

NOV 28 1973

POOR ORIGINAL

N. C. Moseley, Director
of Region II
Regulatory Operations

Docket Nos. 50-269
50-270
50-287

CORRESPONDENCE FROM CHARLES W. PARROTT, III - PIEDMONT ORGANIC MOVEMENT

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated November 12, 1973, with enclosure, from Mr. Charles W. Parrott, III, President, Piedmont Organic Movement, to Congressman James R. Mann. Also enclosed is a copy of a letter dated November 8, 1973, from Congressman Mann to Mr. Parrott. Copies of these documents were sent to Region II by facsimile on November 26, 1973. We previously forwarded to you on November 21, 1973, a copy of a letter dated October 11, 1973, from Parrott to D. F. Knuth and a partial draft reply to this letter together with documents to be transmitted to Mr. Parrott.

All correspondence relating to this matter has been sent to the PDR and the local PDR including Parrott's letter of November 12, 1973, to Congressman Mann. Therefore, in your documentation, you may make reference to any of the correspondence.

J. G. Davis

John G. Davis, Deputy Director
for Field Operations
Directorate of Regulatory Operations

Enclosures:
Cpy of ltr to Cong. Mann
fr C. W. Parrott, dtd 11/12/73 w/encl.

cc: RO Files
IR Central Files

OFFICE	RO:FS/EB	RO:FS/EB,C	RO:DD/FO						
SURNAME	<i>SCA</i> RCPAULUS:DAS	<i>DAS</i> HUTTENBURG	<i>JGD</i> JGDALTS						
DATE	11/27/73	11-27-73	11/27						

PIEDMONT ORGANIC MOVEMENT

714 S. Line Street
Greer, S. C. 29551

November 12, 1973

Honorable James R. Mann
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

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Dear Mr. Mann:

Thank you for your letter dtd. November 8, 1973 and the enclosures. I have just quickly read the article from Congressional Quarterly and will read it more thoroughly later. I feel this whole issue is so important that I wanted to get this letter off to you.

In regard to Dr. Knuth's reply to your inquiry, I was called three times by a Ms. Myrna Steel of the Directorate of Regulatory Operations, United States Atomic Energy Commission. The first call was to advise me that my request had been received, and that she would contact me again, concerning this. The second call was to advise me that the material was being gathered, and to discuss these matters. Unfortunately, I was on my way out the door when she called, and we only got to talk for a few minutes. She said she said she would call later, and she did.

In this third conversation, which was rather lengthy, we discussed some of the problems at Oconee. Items 1 and 4 on the enclosed list. At this time, I was unaware of the other items, or even of all the information presented on item 4 in the list. I was assured that these matters would be looked into, and that I probably would be contacted within a week from someone from the AEC in this region. A name was mentioned, but as I didn't make notes, I cannot recall it. I was also advised that it may take some time to gather the material.

While I have not yet received any of the material, I am not concerned about this, for I realize this sort of thing takes time. And after our conversation, I felt much relieved and encouraged, for Ms. Steel was very frank and honest with me. And I wrote Ms. Steel a letter, concerning some of the subjects we discussed.

My concern that prompted me to wire the Honorable Melvin Price stemmed from the fact that no follow-up on Ms. Steel's call came, and my subsequent knowledge of the other events listed on the enclosed sheets. Please note that I do not doubt Ms. Steel's sincerity, but the thought has crossed my mind that others in the AEC may not feel as she does. Hopefully, this is not the case.

Since Oconee has been in operation for less than a year, and is a "first of a kind", it should not be considered more or less than a giant experimental reactor. And if the incidents listed did in fact occur in the short space of time this station has been on stream, then our future with this reactor(s) does not look too bright.

It is for these reasons that I feel an immediate and public investigation of Oconee Nuclear Station is in the best public interest.

I would like to mention one other item that does not tend to inspire confidence in the nuclear industry, and were it not for the seriousness of these matters, would

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.. provide some comic relief.

Sometime ago, I wrote the Directorate of Licensing, U. S. AEC for a copy of "Safety Evaluation by the Directorate of Licensing U. S. Atomic Energy Commission in the Matter of Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3", docket nos. 50-270/287. I received this just last week, and have given it much study. I would like to quote from this official document, page 7-7 and 7-8: "This correlation was the best available for pool film boiling from vertical surfaces. It was derived from a theoretical model of the stable annular flow regime as compared to the dispersed flow film boiling regime, and therefore it was conservative in this regard. The correlation underpredicted the available data for pool film boiling from vertical surface for a variety of fluids. The Dittus-Boelter correlation*** was used for that part of the core covered by steam."

I was suitably impressed, until I looked up the*** and discovered the Dittus-Boelter correlation was a study done in England in 1930, titled "Heat Transfer in Automobile Radiators of the Tube Type". Perhaps we can hope parts from a 1930 automobile radiator are not in use at Oconee. But they did use the report....

I liken the above to predicting the flight characteristics of a modern military jet aircraft by citing a 1930 report on "The Effects of Thermals on a Film-Covered Model Aeroplane Released at a Height of Fifty Meters".


Thanking you for your attention and concern in this matter, I remain,

CWP/hnp

Enc: 1

cc: Honorable Ernest F. Hollings
Dr. Donald F. Knuth

Respectfully,


Charles W. Parrott III
President, Piedmont
Organic Movement

1. CONFIRMED:

On August 22, 1973, two workers at Duke Power Company's Oconee Nuclear Station, Mr. Furman Lark and Mr. William Holcombe, were sent to repair a leaky valve on the pressurizer of Unit #1. Radioactive boric acid crystals had formed on the valve body. The workers had placed a wrench on the valve and were striking the wrench with a hammer in order to loosen the valve. A news account of this incident reported that they were trying to tighten the valve. In either case, the boric acid crystals were inhaled by the workers. Why they were not wearing protective masks at the time is not known. The workers were checking themselves at a monitoring station, and one man happened to pass the probe under his nose, and got a reading on the instrument. Particles of radioactive boron was found in their nose hairs. These men were sent to Illinois for a whole body count. According to the news items, which didn't appear until Oct. 17 and 18 in the Greenville Piedmont, page 14, and the Greenville News, page 9 (respectively), they received "6% of the radiation exposure permitted by federal codes", or 300 millirems. Federal "codes" for nuclear workers is 5,000 mrem per year. Whether or not any radioactive crystals were carried outside the containment structure is unknown.

2. UNCONFIRMED, BUT LIKELY TO BE ON RECORD:

During hot functional testing of Oconee Unit #2, the secondary side of the primary coolant system was being pressurized for test purposes. As the pressure built up, a valve was commanded to close, to limit or shut-off the pressure. It failed to close. A second valve, in series with the first for safety purposes was then sent a "close" signal. It also failed. As the pressure in the secondary or steam side of the steam generator built up, a worker, Mr. Terry Campbell of Seneca, S. C. was sent to manually close the valve(s). Campbell was unable to close the valves manually, and in the process of carrying out his assignment, the rupture disk, installed in the quench tank functioned normally. The rupture disk is designed to rupture when pressures exceed a safe limit, to prevent breaching of secondary system components. The quench tank is located in the containment building, as are the valves Campbell was trying to close.

Upon rupture, live steam was released in the containment building, scalding Campbell. He suffered 1st, 2nd and 3rd degree burns over most of his body. This happened sometime in August, 1973. At last report, in November, 1973, Terry Campbell was still in the hospital.

3. UNCONFIRMED, BUT LIKELY TO BE ON RECORD:

The following information was brought out in a routine employee's meeting (Monday Morning Meeting) at Oconee. This meeting was held approximately around the 1st of October, 1973. While releasing radioactive gas of an unknown nature, a local temperature inversion occurred. This caused the gas to be carried down to the level of the intake of the air conditioner for the control room of Unit #1, and drawn into the building. The control room employees began to get radioactive readings from their polyester pants, around the knee area. It was determined that static electricity attracted the radioactive particles to the fabric. It is not known what isotope was involved, other than it had a short half-life, having decayed below detection by the next day. It is thought Mr. Ollie Bradham, Instrument Department Head conducted this meeting.

4. UNCONFIRMED, BUT LIKELY TO BE ON RECORD:

At another Monday Morning Meeting, Mr. Ollie Bradham, Department Head advised the employees that Keowee (hydro-electric pumped storage station located on-site) was being run in order to dilute waste water (rumored and thought to be radioactive) generated by Unit #1 that was being dumped into the feed-waters of Lake Hartwell, South Carolina. (Hartwell supplies drinking water for Clemson University, Clemson, S. C., Pendleton, S. C. and Anderson, S. C. Data provided by Duke Power Company indicates that these users withdraw about 4.8 million gallons of water per day from Lake Hartwell) The reason for this is because the station evaporator(s) have proved inadequate to handle the amounts of waste water generated by Unit #1. More waste water was being accumulated than could be shipped off-site. So some of it was dumped into the lake. Another evaporator is planned for Oconee, to handle the excess waste water. One source says it is now definitely going to be built, while an Oconee spokesman, Mr. George Cago, Assistant Operations Engineer told us it is still in the "planning and thinking stages". We have been unable to obtain any information as to the

radioactivity, if any, and amounts of this waste water.

5. UNCONFIRMED, BUT MAY BE ON RECORD:

This happened on a Saturday in early summer, 1973: A radioactive material transport truck, of the tank-trailer type from Aiken, S. C, was being loaded at Oconee. The tractor was removed, and the trailer was resting on its front dolly wheels, on an asphalt surface. As the tank was being filled, the dolly wheels sank into the asphalt. It is not known if a spill occurred, or how much of what if it did. What is known is that the trailer had to be jacked-up to allow the tractor to re-connect to the trailer. And our sources report "a multitude of officials running around with monitors". This took place between the Administrative Building and Unit #1, just a short distance from the equipment hatch.

6. UNCONFIRMED, AND PROBABLY NOT ON RECORD:

A waste transport tank truck backed-up behind Unit #1. It was empty. From 100 feet away, it set off monitors inside the building, even though the doors were closed. Three different sources confirmed this. It took the workers about 30 to 45 minutes to determine the source of radioactivity. It was finally pinpointed to the truck.

7. ABSTRACTS:

We have been told that the radioactivity in Unit #1 has gone up, due to a suspected damaged fuel rod or rods. No further information on this has been obtained to date. However, it is now considered almost normal for a pressurized-water reactor to operate with one or more damaged fuel rods. And we have been told by one source that an additional evaporator will be built to handle the excess waste water. Another source informed us this was still in the planning stage (see item 4). Since the fuel densification reports are considered "proprietary", there is little hope the public will ever get to review this important information. It is "proprietary" in the sense it may contain information that would release "trade secrets" of the companies involved. Our feelings are that since this information may contain information that could affect the lives and health of a very large number of American Citizens, it belongs to them, and to with-hold this information is not only not in the public interest, but criminal as well.

JAMES R. MANN
4TH DISTRICT, SOUTH CAROLINA

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SPARTANBURG

Congress of the United States
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COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE ON
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DISTRICT OFFICES:
FEDERAL BUILDING
GREENVILLE

FEDERAL BUILDING
SPARTANBURG

November 8, 1973

Mr. Charles W. Parrott, III
President, Piedmont Organic Movement
714 South Line Street
Greer, South Carolina 29651

Dear Mr. Parrott,


I have referred your telegrams of 7 November 1973 to the Atomic Energy Commission for comment, and will forward their reply on receipt.

Donald Knuth of the AEC meanwhile informed me (see enclosed letter) that he has contacted you concerning the August 22nd incident at the Oconee Station. Let me know if I can follow up on this matter for you.

Also enclosed for your reference is an article from Congressional Quarterly, September 29, 1973, concerning the hearings on nuclear reactor plant safety which I have mentioned in previous correspondence.

Thank you for your continued interest in this matter.

Sincerely,


JAMES R. MANN
Member of Congress

JRM/rj
Enclosures