NRC FORM 366

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(7 77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT EXHIBIT A 1 LLO (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: L 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 3 5 5 CAT 58 5 -10 00 00 G 1 1 TNSNP1 CON'T DOCKET NUMBER 48 69 EVENT DATE 14 15 REPORT DATE 80 REPORT 0 1 SOUNCE L 00 PTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) EVENTO support inspection per IE Bulletin 79-14, 2 support members were Duri 0 2 found to be reversed for the hangers. One support provided restraint in 0 3 the +X direction, the other in the +X and +Y direction. One line runs from safety injection pumps to low-head safety injection pumps. The other line runs from safety injection pump B to hot leg. Analysis indicates latter pipe could fail during seismic event, causing a degradation in the performance of train B of SIS. 80 CAUSE SUBCODE E 12 13 13 COMPONENT CODE T IS 13 COMPONENT CODE T IC 13 COMPONENT CODE CAUSE CODE SYSTEM CODE B 105 1 F 1 (1) A] (12) 0 2 REVISION SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 17 LER'RO EVENT YEAR TYPE NO 0 4 7 1 28 ACTION FUTURE TAKEN ACTION CONSONS 10101010101 MANUFACTURE X19 919 3 105 37 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 2 The two lines involved are side-by-side. When the support was installed 101 the identity of the two lines was confused, and the support was | inadvertently reversed. The supports were removed and then reinstalled 1 7 in the proper orientation. 113 1 4 80 FACILITY OTHER STATUS 30 NETHOD OF DISCOVERY A 3 10 10 10 3 C Inservice Inspection ACTIVITY CONTENT 60 NA Z D Z AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) 1 6 NA 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES O O O O O CONTON (3) NA 80 1 14 NA 80 TYPE DESCRIPTION NA 1 9 PUBLICITY NICE DESEMPTION (15 NRC USE ONLY NA 2 1 1 11111111 615-842-6967 James D. Swearingen, Jr. NAME OF PREPARER \_ PHONE -



8006030490

Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

#### LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQR0-50-327/8047 Technical Specification Involved: 3.5.2

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.i

Date of Occurrence: 5/13/80 Time of Occurrence: 1000 EDT Unit 1

# Identification and Description of Occurrence

Support 1-SIH-86 and 1-SIH-315 were inadvertently reversed during installation. Seismic analysis indicates that the pipe that runs from safety injection pump B to the hot leg of reactor coolant loop could fail during a seismic event causing a degradation of performance in train B of SIS.

## Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Unit 1 was in mode 3.

Action Specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Met Due to Inoperable Equipment

The supports were returned to proper orientation within 72 hours per action statement 3.5.2. Further analysis of the break location indicates that this technical specification (3.5.2) was not violated.

## Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The two lines involved are side-by-side. When the support was installed, the identity of the two lines was confused, and the support was inadvertently reversed.

## Analysis of Occurrence

The location of the proposed break was on the 4-inch line that runs from the safety injection pump B to the hot legs (loops 2 and 4) of the reactor coolant system. This break is just upstream of the 4-inch to 2-inch reducer and is isolable from the reactor coolant system by two check valves. This break is also isolated from train B safety injection pump by normally shut flow control valve FCV 63-157. Therefore, both trains of safety injection system can meet their primary function of injecting water from the refueling water storage tanks to the four cold loops of the reactor using both train A and B of safety injection pumps. This break will cause a loss of capability to inject water in the hot leg of loops 2 and 4. This lineup is used to prevent boron stratification. This analysis indicates that this location of the break does not violate Technical Specification 3.5.2.

#### Corrective Action

The supports were removed and then reinstalled in the proper orientation.

## Failure Data