

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report No.: UE-269/75-5

Report Date: May 7, 1975

Event Date: April 3, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Operation of low pressure service water pump with suction valve shut

Conditions Prior to Event: Unit at 65 percent full power

Description of Event:

On April 2, 1975, the Oconee Unit 1 B low pressure service water (LPSW) pump was returned to service following cleaning and inspection of the pump motor. At 0650, April 3, 1975, the control operator observed low amperage readings on the B LPSW pump motor and noted that pump suction valve LPSW-3 was shut. The B LPSW pump was stopped and the C LPSW pump was immediately started.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

On April 1, 1975, the B LPSW pump was removed from service for motor maintenance. An "Out of Normal Checklist" was prepared and listed the breaker for valve LPSW-3 as being open; however, the valve itself was not listed as being closed. The pump was returned to service and the breaker for LPSW-3 was closed but the valve was not opened. The pump was placed in service and its parameters (bearing temperature, pressure, etc.) were monitored since maintenance had been performed. Motor amperage was not monitored because this reading would not have been affected by this maintenance. The apparent cause of this event was the failure to properly complete the "Out of Normal Checklist."

Analysis of Event:

The Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) system provides normal and emergency cooling for components in the Turbine Building, Reactor Building, and Auxiliary Building. The LPSW system serves the engineered safeguards function of removing heat from the low pressure injection coolers and the Reactor Building Cooling System. The LPSW system consists of three pumps for Unit 1 and 2 and two pumps for Unit 3. There is a manual cross connection on the supply headers between Units 1 and 2, and Unit 3. One LPSW pump per unit is required for normal operations. The normal operating requirements are greater than the emergency requirements following a loss-coolant accident. This incident resulted in the loss of one LPSW pump but

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did not affect the two redundant operable LPSW pumps nor the cross connect to Oconee Unit 3. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The pump was vented and returned to service. The pump and motor parameters were monitored closely and indicate that performance is satisfactory. The Superintendent of Operations has emphasized to shift supervisors the need and importance for completeness in using the "Out of Normal Checklist."