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Docket Nos. 00-269 50-270 and 50-287

Note to Files:

Discussions with Duke Power and RO Region II regarding the January 5, 1974 experience at Unit 2 has resulted in the following additional information and correction of facts. (See Note to Files 1/10/74).

- Duke has isolated and corrected the cause of the switchyard fault which caused the loss of offsite power. (Faulty shield grounds in cables in blackout logic circuits.)
- The reactor tripped on high pressure rather than loss-of-flow because of the turbine trip. Subsequent loss-of-flow resulted from turbine trip causing switch of primary pumps from unit to startup transformer.
- 3. Keowee and Lee station power cannot be used to power primary pumps since they are on emergency buses only.
- One primary pump was restarted (after offsite power had been restored) in about an hour after trip.
- Probable cause of excessive cooldown rate in natural circulation mode may have been the fact that Unit 2 steam was being used elsewhere in the plant.
- All shutdown systems worked properly including emergency feedwater pump. (Emergency feedwater controls are on emergency power; main feedwater controls are not. Both systems are steam driven.)
- 7. The cause of the turbine trip is scill unknown.
- 8. Duke's Nuclear Safety Review Committee, Station Review Committee and B&W have reviewed the indication of the small metalic object in the vessel bottom head and have concluded that it is safe to return to the 75% power plateau for continued testing. Neutron noise conjusts will be performed at the 40% power plateau on the way up.

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9. At this time RO and L are treating this matter as an unreviewed safety item until Duke provides a report for our review.

L. Q. Pettier I. A. Peltier, LPM

cc: VAMoore ASchwencer IAPeltier