



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
631 PARK AVENUE
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

May 29, 1980

Docket No. 50-485

Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation
ATTN: Mr. J. E. Arthur
Chief Engineer
89 East Avenue
Rochester, New York 14649

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-23, "Loss of Suction To Emergency Feedwater Pumps", is forwarded to you for information. No written response is required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

James M. Allan
Boyce H. Grier
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Information Notice No. 80-23
2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

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cc w/encls:

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ENCLOSURE 1

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SSINS No.: 6835
Accession No.:
8005050061

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LOSS OF SUCTION TO EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMPS

Description of Circumstances:

On April 7, 1980, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, suffered a loss of offsite power due to tornado damage to 500 kv transmission towers. The unit tripped from 98% power; the diesel generators started and supplied vital loads; natural circulation in the reactor coolant system was established; and the emergency feedwater (EFW) pumps supplied feedwater to the steam generators.

The suction of the EFW pumps was aligned to the Condensate Storage Tanks (CST) and to the Startup and Blowdown Demineralizer effluent in parallel. Approximately 15 minutes after the unit tripped, both EFW pumps lost suction. Prompt operator action was taken to isolate the EFW pump suction from the Startup and Blowdown Demineralizer and to vent the EFW pumps. EFW flow was re-established within one minute.

Investigation revealed that the EFW pump suction loss was caused by flashing in the main feedwater train forcing hot water through the Startup and Blowdown Demineralizers to the EFW pump suction where it flashed to steam. The steam caused cavitation of the EFW pumps, and the pressure in the EFW suction header prevented flow from the CST.

The licensee has submitted Licensee Event Report No. 50-368/80-18/03L-0, dated May 5, 1980, describing this event. Action to prevent recurrence included revising the EFW system operating procedure and the Plant Startup Procedure to require shutting the EFW suction valve from the Startup and Blowdown Demineralizers during plant startup at about 5% full power after the steam generator feedwater source has been shifted to a main feedwater pump. In addition, the EFW suction valve from the Startup and Blowdown Demineralizers will be verified closed once per shift during Mode 1 operation.

This IE Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If NRC evaluations so indicate, further licensee actions may be requested or required.

No written response to this IE Information Notice is required. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

ENCLOSURE 2

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RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Notice No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued to
80-15	Axial (Longitudinal) Oriented Cracking in Piping	4/21/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
80-16	Shaft Seal Packing Causes Binding in Main Steam Swing Check and Isolation Valves	5/5/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-17	Potential Hazards Associated With Interchangeable Parts On Radiographic Equipment	5/5/80	All Radiographic Licensees
80-18	Possible Weapons Smuggling Pouch	5/5/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL, Fuel Fabrication and Processing Facilities and Materials Priority I Licensees
80-19	NIOSH Recall of Recirculation-Mode (Closed-Circuit) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (Rebreathers)	5/6/80	All Power Reactors with an OL, Research Reactors, Fuel Facilities and Priority I Material Licensees
80-20	Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse Unit 1 While in Refueling Mode	5/8/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-21	Anchorage and Support of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment	5/16/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-22	Breakdown in Contamination Control Systems	5/28/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL