

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-13/1T-1Report Date

Update Report - June 16, 1980
Previous Report Date - March 24, 1980

Occurrence Date

March 9, 1980

Identification of Occurrence

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraphs 3.4.A.7.b and 3.12.B.3.A, when the Fire Suppression Water System was removed from service to replace valve V-9-4.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.(9).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was shutdown for a refueling/maintenance outage.

The reactor was subcritical.
The reactor mode switch was locked in shutdown.
The cavity was flooded.

Description of Occurrence

On Sunday, March 9, 1980, the Fire Suppression Water System was removed from service to replace Fire Diesel Pump 1-1 discharge valve V-9-4 which was discovered during a surveillance test to have a crack in the valve body. The NRC was notified on Friday, March 7, 1980, of the plans to remove the Fire System from service to repair V-9-4.

The Fire Suppression Water System was planned to be out of service for 12 hours. Actual time was only 5-1/2 hours. The preplanning included the reactor mode switch to be locked in the shutdown position. An administrative hold was placed on all work being performed on any reactor system that could inadvertently lower the water level to below 4'8" above the top of the core. A roving fire watch patrolled and documented inspections at 2 hour intervals in all areas required by the Technical Specification. All welding, burning and grinding operations

were prohibited. A fire truck pumper supplied by local fire department was used as a back-up supply of fire water. The pumper would use sea water from the discharge canal and enter the system via hydrant #2. The pumper was only to be used if the Group Shift Supervisor required the Water Suppression System to handle an emergency condition. Startup banks S1A and S1B were in service and electrical buses A, B, C and D were all energized.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of this occurrence is attributed to component failure. The 10" long through wall crack in V-9-4 was attributed to excessive stress between the flange and valve body area. The crack occurred approximately 1 week after increasing the relief valve set point (operating pressure) from 150 psi to 180 psi. At the higher relief valve setting, increased piping vibration was observed which increased the stress on this valve body.

Analysis of Occurrence

This job was preplanned to prevent unexpected failure of the fire system. The temporary Fire Water Suppression System, in addition to the fire watches and other precautions taken throughout the plant, minimized the safety significance of this event. Upon completion of the job and successful testing, the Fire Water Suppression System was returned to service.

Corrective Action

Valve V-9-4 was removed and replaced with a new valve. The relief valve setting was returned to 150 psi.

Failure Data

Size: 10"
Type: Gate
Vendor: Kennedy Valve