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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT () 638 S Street, Box 15830, Sacramento, California 95813, 010 45

August 13, 1979

Mr. Norman C. Healey
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Division of Reactor Operations Inspections
4350 East West Highway
Washington, D. C. 20555

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
POOR QUALITY PAGES

Docket Nos.: 50-313 Arkansas Muclear 1
50-302 Crystal River 3
50-346 Davis Besse
50-269 Oconee 1
50-270 Oconee 2
50-287 Oconee 3
50-312 Rancho Saco
50-289 Three Mile Island I
50-320 Three Mile Island II

Dear Hr. Hosley:

Acting as chairman of the Babcock and Wilcox (BW) Users Group Subcommittee on Feedwater Pipe Cracking. IE Bulletin 79-13, the purpose of this letter is to confirm arrangements for a meeting between members of your staff and of the utilities utilizing reactors designed by Babcock and Wilcox (BW) to discuss the type and extent of examinations required to be performed under the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-13. Participating utilities are Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Arkansas Power and Light, Metropolitan Edison, Florida Power Corporation, Toledo Edison and Duke Power.

As you are aware, some plants of the Westinghouse design have exhibited cracking in fittings welded to the main feedwater nozzles on steam generators. To date, in all plants inspected, only the nozzle to fitting welds have exhibited degradation due to cracking.

Cracking has been postulated by plant personnel at Westinghouse facilities to be initiated by thermal stress, propagated by loading stress assisted by corrosion. Thermal stresses have been of a low cycle, high stress type. Instrumentation installed at a number of Westinghouse facilities has shown that during plant stortups, feedwater transients and Auxiliary Feedwater pump testing, large temperature gradients exist across the nozzle to fitting weld. Corrosion has been evidenced at the Westinghouse facilities by pitting inside nozzles and fittings and by cracks filled with corrosion products.

Specific differences in configuration and operations exist between BSW and Westinghouse plants which lead us to believe that this problem is not specific to BSW facilities for the reasons listed below:

- 1) B&W Once Thru Steam Generators (OTSG) do not utilize nozzles for the attachment of Main Feedwater piping to the vessel.

  Main Feedwater enters the OTSG through a ring header attached to the OTSG by 32 riser pipes with bolted connections (see Figure 1). Auxiliary Feedwater piping is also connected to the OTSG by means of an external ring header attached to the OTSG with 7 risers with bolted connections at all plants except Rancho Seco, Davis Besse, and Oconee 3, where a welded mozzle connection with an internal ring header is used. This design differs from the Westinghouse design where Main and Auxiliary Feedwater enter the steam generator through a single welded nozzle connection.
- 2) All Baw facilities utilize AVT chemistry control and full flow demineralizers. In addition, all plants have recirculation loops wherein feedwater is "cleaned up" to minimum requirements prior to feeding the OTSG during startup. During startup transients, feedwater level within the OTSG is maintained constant and no intermittent feeding is utilized. All Westinghouse facilities initially utilized phosphate chemistry control. Only recently have some of the facilities switched to AVT control. Full flow demineralizers are an uncommon feature of Westinghouse plants as are feedwater recirculation loops.
- 3) A total of 95 welds has been examined at B&W facilities in Main and Auxiliary Feedwater piping. A tabulation of these welds appears in Table 1. Of the 95 welds inspected, only 5 contained reportable indications. Further, it is important to note that these reportable indications were construction type fabrication defects and not cracks.
- Augmented examinations of Main and Auxiliary Feedwater piping, risers and nozzles requested by NRC have been performed at Crystal River Unit 3 and at Davis Besse. These examinations were carried out under NRC regional office direction and utilized radiographic inspection techniques. No welds were found with cracks.

As a result of the facts outlined above, we propose the inspection outlined below will provide compliance to, and meet the intent of, IE Bulletin 79-13 at BAW facilities:

- 1) Volumetric inspection of all Auxiliary Feedwater nozzle to piping welds at Davis Besse, Oconee 3 and Rancho Seco.
- 2) The addition of ultrasonic testing as a "primary test." A procedure with proven ability to detect cracks which are of concern and which has NRC staff concurrence would be utilized. It should be noted that normal Section XI ultrasonic testing procedures utilized at a number of Westinghouse facilitites contirmed radiographic results and in some cases was more than was seen with radiography.

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3) Evaluation and disposition of ultrasonic testing results in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Code and evaluation and disposition of radiographic results in accordance with the original construction code of the piping.

Results of the nozzle to pipe weld examinations will be reported in accordance with Item 4 of IE Bulletin 79-13.

As a result of the ISI performed to date at B6W facilities, augmented examinations performed at Crystal River Unit 3 and Davis Besse which found no indications of cracking problems, and the fact that no cracks have been seen at any Keringhouse facility in welds other than nozzle to fitting welds, no additional examination of Main and Auxiliary Feedwater piping other than that normally required by Section XI is deemed necessary or appropriate at any of the B6W facilities.

We understand this meeting is to be held in Washington, D. C. on Friday, August 24, 1979. We request that the authors of IE Bulletin 79-13, personnel who are responsible for review of inspection results, and any other members of your staff you deem necessary, be present. Please contact myself at Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station (209) 748-2751 with any questions you may have.

Respectfully,

W. B. Carrett

Plant Nechanical Engineer
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station

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Chairman, B&W Users Group Subcommittee on Feedwater Pipe Cracking, IE Bullctin 79-13

WBG: sc

#### Attachments

cat D. Ransch, Chairman, B&W Users Group, SMUD

S. W. Johnson, FPC

C. T. Daft, TECO

H. White, AP&L

J. Potter, Met. Ed.

J. D. Norton, Duke


bcs: R. J. Rodriguez

J. V. McColligan

D. C. Blachly

Admin File

## 177 FA OTSG feedwater nozzle assembly



F.W. SYS./LOOP	SIZE/SCHED.	- FWELDS	PEXAMS		TYPES OF WELLDS EXAMINED	FREPORTABLE/PLANT	COMENTS
			RT	IIT		(All FOUND SY RT)	
MAIN 'A'	24" \$/80	4	4	0	PF	11 Rec OCO 1,2,3	
	20" 5/80	13	4	11	P-Pen (2) PF(7) FV(1) FF(1	6 Rec 000 1.3	
	18" \$/80	3	3	9	PF (2) PV (1)	4 Rac CR-3	
	14" 5/80	11	10	1	PF	20 Rec OCO 1,2,3 6	
	10" 5/80		0	9		CR-3	
	6.75" .80wall	1 3	10	1	PF		
	6" S/80	8	8	0	PF(4) PF(2) PN(1) PV(1)		
	3" S/80	a	9	9			
MAIN 'B'	24" S/80	1	1	g	PF	7 Rec 000 3	Report
	20" 5/80	11	1 2	111	P-Pen(2) PF(7) FV(1) FF(1)	1	were fabr
	18" S/80	3	3		PF(2) PV(1)	12 Rec CR-3	cation
	14" 5/80	13	111	1 2	PF(11) FF(2)	14 Rec, 1 Rep 000 2,3	defects
	10" \$/60	1	1	9		6 CR-3	
	6" \$/80	2	2	0	PF(1) PV(1)	3 Rec 000 1,3	
	3" S/80	3	3	9	PF(2) FF(1)	8 Rec, 3 Rep CN-3	
AUX 'A'	6" S/80	7	6	1	PF(6) P-1 an (1)	7 Rec OCO 1,2,3	
	6" S/120	1	1		PV	2 Rec OCO 3	
	3" S/80		0				
AUX 'B'	6" S/80		-	-	DU/2\ BP/6\ BB/1\	12 Rec, 2 Rep CR-3	
AUX B		8	8	0	PV(2) PF(5) PP(1)	12 Rec, 2 Rep CR-3	Reporteh!
		1	1		PF	4 Rec 0C0 2	wore 1 1
	6" \$/140	1	1	9	PF	1	cation
	3" S/80	3	3		PF(2) FF(1)	6 Rac CR-3	defects
TOTALS:		95	72	27		116 Rec 6 Rep	
				99			

and the same

P-PIPE
F-FITTING
V-VALVE
M-NOZZLE
PEN-PENETRATION

NOTE: Total number of welds disagrees with total number of exams due to the fact that the P-Pen welds were tested by both methods (R.S.).
All reportable flaws are fabrication defects.

MEETING AGGENDA

NRC/ B&W OWNERS GROUP

FRIDAY- AUGUST 24, 1979

INTRUDUCTIONS

BACKGROUND

### DISCUSSION OF B&W PLANTS


- Design differences between B&W and Westinghouse facilities
- Previous inspections
- Operation
- Chemistry control


PROPOSED PROGRAM

DISCUSSION


IMPLEMENTATION

SUMMARY






# 177 FA OTSG auxiliary feedwater Welded nozzle assembly



## 177 FA OTSG feedwater nozzle assembly



### IST AND SUPPLEMENTAL MAIN AND AUX. FEEDWATER WELD EXAMS

SYS./LOOP	SIZE/SCHED.	#WELDS	DEX	AMS	TYPES OF WELDS EXAMINED	#REPORTABLE/PLANT	COMMENT
			RT	บา			CO. SILS 1
:N 'A'	24" \$/80 20" \$/80 13" \$/80 14" \$/80 10" \$/80 6.75" .80wall 6" \$/80 3" \$/80	13 3 11 0 1 8	4 4 3 10 Ø 8 8	11 Ø 1 Ø 1 Ø	PF P-Pen (2)PF(7)FV(1)FF(1) PF (2) PV (1) PF PF PF(4)FF(2)PN(1)PV(1)	(All FOUND BY RT)  11 Rec OCO 1,2,3 6 Rec OCO 1,3 4 Rec CR-3 20 Rec OCO 1,2,3 & CR-3	
IN 'B'	24" \$/80 20" \$/80 18" \$/80 14" \$/80 10" \$/60 6" \$/80 3" \$/80	1 11 3 13 1 2 3	1 2 3 11 1 2 3	Ø 11 Ø 2 Ø Ø	PF P-Pen(2)PF(7)FV(1)FF(1) PF(2) PV(1) PF(11) FF(2) PF(1) PV(1) PF(2) FF(1)	7 Rec OCU 3  12 Rec CR-3 14 Rec, 1 Rep OCO 2,3 & CR-3 3 Rec OCO 1,3 8 Rec, 3 Rep CR-3	Reported were fab cation defects
x 'A'	6" \$/80 6" \$/120 3" \$/80	1 0	6 1 0	1 Ø Ø	PF(6) P-Pen (1) PV	7 Rec OCO 1,2,3 2 Rec OCO 3	
к 'В'	6" S/80 6" S/120 6" S/140 3" S/80	8 · 1 1 3	8 1 1 3	Ø Ø Ø	PV(2) PF(5) PP(1) PF PF PF(2) FF(1)	12 Rec, 2 Rep CR-3 4 Rec OCO 2 6 Rec CR-3	Reportab were fab catio defects
TALS:		95	72	27		116 Rec 6 Rep	

P-PIPE F-FITTING V-VALVE N-NOZZLE PEN-PENETRATION

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