

No provision for vehicles to enter the material access area exists, consequently, no provision is made for their control.

### 3.7 Keys, Locks, Combinations

#### 3.7.1 Types and Kinds of Locks

Four types of locks are used for plant security and protection purposes. The truck gate and personnel gate in the protection barrier are 1) electric locks, controlled by a guard or watchman from the plant security station. These gates are in full view of the guard or watchman. Entrance into the material access area is through the security station then through doors which have 2) push-button combination locks. 3) A key lock is installed in the metal door meeting the underwriters laboratories standard, key locks for Group 1. 4) Key padlocks are used internally. These locks are equivalent to six pin cylinder locks meeting UL437.

#### 3.7.2 Keys

Issuance of and control of keys is the responsibility of the Facility Manager. The name, type and key way code is maintained by security, number of keys issued and to whom, receivers sign for keys. Key blanks are not maintained. Locks are changed whenever a person who has had access to same has been terminated or transferred or a key has been lost. Keys for security locks are retained within the protected area.

#### 3.7.3 Combinations

Combinations of locks are controlled by issuance to persons on a need-to-know bases. Supervisory personnel are authorized to issue lock combinations. Combinations are changed periodically and when an employee who is authorized to have the combination is terminated or transferred.

#### 3.5.1.3. Package Searches

All packages entering the protected area will be searched by the guard for the detection of firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and shielding materials for SNM. The search will be conducted physically by the guard on duty.

#### 3.5.2 Vital and Material Access Areas

##### 3.5.2.1 Access Control

Access to the material access area is gained by passing through a door equipped with a four tumbler combination lock. The combination is known only to authorized individuals. The vault is protected by a key lock and a combination lock.

### 3.5.2.3 Authorized Individuals

Admittance to the material access area is gained as stated through a combination locked door, whihc combination is known only to personnel authorized for the area.

### 3.5.2.4 Surveillance

Since all material in the material access area is dispersed on the walls of equipment and gloveboxes, an exception to the requirement that two individuals will be in every occupied area is requested.

### 3.5.2.5 Exit Search

The SNM detector for exit search is located immediately external to the material access area and provides an ideal point of observation for guards without undue presence of background radiation to confound the detector. An exception to the requirement for location of the SNM detector at the material access area is requested.