# U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

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/0/1/	CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)/V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2)/0/0/-/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3)/4/1/1/1/1 (4)/ / / (5)LICENSEE CODELICENSE NUMBERLICENSE TYPECAT
/0/1/	$\frac{\text{REPORT}}{\text{SOURCE}} \frac{/L}{(6)} \frac{/0/5/0/0/3/3/8}{\text{DOCKET NUMBER}} (7) \frac{/0/6/0/3/8/0}{\text{EVENT DATE}} (8) \frac{/0/7/0/3/8/0}{\text{REPORT DATE}} (9)$
	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
10/2/	/ On June 3, 1980, the containment internal air partial pressure exceeded the /
/0/3/	/ allowable Technical Specification limit for the existing service water and /
10/4/	/ RWST temperatures by 0.3 psia. Because the unit was in Mode 3 and the air /
/0/5/	/ partial pressure was returned to acceptable limits within 1 hour, the health /
/0/6/	/ and safety of the general public were not affected. This event is reportable /
10/7/	/ pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /
/0/8/	1
	SYSTEMCAUSECAUSECOMP.VALVECODECODESUBCODECOMPONENT CODESUBCODESUBCODE
/0/9/	$\frac{/S/C}{(11)} \xrightarrow{/E} (12) \xrightarrow{/B} (13) \xrightarrow{/V/A/L/V/E/X} (14) \xrightarrow{/B} (15) \xrightarrow{/D} (16)$ SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
(17	LER/RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.
(11)	NUMBER <u>/8/0/ /-/ /0/5/4/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/</u>
ACT	IONFUTUREEFFECTSHUTDOWNATTACHMENTNPRD-4PRIMECOMPONENTENACTIONON PLANTMETHODHOURSSUBMITTEDFORMSUBPLIERMANUFACTURER
/X/	(18) $\underline{/Z/}$ (19) $\underline{/Z/}$ (20) $\underline{/Z/}$ (21) $\underline{/0/0/0/}$ (22) $\underline{/Y/}$ (23) $\underline{/N/}$ (24) $\underline{/A/}$ (25) $\underline{/F/1/3/0/}$ (26)
C.	AUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
/1/0/	/ The air partial pressure limit was exceeded because of air leakage past a /
/1/1/	/ containment purge supply valve. Initial action was to restore the partial /
/1/2/	/ pressure by starting the containment air recirc fans and securing the outside /
/1/3/	/ instrument air. The purge supply valve was subsequently verified closed by /
/1/4/	/ manual operation and satisfactorily type "C" tested.
I	ACILITY METHOD OF
/1/5/	STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)   /X/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) /HOT STANDBY / (30) /B/ (31) /PERIODIC SURVEILLANCE/
/1/6/	ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) <u>/Z/</u> (33) <u>Z/</u> (34) / <u>NA</u> / / <u>NA</u> // PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
/1/7/	NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) /0/0/0/(37)/Z/(38) / NA // PERSONNEL INJURIES //
/1/8/	NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) /0/0/0/ (40) / NA // LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
/1/9/	TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)
	PUBLICITY
/2/0/	ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY ////////////////////////////////////
800	7070381 NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Unit #1 Attachment: Page 1 of 1 Docket No. 50-338 Report No. LER 80-054/03L-0

# Description of Event

On June 3, 1980, with the unit in a hot standby condition, the containment internal air partial pressure exceeded the corresponding Technical Specification limit for the existing service water and RWST temperatures by 0.3 psia. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.6.1.4 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

# Probable Consequence of Occurrence

The containment air partial pressure and temperature are varied as a function of service water temperature and Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) water temperature according to the Technical Specification, Figure 3.6-1. This is required to assure the containment will depressurize in less than 60 minutes and subatmospheric pressure is maintained thereafter. Because the air partial p essure was returned to acceptable limits within 1 hour and the unit was in Mode 3 when the event occurred, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

# Cause of Event

The air partial pressure limit was exceeded due to air leakage past containment purge supply valve MOV-HV100C.

#### Immediate Corrective Action

The containment air partial pressure was restored to within specs by starting the containment air recirculation fans and securing the outside instrument air. The leaking purge supply valve was later manually operated and verified closed. The valve was then Type "C" tested with satisfactory results.

#### Scheduled Corrective Action

No scheduled corrective action is required.

## Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions are required.

### Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this occurrence.