



435 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pa.
15219

(412) 456-6000
June 4, 1980

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Boyce H. Grier, Regional Director
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
I.E. Bulletin 80-06

Dear Mr. Grier:

We have reviewed the referenced bulletin concerning Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls with the following results.

1. A review of the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ESF actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode has been completed. The following tabulation lists the equipment that does not remain in the emergency mode and lists the proposed corrective action and schedule for implementation.
 - a. The air ejector vent containment isolation valve automatically opens upon CIB reset if a radiation monitor Hi-Hi alarm signal is also present. A seal-in circuit will be installed that will prevent the valve from opening on CIB reset even with a radiation monitor alarm present. Operator action at the control switch in the control room will be required to open the valve after CIB reset. This modification will be completed prior to the schedule plant startup scheduled for July 1980.
 - b. The charging pump cubicle exhaust dampers shift from normal auxiliary building ventilation to the supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) on a CIB signal and automatically return to their normal alignment on CIB reset unless hand switches located in the auxiliary building are in the ESF position. A seal-in circuit will be provided

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b. (continued)

that will prevent the dampers from returning to their normal position on CIB reset. Operator action at the local control station in the auxiliary building will be required to return the dampers to their normal position after CIB reset. This modification will be completed prior to the scheduled plant startup in July.


- c. The safeguards pit isolation dampers close automatically on a CIB signal and open on CIB reset unless hand switches located in the safeguards building are in the ESF position. A seal-in circuit will be provided as in (b) above. The modification will be completed prior to the scheduled plant startup in July.
- d. The SLCRS bypass and exhaust dampers move to their safety position on a CIA signal. The dampers have a maintained OPEN-CLOSE switch which will allow the dampers to return to their normal position on resetting CIA. A seal in circuit will be provided to prevent the dampers from returning to their normal position on CIA reset. Operator action at the control switch in the control room will be required to reposition the dampers after CIA reset. This modification will be completed prior to the scheduled plant startup in July.
- e. The Safety Injection accumulator discharge isolation valves have control switches which are maintained in CLOSE and spring return from OPEN to AUTO. If the switch is in the CLOSE position, the valve will open on SIS but reclose if SIS is reset because of the maintained close switch position. The bypass is physically defeated by placing the valves in the open position and disconnecting power to the valve operator control circuits and removing the plug in the lock out circuit. Procedures are in use which place this feature into effect in the proper operating modes and verify the open position per Technical Specifications. We have determined that no further action is required for these valves.
- f. Upon reset of the Feedwater Isolation Signal, the main feedwater control and bypass valves will return to their control function. Although there is no means to physically defeat the reset of these valves, the upstream isolation valves close and main feedwater pumps trip off on feedwater isolation and do not automatically open or restart on reset of the signal. Procedures also require the resetting of the valve controllers to the "O" open position prior to resetting the feedwater isolation signal. With these features, the opening of the control valves has no effect upon feedwater flow to the steam generators. We have determined that no corrective action is required for these valves.

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
I.E. Bulletin 80-06
Page 3

2. A test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signal will be completed prior to the scheduled plant startup in July. The test will be in conjunction with the 18 month ESF actuation system test and will also verify the modification described above function as designed.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact my office.

Very truly yours,


C. N. Dunn
Vice President, Operations

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Division of Reactor Operation Inspection
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. D. A. Beckman, Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Beaver Valley Power Station
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

✓ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
c/o Document Management Branch
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attest:

Thomas C. Elder D.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY) SS:

On this 21st day of JUNE, 1980, before me, DONALD W. SHANNON, a Notary Public in and for said Commonwealth and County, personally appeared C. N. Dunn, who being duly sworn, deposed, and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements set forth in the Submittal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

DONALD W. SHANNON, NOTARY PUBLIC
PITTSBURGH, ALLEGHENY COUNTY
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES JUNE 7, 1983
Member, Pennsylvania Association of Notaries