

Letter from Florida Power Corporation, J. T. Rodgers,  
dated August 8, 1973 - 50-302 - ROB 73-2


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**Florida  
Power**  
CORPORATION

August 8, 1973

The Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
Region II - Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, Northeast  
Atlanta, GA 30303

IN RE: FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION  
CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT  
DOCKET NO. 50-302

Dear Sir:

As requested in your July 13, 1973 letter concerning Directorate of Regulatory Operation - Bulletin No. 73-2, "Malfunction of Containment Purge Supply Valve Switch," we have reviewed the design of the control circuit for the containment ventilation system isolation valves installed at our Crystal River facility to determine whether the failure of a single control switch could result in the simultaneous failure of the redundant supply valves or redundant exhaust valves. The results of our review are as follows:

References: GAI Flow Diagram BS-302-76  
GAI Logic Diagrams AH-23, 24, 24A  
(S-203-005) AH-25, 25A, 26  
GAI Elementary Diagrams AH-35, 24, 25  
(B-208-005)

AHV-1A and AHV-10, the outside Reactor Building Containment Purge Valves, are operated by dual solenoids which are energized to open and fail closed. In the event that a switch contact block would fail causing the valves to remain energized and an RB isolation signal was initiated, the valve would close since the RS isolation signal is in series with the switch and opening the circuit anywhere causes the valve to close. In addition, there are local pushbuttons near the valve to open or close the valve if required. The normal switch is located on the ES section of the control board.

The Director

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
August 8, 1973

AHV-1B and AHV-1C, the inside Reactor Building Containment Purge Valves are operated by motor operated valves. If the switch becomes defective, thus preventing closure of the valve, two alternatives are left. If a containment isolation signal is initiated, this circuitry bypasses the switch and will close the valve. In addition, there are pushbuttons located at the motor control center to close the valve.

In summary, we are protected against this type of failure at Crystal River Unit #3.

Please contact us if any clarification or further discussion is required.

Very truly yours,



J. T. Rodgers  
Assistant Vice President

JTR/ns