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Writer's Direct Dial Number

May 29, 1980  
TLL 245

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Attn: Harold R. Denton, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit I (TMI-1)  
Operating License No. DPR-50  
Docket No. 50-289  
Corrective Actions in Response to the Crystal River Incident

Enclosed are answers to five informal questions related to our corrective action for the February 26, 1980 Crystal River incident given to C. W. Smyth/E. G. Wallace (GPUSC) from D. DiIanni (NRC).


Sincerely,

Signed J. G. Herbein

J. G. Herbein  
Vice President  
TMI-I

JGH:CWS:bjc

Enclosure

cc: J. T. Collins  
D. DiIanni  


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QUESTION NO. 1:

Actions which will allow the operator to cope with various combinations of loss of instrumentation and control functions. This includes changes in (A) equipment and control systems to give clear indications of functions which are lost or unreliable; (B) procedures and training to assure positive and safe manual response by the operator in the event that competent instruments are unavailable.

RESPONSE:

- A. Our March 17, 1980 letter (TLL-117) indicated that "suitable indication will be provided to allow the operator to determine which ICS/NNI power supply has been lost" and that the "operators will be trained to respond to ICS/NNI power failures." This training will include recognition of which instruments are available and should be used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
- B. As indicated in our March 13, 1980 letter (TLL-114), operator training and procedures will be revised to cope with ICS/NNI power failures (see response to Question 2).

QUESTION NO. 2:

Verification of the effects of various combinations of loss of instrumentation and control functions by design review analysis and by test.

RESPONSE:

Our response to Item 2 in our letter of March 13, 1980 (TLL-114) discusses our planned tests and analyses.

QUESTION NO. 3:

Correction of electrical deficiencies which may allow the power operated relief valve and pressurizer spray valve to open on non-nuclear instrumentation power failures, such as, the event which occurred at Crystal River 3 on 2/26/80.

RESPONSE:

As indicated in our March 17, 1980 letter (TLL-117), the PORV fails closed and the pressurizer spray valve fails as is on loss of power (see response to Item 6).

QUESTION NO. 4:

Indicate what tests will be performed to verify the effects of combination of power loss on instruments and control functions.

RESPONSE:

A description of the tests to be performed will be provided by June 30, 1980.

QUESTION NO. 5:

Provide a list of instruments necessary to bring the plant to cold shut-down.

RESPONSE:

This list will be provided by September 30, 1980.