

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report No.: RO-269/76-18

Report Date: December 6, 1976

Occurrence Date: November 21, 1976

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Vent particulate monitor inoperable during gaseous waste tank release

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit in cold shutdown

Description of Occurrence:

On November 21, 1976, a routine controlled gaseous waste release was made from the "1D" gaseous waste decay tank to the unit vent. The release lasted 5 hours, 34 minutes. On November 22, 1976, it was determined that RIA-43, the particulate monitor in the unit vent, was inoperable and had been inoperable during the November 21, 1976 gaseous waste tank release. Oconee Technical Specification 3.10.4.a requires the unit vent particulate monitor to be operable during the release of radioactive gaseous waste from the gaseous waste tanks to the unit vent.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The unit vent particulate monitor, RIA-43, failed due to a burned out capacitor in the log-rate meter card and its operability was not verified prior to the gaseous waste release.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The purpose of the unit vent particulate monitor, RIA-43, is to provide a record of air particulate activity by monitoring a moving filter paper through which a vent air sample has been passed. RIA-43 is checked daily for operability, but in this incident the monitor failed after the daily check. RIA-43 alarms upon detection of a high radioactivity level. The release is terminated by either waste gas release monitor, RIA-37 and -38, or the wide range gaseous activity monitors in the unit vent, RIA-45 and 46, when a high radiation level is indicated. The isolation and sampling of the gaseous waste decay tank prior to each release, as required by Technical Specification 3.10.9, also protects against uncontrolled releases. The GWD tank sample taken prior to this release was processed through an absolute particle filter and the particle activities were well within station objectives. It is therefore concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action:

The burned out capacitor in RIA-43 was replaced and the gaseous waste disposal procedure has been changed to include a sign off step verifying the operability of RIA-43 and 44 prior to a gaseous waste tank release. It is felt that this corrective action will prevent recurrence of this incident.

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