

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK:                                  (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | T | N | S | N | P | I | 7 | 0 | 0 | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5  
7 8 9 LICENSE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 CAT 58

CONT

0 1 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 1 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 9  
7 8 9 REPORT SOURCE 60 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT # 78 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (19)

0 2 | During support inspection per NRC IE Bulletin 79-14, 1-CVCH-300 was  
0 3 | found to be improperly designed. The pipe lugs had moved out of the  
0 4 | hanger due to thermal expansion. Pipe was therefore unsupported.  
0 5 | Seismic analysis indicates that in a seismic event the pipe would break.  
0 6 | This break would occur on the normal letdown line from the reactor  
0 7 | coolant system causing an unisolable loss-of-coolant accident.  
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0 9 |  
7 8 9

0 9 | C | G | 11 | B | 12 | A | 13 | S | U | P | O | R | T | 14 | A | 15 | 16  
7 8 9 SYSTEM CODE 9 10 CAUSE CODE 11 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 COMPONENT CODE 13 14 15 16 17 18 COMP SUBCODE 19 VALVE SUCCODE 20  
17 | 8 | 0 | 21 | 22 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 24 | 0 | 1 | 28 | T | 30 | 0 | 32  
21 22 EVENT YEAR 23 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO 24 25 26 OCCURRENCE CODE 28 29 REPORT TYPE 30 31 REVISION NO 32  
F | 18 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | L | 25 | X | 9 | 9 | 9 | 20  
33 34 ACTION TAKEN 35 EFFECT ON PLANT 36 SHUTDOWN METHOD 37 HOURS 38 39 40 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 41 NPRO-A FORM SUB 42 PRIME COMP SUPPLIER 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Design error. The lugs on the pipe were too short and slipped out of  
1 1 | hanger during heatup. The thermal expansion of the piping was greater  
1 2 | than the support the Division of Engineering Design considered. The  
1 3 | lugs were lengthened by ECN-5217.  
1 4 |  
7 8 9

1 5 | B | 23 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | N/A | 20 | C | 31 | Inservice inspection  
7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS 10 POWER 11 12 13 OTHER STATUS 20 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 45 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 22  
1 6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | N/A | 35 | N/A | 26  
7 8 9 ACTIVITY RELEASED 10 11 12 CONTENT 13 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 26  
1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A | 39  
7 8 9 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 11 12 TYPE 13 DESCRIPTION 39  
1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | N/A | 41  
7 8 9 PERSONNEL IN JIJIES NUMBER 11 12 DESCRIPTION 41  
1 9 | Z | 42 | N/A | 43  
7 8 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE 11 12 DESCRIPTION 43  
2 0 | N | 45 | N/A  
7 8 9 PUBLICITY ISSUED 11 12 DESCRIPTION 45  
68 69

NAME OF PREPARER J. D. Swearingen PHONE 615-842-6967

8006030 460

POOR ORIGINAL

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQRO-50-327/8051      Technical Specification Involved: 3.4.10

Reported Under Technical Specification 3.4.10

Date of Occurrence: 5/16/80      Time of Occurrence: 1530 CDT      Unit 1

Identification and Description of Occurrence

Hanger support 1-CVCH-300 was found to be improperly designed, leaving the pipe unsupported. The support is on the normal letdown from the reactor coolant system. Design analysis showed that this pipe could break in a seismic event in a location that would cause an unisolable loss of coolant accident. Therefore, action statement 3.4.10 could not be complied with. The reactor was taken to cold shutdown within 24 hours, in accordance with LCO 3.03.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Reactor was in mode 3 conducting hot-functional testing.

Action Specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Met Due to Inoperable Equipment

Action statement 3.4.10 requires reactor coolant integrity to be maintained. This could not be done; therefore, according to LCO 3.03, the reactor was taken to cold shutdown immediately.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The hanger was improperly designed. The pipe lugs were too short. During heatup the pipe lugs moved outside of the hanger bracket, causing the pipe to be unsupported. Thermal expansion of the pipe was greater than what the Division of Engineering Design had considered.

Analysis of Occurrence

Should a seismic event occur, the pipe could break at a location that is unisolable from loop 3 of the reactor coolant system. This pipe is a 3-inch line.

Corrective Action

The reactor was taken to cold shutdown. The pipe lugs were redesigned by EN DES. The lugs were made longer so as not to move out of the hanger during thermal expansion.

Failure Data

N/A.