U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1 (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE — LICENSE NUMBER — LICENSE TYPE — CAT

/0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/5/2/0/8/0/ (8) /0/6/1/8/8/0 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER — EVENT DATE — REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / In order to perform maintenance on a leaking drain valve, one of two flow paths /
/0/3/ / from the Refueling Chemical Addition Tank to the RWST was isolated. This is /
/0/4/ / contrary to T.S. 3.6.2.3 and is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. The /
/0/5/ / Train A flow path was isolated. Since the Train B flow path was operable, and /
/0/6/ / the Train A flow path was returned to operable status in 4 hours, the public /
/0/7/ / health and safety were not affected. /
/0/8/ / /

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/	/S/B/ (11)	/E/ (12)	/B/ (13)	/V/A/L/V/E/X/ (14)	/E/ (15)	/P/ (16)

	LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
(17)	/8/0/	/-/ /0/4/8/	/ \ /	/0/3/	/L/	/-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/B/ (18)	/Z/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/A/ (25)	/V/0/8/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / A drain valve leak through the valve packing and by the valve seat required /
/1/1/ / removal of the drain valve for maintenance. The drain valve seat was lapped, /
/1/2/ / the packing adjusted, and the valve was reinstalled. No further corrective /
/1/3/ / actions are required. /
/1/4/ / /

	FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/	/E/ (28)	/1/0/0/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/A/ (31)	/ OPERATOR OBSERVATION /

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/	/Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/	/0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/	/0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/	/Z/ (42)	/ NA /

	PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/	/N/ (44)	/ NA / 8006230509	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

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Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit #1 Attachment: Page 1 of 1
Docket No. 50-338
Report No. LER 80-048/03L-0

Description of Event

A piping connection between the refueling water chemical addition tank and the refueling water storage tank allows sodium hydroxide solution to flow, by gravity, from the refueling water chemical addition tank to the refueling water storage tank. The flow line splits into two branch lines down stream of the refueling chemical addition tank which recombine prior to entering the refueling water storage tank. Each branch line is isolated by a motor operated valve which opens after a 5 minute time delay following a quench spray pump start or a containment depressurization signal. One valve receives a Train A signal and the other receives a Train B signal for complete redundancy. On May 20, 1980, during 100% power operation, the Train A motor operated valve, MOV-QS-102A, was electrically isolated while in the closed position and a manual isolation valve, 1-QS-34, on the same branch line was closed in order to remove a leaking drain valve for maintenance. This action degraded the reliability of the refueling water chemical addition system and is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Since the Train B flow path was operable, and the Train A flow path was returned to operable status in 4 hours, the public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

A drain valve leak through the valve packing and by the valve seat required removal of the drain valve for maintenance. In order to remove the valve the Train A flow path had to be isolated.

Immediate Corrective Action

The drain valve was removed, the valve seat lapped and the packing adjusted. The valve was reinstalled and the normal Train A flow path restored to operable status. The Train A flow path was inoperable for 4 hours.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No scheduled corrective actions are required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No actions to prevent recurrence are required.