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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT C 6201 S Street, Box 15830, Sacramento, California 9581.3; (916) 452-3211

April 16, 1976

Mr. R. H. Engelken Director of Regulatory Operations Region V, NRC Operations Office 1990 N. California Boulevard Walnut Creek Plaza, Suite 202 Walnut Creek, California 94596

> Re: Operating License DPR-54 Docket No. 50-312 Reportable Occurrence 76-4

Dear Mr. Engelken:

As defined by Technical Specifications for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Section 6.9.1, and Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4, Section C.2.a.5, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District hereby submits a written follow-up report on Reportable Occurrence 76-4, reported to NRC on April 6, 1976.

As described in the April 6 transmittal, a calibration check of the Reactor Protection System pressure transmitters on April 5, 1976, revealed that all four transmitters had drifted beyond the 4 psi accuracy allowed in the safety analysis. Three of the transmitters had drifted high (1 psi, 1.2 psi and 4.9 psi beyond the 4 psi tolerance) which would have prevented a reactor trip on low pressure at the Technical Specification limit of 1900 psi. The fourth transmitter had drifted low (2.2 psi beyond the 4 psi tolerance) which by itself would not have prevented a trip on high pressure; the three other channels would have tripped prior to the system reaching the Technical Specification limit of 2355 psi.

On two previous occasions the District has reported excessive drift in these pressure transmitters. Abnormal Occurrence Report 75-3 dated March 11, 1975, reported one transmitter out of calibration and stated that the calibration of the remaining transmitters would be checked within sixty days. On April 4, 1975, Abnormal Occurrence Report 75-4 described the drift of three transmitters beyond the tolerance limits. As a corrective action for the problem, a biweekly check was instituted by which drift could be determined, providing an alert prior to exceeding of specification limits. On March 18, 1976, during one of these biweekly checks, it was observed that the drift on the transmitters had increased, possibly beyond the permissible 4 psi limit. During the scheduled shutdown two weeks later, a calibration check was made and the excessive drift was discovered.

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## Mr. R. H. Engelken

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Based on the drift of 0.8 psi/month allowed by the manufacturers' specifications, the high and low RPS pressure trip setpoints will be set 10 psi more conservative. This action should prevent drift outside the limits during the period between refueling calibrations. An equivalent correction will be applied to the variable low RCS pressure/temperature trip. Also, the biweekly check for drift, which was successful in identifying the instance of excessive drift, will be continued. A new reference point will be established with each startup. The refueling interval calibration, setting a null point with a deadweight gauge, will be continued as described in AO 75-4.

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The NRC is currently conferring with Florida Power Corporation about the RPS pressure trip setpoints for their Crystal River Plant. The reactor vendor, Babcock & Wilcox, maintains that the pressure related trip setpoints required for their plants include 30 psi of conservatism for instrument string error. The setpoints actually used in the Final Safety Analysis Report used the 30 psi margin and the Technical Specification trip settings can be relaxed accordingly. Babcock & Wilcox considers this a generic issue for its plants, including Rancho Seco, and if their position is upheld, the drift experienced by our four transmitters would be acceptable. The final determination of action on this problem will be delayed pending resolution of this issue.

The pressure transmitters are Veritrak Model No. 59 PH 443-7050, manufactured by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Veritrak Products, Phoenix, Arizona.

There was no transient associated with this occurrence.

Respectfully Submitted,

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J.J. Mattimoe Assistant General Manager and Chief Engineer

JJM:RWC:sal