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0 2	Hydraulic Snubbers SR17 and SR11 were found very close to t	he end or	ftheir
03	piston travel. The snubbers were disconnected to allow for	the add:	ition 6
0 4	of shims, rendering them inoperable. This placed the unit	in the Ad	tion S
0 5	Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.7.1. (NP-33-77-70)	30
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	CAUSE DESCRIPTION		
0 8	The cause of Hydraulic Snubbers SR17 and SR11 reaching their		
0 0	stroke has been attributed to oversight in design and person	nnel erro	30
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TOLEDO EDISON GOMPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUGLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-70

DATE OF EVENT: August 22, 1977

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Main Steam Line 1-1 Hydraulic Snubbers SR17 and SR11 were rendered inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The plant was in Mode 2, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On August 9, 1977, at approximately 0900 hours, during a review of all hydraulic snubbers to check "as built" conditions, construction management found hydraulic snubber SR17 on the Main Steam Line 1-1 to be at or very nearly at the end of its piston travel. This may have made the hydraulic snubber inoperable.

On August 10, 1977, hydraulic snubber SR11 on Main Steam Line 1-1 was also found to be very close to the end of the piston travel. At 1330 hours on August 22, 1977, seismic hydraulic snubbers SR11 and SR17 were disconnected (to allow for addition of shims) rendering the two hydraulic snubbers inoperable.

The above actions placed the station in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.7.1 which requires all nuclear safety related hydraulic snubbers to be operable in Mode 2.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of hydraulic snubbers SRII and SRI7 reaching their maximum stroke has been attributed to oversight in design. When a change in the position of the hydraulic snubber support was made, design personnel failed to change the piston design hot and cold settings. The supports were changed due to interferences with other items in the area.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no threat to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Hydraulic snubbers SRII and SRI7 are seismic hydraulic snubbers which are only required for a seismic event. There was not a seismic event during the time when the hydraulic snubbers were inoperable.

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-70

Corrective Action: The pins for hydraulic snubbers SR11 and SR17 were removed and the threaded eyelet of the piston was screwed out approximately 1/4 inch which allowed the hydraulic snubbers to have an additional 1/4 inch piston travel. This temporary fix would allow the hydraulic snubbers to be operable in case of a seismic event. The pins were removed without much effort which indicated that the hydraulic snubber and pipe were not in a bind. The pins were re-inserted after the adjustment of the threaded rod ends, and hydraulic snubbers were declared operable at 1500 hours on August 10, 1977.

A permanent fix was made to hydraulic snubbers SR11 and SR17 by installing a 1½ inch shim to the support which changed the hydraulic snubber piston rod to a midstroke position. The piston rod eyelet was returned to its original position. Repositioning the piston rod to the midstroke position allows for adequate thermal growth without the hydraulic snubber reaching the end of its travel. The hydraulic snubbers were declared operable at 1445 hours on August 23, 1977, removing the station from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.7.1. All hydraulic snubbers have been checked to ensure there is adequate piston travel. The problem with the hydraulic snubber SR11 was found during the checkout of all hydraulic snubbers.

Failure Data: There have been no previous failures with hydraulic snubbers SRII and SRI7. A previous failure with hydraulic snubber GCB-7-H4 having no hydraulic fluid was reported on LTR NP-33-77-19.