NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | LICENSEE CODE: G A E I H 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 2 2 4 8 0 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 3 1 0 8 0 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During Reactor startup with the mode switch in startup and hot standby,
03 the HPCI system did not become operational at 113 psig as specified in
04 Technical Specifications 3.5-0.1. The system was not operational
05 until 127 psig. There were no effects upon public health and safety due
06 to this event. This is a repetitive occurrence as last reported on
07 Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-321/1979-106.
08

09 | SYSTEM CODE: S F (11) | CAUSE CODE: B (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: A (13) | COMPONENT CODE: I N S T R U (14) | COMP. SUBCODE: S (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR: 8 0 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 2 3 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 | REPORT TYPE: L | — | REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: E (18) | FUTURE ACTION: G (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: Y (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: B 0 6 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 This failure is due to a design deficiency and instrument drift. The
11 present design does not allow a trip at 100 psig and reset at 113 psig.
12 The pressure switches were recalibrated to specifications. Future cor-
13 rective action includes a design change to the pressure switches and the
14 pursuit of a document change to the present Tech Specs.

15 | FACILITY STATUS: C (28) | % POWER: 0 0 4 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Operator Observation

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

17 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

18 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

19 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY

20 | ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA | NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER: R. T. Nix PHONE: 912-367-7781

8003210416

NARRATIVE REPORT

Georgia Power Company
Plant E. I. Hatch
Baxley, Georgia 31513

Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-321/1980-23.

During reactor startup with the mode switch in startup and hot standby position, the HPCI System did not become operational at 113 psig as specified in Technical Specifications Section 3.5.D.1. There were no effects upon public health and safety due to this event. This is a repetitive occurrence as last reported on Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-321/1979-106. This report addressed the problem of HPCI isolating at 116 psig. Technical Specification Section 3.5-D.1 requires that HPCI be operational if the reactor pressure is greater than 113 psig. Prior to LER 50-321/1979-106, the switches, 1E41-N001A-D, setpoint was 125 psig. This setpoint complied with Tech Specs requirement Table 3.2.2 which requires the switches to be set equal to or greater than 100 psig, but does not comply with Tech Specs Section 3.5-D.1 which required HPCI to be operational at 113 psig. The inherent problem was first recognized at this point. A design change was submitted to change the setpoint to a value greater than 100 psig but less than 113 psig.

On February 24, 1980, HPCI did not become operational at reactor pressure equal to or greater than 113 psig. The calibration of the HPCI Steam Line Low Pressure Switches was checked and found as follows:

N001A trip 90.7 psi, reset 127.7 psi.
N001B trip 98.7 psi, reset 123.7 psi.
N001C trip 100.7 psi, reset 132.7 psi.
N001D trip 98.7 psi, reset 123.7 psi.

Three of the switches A, B and D were found below the acceptance criteria of actuation at greater than 100 psig. The expected actuation point is 106.5 ± 5 psi. The difference between the expected actuation and the actual trip point is attributed to instrument setpoint drift.

The manufacturer of these switches is Barksdale. The specifications of the switch permit a reset span differential of 11 to 40 psig and is not adjustable. Because of the wide differential, the switches cannot be adjusted to meet the present Tech Spec requirements.

The planned corrective action will include the following. A design change to the pressure switches to meet the Technical Specification requirements is being investigated. Unit II Technical Specifications (Standard Tech Specs) require that HPCI be operational at pressures equal to or greater than 150 psig. A proposal to change Unit I Tech Specs concerning HPCI to Standard Tech Specs is being investigated. A follow-up report will be submitted.