



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-302/80-22

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation  
P. O. Box 14042, Mail Stop C-4  
St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

Facility Name: Crystal River 3

Docket No. 50-302

License No. DPR-72

Inspection at Crystal River plant site near Crystal River, Florida

Inspector: C. M. Upright for  
P. T. Burnett

5/16/80  
Date Signed

Approved by: C. M. Upright  
C. M. Upright, Acting Section Chief, RONS Branch

5/16/80  
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on April 28 - May 2, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine, announced inspection involved 31 inspector-hours on site.

The areas inspected included refueling and related surveillance activities and licensee response to IE bulletins.

Results

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Employees

- \*D. C. Poole, Nuclear Plant Manager
- \*P. F. McKee, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
- \*G. R. Westafer, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent
- \*T. C. Lutkehaus, Technical Services Superintendent
- J. Cooper, QA/QC Manager
- \*K. F. Lancaster, Nuclear Compliance Supervisor
- \*G. M. Williams, Nuclear QA/QC Supervisor
- M. E. Collins, Reactor Specialist
- \*J. L. Bufe, Nuclear Compliance Auditor

Other licensee employees contacted included two shift supervisors, four technicians, four operators, three security force members, and four office personnel.

#### Other Organizations

- C. F. Wreath, Southern Science Applications, Inc.
- R. D. Keller, Southern Science Applications, Inc.

#### NRC Resident Inspector

- \*B. W. Smith

#### \*Attended exit interview

### 2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 2, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee made a commitment not to hoist fuel assemblies at speeds in excess of that specified by the fuel vendor and to modify the auxiliary hoist on the fuel building crane to meet that speed limit before it is again used to move fuel. The inspector pointed out that although the main hoist on the fuel building crane moves at less than the speed limit, its use to move fuel posed another problem: The mass of the lower block far exceeds that of the fuel bundle and interferences that could damage the fuel would be a very small fraction of the suspended load and, hence, might not be observed or otherwise detected.

The licensee's actions in response to IE Bulletin 79-21 are discussed in Paragraph 7. At the end of the interview the licensee provided the inspector with additional written information for in-office review. That review and telephone conversations with the licensee on May 6 and May 7, 1980 led to the licensee making further commitments to revise EP-106 and their response to IEB 79-21 by May 26, 1980 (See Paragraph 7)

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 6.

5. Refueling Activities

The "Refuel Log Book" was reviewed beginning with the first entry on April 19, 1980 to the end of the fuel shuffle on April 27th and core verification on April 28th. The "Fuel/Control Component Move Sheets" and "CR-3 Core Map Check Form" of procedure FP-203, "Refueling Procedure" were reviewed in concert with the review of the log. Following discussion of these documents with the reactor specialist the inspector had no further questions.

6. Surveillance Activities

The inspector reviewed some of the surveillance procedures that are specific to operation in modes 5 and 6. The following procedures were found to have been acceptably performed with adequate frequency:

- SP-220 Source Range Functional tests during Refueling Operations,
- SP-346 Containment Penetrations Weekly Check during Refuel (Since the last scheduled performance of this procedure on 4/26/80 it has been revised to require that more observations be recorded on data sheets.),
- SP-406 Refueling Operations Daily Data Requirements,
- SP-531 Spent Fuel Handling Bridge Interlock Surveillance,
- SP-532 Reactor Building Main and Auxiliary Bridges Interlock Surveillance, and
- SP-670 Reactor Building Fuel Handling Bridge Load Test.

Late in the inspection, SP-321, Power Distribution Breaker Alignment and Power Availability, was reviewed. The frequency of performance was acceptable. However, notes in the completed procedures indicated that certain breaker positions were different from those required by the procedure because the offsite power source was different from normal. The issue of whether the changes to the procedure are substantive and should have been reviewed by the PRC prior to implementation has been identified as unresolved item 80-22-01. Since the issue also encompasses the licensee's compliance with technical specifications 4.8.2.2 and 4.8.2.4.1, it is being actively pursued by the senior resident inspector.

7. Bulletin Followup

IE Bulletin 79-21 addressed temperature effects on level measurements. The licensee responded to the bulletin on September 17, 1979. That response indicated three areas where procedure modifications, supplementary instructions or additional operator training would be necessary. The following procedures were reviewed for content:

AP-116, Pressurizer System Abnormal Conditions,

EP-105, Steam Supply Systems Rupture and,

EP-106, Loss of REactor Coolant or Reactor Collant Pressure.

Although all had been recently revised, none addressed the concerns of IEB 79-21 or the actions implied by the licensee's response to it. From further discussion the inspector learned that the licensee had interpreted an NSSS vendor letter dated October 19, 1979 to mean that no action on their part, beyond training already performed, was required to address the concerns of the bulletin.

The vendor letter was not immediately at hand. A copy was provided to the inspector after the exit interview. In-office review of the letter by Region II inspectors led them to different conclusions. Their concerns related to pressurizer level errors and protection of pressurizer heaters were communicated to the licensee in a telephone conversation on May 6, 1980. In a further telephone conversation on May 7 the licensee made commitments to appropriately revise EP-106 by May 26, 1980 and to revise their response to IEB 79-21 by the same date. These commitments will be tracked as inspector follow-up items 80-22-02 and 80-22-03 respectively.