

Exhibit 3

Exemptions: Introduction.

2.1.3 Overview of Permanently Defueled Emergency Plans.

No support services are identified for Cumberland, Lebanon or York Counties of the Cities of Harrisburg (12 miles from Three Mile Island (“TMI”); population 49,000), Lancaster (25 miles from TMI; population 60,000), and York, (25 miles from TMI; population 44,000).

The City of Lancaster, which is south of TMI, depends on the water supply from the Susquehanna River, and is south of TMI.

Support services are not identified, but listed “as appropriate.”

2.6 State and Local Government Notification and Response.

This section failed to acknowledge or review if communications have improved since November, 2009 when 150 workers were contaminated. Both Dauphin County and Governor Rendell complained about the lack of communication from Exelon. It took Exelon five hours to notify Mayor Robert Reid of Middletown.

2.8 Technical Support.

This section failed to acknowledge or review the history of communication failures in the region. The breakdown in communication during the St. Valentines Day blizzard in 2007, left thousands of motorists stranded on Interstate 78 and 81. There was a total collapse of interagency cooperation during that transportation disaster which resulted in scathing rebuke from Former FEMA Director, Jamie Lee Witt. (Enclosure).

Technical Support.

This section failed to acknowledge that Emergency Operations Facility (“EOF”) is located sixty miles away in Coatesville. (Enclosure).

2.9 Mitigation of Consequences of Beyond Design Basis Events. This section fails to account for the adjustment of available surface water use. The Susquehanna River Basin Commission plans to address this issue in 2020.

Page 8. Population and Population Distribution.

This section fails to account for the Borough of Middletown (population 9,270; three miles from Three Mile Island), Frey Village: Diakon Senior Living Services (136 beds; four miles from TMI), Harrisburg International Airport (1,400 employees; four miles from TMI), Middletown Area School District (656 students; six miles from TMI), and Pennsylvania State University Harrisburg (256 staff; 5,000 students; four miles from TMI).

This section fails to account for large worker populations off of Fulling Mill Road and Route 283 that include, but are not limited to the Pennsylvania Lottery, Phoenix Contact, Vibra Health Plan, Vizo Federal Credit Union, and Wolf Steel.

These facilities are located in close proximity to the Lower Swatara Township Fire Department. (Please refer to the LAR, p. 3)

Page 9: The LAR fails to inventorize the cargo traveling 2,000 feet from TMI, and minimizes the risk of liquified gas. The study limited their analysis of gas by dismissing an accident “as less damaging than the postulated air strike against which the plant is protected...” There was no commentary on the transportation of chemicals, fertilizer, hazardous waste, medical waste, etc.

5.2.1 Radiological Monitors.

This section does not catalogue radiation monitors, which are scheduled to be checked annually. (Section 11). Off site atmospheric monitoring has no real time capacity and depends on TLDs. Effluent monitoring is not in place for tritium plumes which have been located onsite. Moreover, Exelon does not possess onsite filter analyzing capability.

7.1 Normal Facility Organization.

The staffing on site is skeletal and inadequate for the site with “monitoring” responsibilities for TMI-1 and TMI-2. There is no Health Physicist, Certified Reactor Operator or trouble shooter required.

7.1.2. and 7.1.3. Rather than employing a Certified Reactor Operator, Exelon relies on a Non-Certified Operator . He is supported by a Radiation Protection Technician rather than a Health Physicist.

7.2 The power to initiate an emergency resides solely in the hands of the Emergency Director, without a default plan or crisis manger in place,

7.2.3 Local services are based exclusively on contract agreements that are limited in scope, and as evidenced by Appendix 4, leave the Cities of Harrisburg, Lancaster, and York, counties of Cumberland, Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon, school districts of Central Dauphin, Harrisburg, Hershey, Lower Dauphin, Middletown, Northeastern, West Shore, York, and the Borough of Middletown, Harrisburg International Airport, and PSU Harrisburg, exposed and without a plan of action.

This plan is less than adequate and provides no planning for communities outside the fence line.

Please note that neither the EOF or Exelon’s corporate management are not included in the Communication tests as discussed 11.1.2.

7.2.4 Recovery Organization.

Please refer to comments regarding 7.1 and 7.2.

Coordination with State Government Authorities.

Please refer to discussion on the relocation of the EOF.

7.3 Coordination with State Government Authorities.

Exelon's accident scenario presumes that an evacuation at TM I will occur during the week, when the roads are clear, the weather is mild, staff is not off for hunting or vacation (no remote signal access), and there is a full-time support staff at home.

Initial Radiation Dose Projection.

This section provides no baseline data, nor does it define the method for quickly determining...radiological conditions..." In fact the system is dependent on "self-reading dosimeters."

9.3.1 Site Personnel Accountability.

This section provided no accountability guidelines other than completion is required with 60 minutes.

9.3.3 Site Egress Control Methods.

This action can not be enforced. There are no security pill boxes and the booths left behind are unguarded. The North and South Gate entrances are unguarded without communication apparatus.

9.3.3. Contamination Control and Decontamination Capability.

This section is general and vague and offers no specific guidance or instructions.

9. 4.1 Offsite Hospital and Medical Services.

Hershey Medical can treat no more than two contaminated patients at a time.

9.4.3 Medical Service Facilities.

This section failed to research capacity. Please refer earlier discussion.

9.5.2 Emergency Radiation Protection Program.

The 45 year old age barrier is unenforceable, and there is no backup plan.

Voluntary exposure to dose levels above 25 Rem is illegal.

Sacrificing workers for the greater good of large populations is illegal and unethical.

The LAR acknowledges accident “situations” may be “justified” when the collective dose avoided by an emergency operation is significantly larger than incurred by the workers involved.”

9.5.4 Non Exelon Personnel Exposure Authorization.

Is the protocol implemented before an emergency or is this the predetermined right of Emergency Director or their unidentified surrogate?

9.5.5. Contamination and Decontamination.

“Temporary decontamination areas” are not identified and the “offsite assembly areas” are not identified.

Who conducts the free release survey?

The free release survey, and eventual release can be controverted by onsite, offsite, contracted and Exelon employees.

9.5.6 b. The section is unenforceable.

Who or what enforces the prohibition of eating, drinking, smoking and chewing...”

10.2 Public Information.

There is no plan for Exelon's Corporate management to communicate from 60 miles away in Coatesville what is occurring on the ground at Three Mile Island.

11.1.1.1 Radiation Emergency Exercise and Drill.

This section assumes biennial drills are sufficient. There is a presumption that equipment will remain functional and in non-degraded condition without interruption for 24 months.

11.1.10. Evaluation of Exercise.

Exelon audits its own program by "obtaining qualified controllers."

However, the Company is "independently" audited under 11.2 2, Training is ill-defined and may be provided to those who may be called upon to assist an emergency." The auditing entity and trainings are not defined and nebulous.


The annual training for Local Support Service Personnel under 11.2.4, which is offered annually is general, ill defined, and offered to "off site organizations which may provide off site services..."

11.3. Review and Updating of Plan and Procedures.

There are no provisions made in the event service contracts are canceled by geographically sensitive nonprofit and volunteer groups.

11.4 Maintenance and Inventory of Emergency Equipment and Supplies.

Please refer to earlier comments.



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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: GOVERNOR RENDELL RESPONDS TO INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF STATE'S SNOWSTORM RESPONSE; PLEDGES REFORMS TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

Crisis Resource Guide:

One of the most comprehensive Disaster, Crisis and Emergency Resource Guides. Links to everything from Homeland Security sites to hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, wildfire and health and medicine.

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**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
March 27, 2007**

GOVERNOR RENDELL RESPONDS TO INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF STATE'S SNOWSTORM RESPONSE; PLEDGES REFORMS TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

REPORT BY JAMES LEE WITT ASSOCIATES IDENTIFIES IMPROVEMENT ITEMS AT PENNDOT, STATE POLICE, PEMA, NATIONAL GUARD

HARRISBURG — Governor Edward G. Rendell said today that an independent review of the state's response to the Valentine's Day snowstorm has yielded valuable insight into Pennsylvania's emergency response operations that will help public officials better respond to future incidents.

The report, issued by James Lee Witt Associates, evaluated the performance of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, state police, Department of Transportation, and the National Guard, and identified key areas in need of operational reform.

In response to the report, Governor Rendell issued three directives to PennDOT, PEMA and the state police, ordering immediate adoption of changes that address specific findings outlined by the firm.

The Governor added that James Lee Witt Associates will be retained to help state government officials look at broad and major changes in the commonwealth's system of emergency preparedness.

"With today's action, I can assure the citizens of Pennsylvania that specific deficiencies in our planned readiness will be addressed immediately," Governor Rendell said. "For example, I will ask PennDOT to work with James Lee Witt Associates on a second report that is specifically designed to foretell traffic conditions

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instantaneously. Additionally, we'll take steps to immediately repair each component of the roadway weather information system so PennDOT can improve its situational awareness in future events similar to this.

"These changes are much needed and, frankly, should have been done a long time ago. They will be corrected. Our work to revamp and improve this system will continue with the help of Mr. Witt and his team," the Governor said.

Governor Rendell went on to express his disappointment at the state's failure to address the issues outlined in the reports, despite being noted in earlier after-action reports, and accepted responsibility for not acting on these matters.

"The most disturbing part of the report, I find, was its findings that state emergency system management is lacking and is not on par with national standards," said the Governor

"I take full responsibility for that failing," he said. "As Mr. Witt noted in the report, 'The winter storm was not the first sign of issues with emergency management in Pennsylvania. After action reports on previous emergencies outline many of the ongoing problems with emergency management in the commonwealth. Yet, due in great part to extraordinary efforts by individuals in response to previous events, these problems had not surfaced to the extent that they did during the winter storm.'

"Since I've been Governor, there have been eight different disasters where we have been called on to provide emergency services," said the Governor. "In each and every case, that response was more than satisfactory and received high praise from citizens and commentators alike.

"In retrospect, I see that the above portion of the report is correct; the extraordinary effort of many Pennsylvanians overshadowed systemic failings and lured us into a sense of complacency. What happened in this snowstorm, therefore, was a much needed wake-up call.

"I would note that in the snowstorm we experienced on March 16, although it did not present similar challenges to the Valentine's Day incident, our response did demonstrate that some of those lessons have already been learned."

Following a slow response by state officials to two days of freezing rain and snowfall across Pennsylvania, and what he deemed a "total breakdown in communications," Governor Rendell asked that James Lee Witt, chairman and CEO of James Lee Witt Associates, a part of GlobalOptions Group, conduct an independent review into the state's performance.

The report issued today by the Washington D.C.-based public safety and crisis management consulting firm, is the result of that review.

The firm's examination included interviews with key personnel involved in the response from that state and local levels; compiling a detailed chronology of events leading to the storm and the response in the days that followed, analyzing pertinent records within each agency, and evaluating the statutes and missions to which each department adheres.

Looking at PennDOT, JLWA found conditions at the agency in the weeks prior to the storm contributed to its performance in clearing the roadways and maintaining safe driving conditions. Among the firm's findings:

- PennDOT did not have sufficient manpower to operate the available plows beyond one 12-hour shift in Berks County, apparently due to lack of oversight at the local level regarding staffing practices
- The agency does not subscribe to one weather forecasting service, leading to varied weather outlooks between local districts
- Some PennDOT officials has no previous experience dealing with a storm of this magnitude, particularly in Berks County where the management team had been in office less than a month following the former team's retirement
- The state's roadway weather information system was not operational due to improper maintenance
- The department did not grant high priority to customer information systems, causing many highway information signs to be neglected and provide outdated or inaccurate information

The James Lee Witt Associates report characterized PEMA's level of readiness as below what was expected, citing its reluctance to activate the state emergency operations center to Level 3 and not fully implementing procedures required by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's National Incident Management System.

Additionally, the report says, the agency failed to communicate the seriousness of the events to the Governor and his office.

State police were found to have lacked a coordinated response to the storm until early in the evening of the second day. This hampered information flow from the units on the ground because there was no overall incident command at the regional or state levels. It was not until Commissioner Jeffrey B. Miller learned of problems on I-78 that the department was able to raise situational awareness to the point where a common operational picture could emerge.

The report's findings also said that the National Guard could have begun initial distribution of food and supplies to stranded motorists as early as 3 a.m. on Feb. 15, rather than shortly after 10 a.m. as was the case. JLWA said the earlier delivery start time could have been made possible if PEMA had assigned the Guard with the mission earlier.

Overall, the Witt team faulted the commonwealth for not adopting emergency management as a core principle, and found a lack of awareness among all levels of the state's system.

The report went on to make several recommendations to the administration, including steps to:

- Ensure that emergency preparedness and management is a higher priority in the commonwealth
- Instruct PEMA to more clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each agency during emergencies, in accordance with Title 35 of the Pennsylvania Code, which outlines the agency's statutory powers and duties
- Expedite the adoption and full implementation of the National

- Incident Management System
- Establish of a joint information center at the state emergency operations center that could coordinate messages to the public and media in times of emergency
- Improve horizontal and vertical communications through an improved, formal notification process developed by the state police commissioner that maximizes situational awareness
- Develop and implement ongoing training and exercises to test the state's system and employees
- Appoint a team of state and local officials, lead by the secretary of Transportation, to develop written traffic diversion plans along primary interstate and state highways that will also serve the commonwealth in the event of a statewide evacuation.

The report also outlined additional steps for the transportation secretary that includes implementing management protocols that assure the department's ability to maintain and operate portions of Pennsylvania's interstate highway system; revising its customer communication goals; and immediately direct the repair of all tools and technology PennDOT can employ to enhance awareness in Harrisburg and among motorists throughout the state.

Governor Rendell was urged to call for an extensive examination of the commonwealth's preparedness and emergency management capabilities. The evaluation should include key leaders at the local, state and federal levels, as well as representatives from academia and the non-profit sector, according to the report. Such an assessment should cover management structure, legislative and policy changes, and new procedures.

Founded in 2001, James Lee Witt Associates is a public safety and crisis management consulting firm based in Washington, DC with offices in Atlanta, Chicago, Little Rock, and Sacramento. Led by James Lee Witt, the Federal Emergency Management Agency director under President Bill Clinton, JLWA has unrivaled experience and hands-on knowledge of public safety, disaster response, continuity of operations, and emergency management issues. JLWA was retained by the State of Louisiana to help coordinate activities in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and has conducted analyses for the City of Philadelphia and other cities, counties, universities and corporations.

To learn more about the firm, visit <http://www.wittassociates.com>

A full copy of the report by James Lee Witt Associates can be found [here](#).

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EDITOR'S NOTE: Letters from Governor Rendell to Secretary of Transportation Allen D. Biehler, State Police Commissioner Jeffrey B. Miller, and PEMA Director James R. Joseph discussing the report and its findings are available [here](#).

[* Access GlobalOptions Groups' Community Engagement Leadership Tool for Catastrophic Health Events Report and Related Documents](#)

- [GlobalOptions Group's Emergency Preparedness Expert Participates In Panel to Provide Guidance for Cities in Extreme Health Event](#)
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August 21, 2008
Why We Opposed The Move

To the Editor:

Exclon's relocation of Three Mile Island's Emergency Operations Facility ("EOF") and Joint Information Center ("JIC") to Chester County focused on geographic, technical and cost saving considerations. These are important and meaningful components of this discussion. However, it is also necessary to review the history of communication and emergency preparedness problems at Three Mile Island ("TMI").

TMI-Alert opposed the relocation and consolidation of the EOFs based on past history, and our belief that each nuclear plant should have a dedicated support facility in the same area as the plant. Lets take a moment and recap why we had dedicated EOF, and remember that the chain of communications begins with the plant's operator.

On March 28, 1979, 4:30 p.m., Lt. Governor William Scranton briefed the public at the Capitol: "This situation is more complex than the company first led us to believe. We are taking more tests. And at this point, we believe there is still no danger to public health. Metropolitan Edison has given you and us conflicting information. We just concluded a meeting with company officials and hope this briefing will clear up most of your questions."

The NRC, honkered down in D.C. and suburban Maryland, was also out of the loop: "We are operating almost totally in the blind," NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie said in taped conversations among NRC officials that later became public. "[The Governor's] information is ambiguous, mine is non-existent, and...I don't know, it's like a couple of blind men staggering around making decisions."

On March 30, 1979, Governor Richard Thornburgh, who was in Harrisburg, recommended an evacuation for preschool children and pregnant women living within five miles of the plant. Schools in the area closed. Out of a target population of 5,000, over 140,000 Central Pennsylvanians fled the area.

Due to the poor communication and lack of coordination during the TMI accident , President Carter issued Executive Order 112148 in December 1979. The Order directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the NRC to implement Radiological Emergency Response Plans for all populations living around nuclear power plants.

As planning improved and testing increased, the folks who operated TMI still had problems passing the grade. On March 5, 1997, TMI failed an emergency preparedness drill, and agreed to pay a \$210,000 fine for violations identified by the NRC relating to the inadequate implementation of the plant's emergency preparedness program.

Four years later, after a documented history of missteps in relation to emergency preparedness and communication, AmerGen made a unilateral decision to relocate the EOF without consulting officials. TMI later reversed itself and notified the NRC that it intend to delay submitting its application seeking approval for a standardized emergency plan. One size rarely fits all.

Distance and technology can not alter history or past poor performance. I did tour both sites, and remain convinced of the need for a dedicated support location for Three Mile island which could assist the community during natural disasters. You can not be over prepared to respond an emergency, and nuclear lightning can strike twice.

Sincerely,

Eric Epstein

Mr. Epstein is the Chairman of Three Mile Island Alert , Inc., a safe-energy organization based in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and founded in 1977. TMIA that monitors Peach Bottom and Three Mile Island nuclear generating stations.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AmerGen To Relocate TMI Joint Information Center
New location in Coatesville to provide better services, technology
*Open house for media representatives at Coatesville on **Aug. 26***

LONDONDERRY TWP. Pa. (August 19, 2008) – AmerGen announced today that it would begin using the Coatesville Joint Information Center (JIC) for the Three Mile Island Generating Station on August 26, 2008. The company's Peach Bottom and Limerick Generating Stations also use the Coatesville JIC.

All nuclear power stations must have a JIC located outside the 10-mile radius of the plant. The Coatesville JIC will be used as the sole source of official information in the event of a declared emergency at Three Mile Island and replaces the existing JIC located in Susquehanna Township.

Relocating the TMI JIC to Coatesville will improve the station's overall ability to respond to an emergency. The Coatesville facility is larger and better equipped than the existing JIC. It also enables the company to use personnel from its regional headquarters in nearby Kennett Square to support TMI by staffing the Coatesville JIC, allowing personnel at TMI to respond to the site in the event of an emergency.

TMI's Emergency Operations Facility already is located in Coatesville and the move will enable the Londonderry Township nuclear plant to use the same facility for its entire offsite emergency response operation. TMI was the only Exelon-owned facility in Pennsylvania that maintained a separate JIC.

The Coatesville JIC offers wireless dataport technology, access to phone lines and copy/fax machines and a large, comfortable facility for media when the center is activated. Exelon Nuclear has installed state-of-the-art webcasting technology, which will offer the news media and county officials real-time internet access to press conferences held at the JIC in Coatesville. The Coatesville's facility has offices available for state and NRC officials, who also would be available to interface with the media.

The company will provide local media with the ability to report from near the plant by making a room available to reporters in the TMI Training Center, located across the river from TMI on Rt. 441.

TMI held an open house for the news media at the Coatesville JIC on Oct. 31, 2007. Company officials have briefed state and county officials on the relocation of the facility.

The TMI JIC is a 15,000 square foot facility located on a 2-acre lot in Commerce Park, Susquehanna Township. Only one employee works in the facility and that person will move to an office at Three Mile Island. TMI plans to eventually sell the facility.

Note to Editors: AmerGen will hold an open house for the news media at the Coatesville JIC on August 26 from 10 a.m. to 12 p.m. Please RSVP to Ralph DeSantis at 717-948-8930. The Coatesville JIC is located at 175 N. Caln Rd, Coatesville, PA 19320.

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AmerGen Energy LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Exelon Generation LLC, a unit of Exelon Corporation. Exelon Corporation is one of the nation's largest electric utilities with approximately \$19 billion in annual revenues. The company has one of the industry's largest portfolios of electricity generation capacity, with a nationwide reach and strong positions in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic. Exelon distributes electricity to approximately 5.4 million customers in northern Illinois and Pennsylvania and natural gas to approximately 480,000 customers in the Philadelphia area. Exelon is headquartered in Chicago and trades on the NYSE under the ticker EXC.