



SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. Report No. 50-302/78-007/01T-0
2. Facility: Crystal River Unit #3
3. Report Date: 6 February 1978
4. Occurrence Date: 4 February 1978
5. Identification of Occurrence:

The engineered safety feature response time for feedwater isolation valve FWV-15 was greater than 34 seconds contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.2.1, Table 3.3-5.

6. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Mode 3 hot standby operation.

7. Description of Occurrence:

At 0400 during the performance of SP-136, engineered safeguards actuation systems sensor response time test, it was determined that feedwater isolation valve FWV-15 stroke time was greater than the required 34 seconds. The stroke time was 89 seconds. The valve was immediately closed (ES actuation position). The valve operator was renewed with the correct model operator under Work Request #0-6141 and verified operable, (with a 27.5 seconds stroke time) prior to removing the "B" feedwater train from isolation.

8. Designation of Apparent Cause:

The cause of this event was the original installation of a valve operator with 89 second closure time on FWV-15. Subsequent to original installation, the steam rupture matrix was incorporated into the ES actuation scheme with stroke time requirement of FWV-14 and 15 changed to less than 34 seconds. The valve operator for FWV-15 was not changed.

9. Analysis of Occurrence:

During plant operation to date, there has been no occasion requiring feedwater isolation. Therefore, the safety implications of this occurrence were minimal as redundant feedwater isolation valve FWV-30 was verified operable.

10. Corrective Action:

The successful completion of testing of the complete Steam Rupture Matrix Surveillance Procedure assures that this occurrence was an isolated instance. Recurrence is therefore precluded.

11. Failure Data:

This is the first occurrence of this type of event.