

3.7 (cont'd)

E. Drywell-Suppression Chamber
Differential Pressure

1. Differential pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber shall be maintained at equal to or greater than 1.1 psid except as specified in a, b, and c below.
 - a. This differential shall be established within 26 hours after placing the mode switch in run.
 - b. This differential may be decreased to less than 1.1 psid 24 hours prior to placing mode switch in refuel or shutdown.
 - c. This differential may be decreased to less than 1.1 psid for a maximum of four (4) hours during required operability testing of the HPCI system pump, the RCIC system pump, and the drywell-pressure suppression chamber vacuum breakers.
2. If the differential pressure of specification 3.7.E.1 cannot be maintained, and the differential pressure cannot be restored within the subsequent six (6) hour period, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in Hot Standby in six (6) hours and in a Cold Shutdown condition within the following 18 hours.

4.7 (cont'd)

E. Drywell-Suppression Chamber
Differential Pressure

1. The pressure differential between the drywell and suppression chamber shall be recorded at least once each shift.

3.7.D & 4.7.D (cont.d)

The primary containment is penetrated by several small diameter instrument lines connected to the reactor coolant system. Each instrument line contains a 0.25 inch restricting orifice inside the primary containment and an excess flow check valve outside the primary containment. A program for periodic testing and examination of the excess flow check valves is performed as follows:

1. Vessel at pressure sufficient to actuate valves. This could be at time of vessel hydro following a refueling outage.
2. Isolate sensing line from its instrument at the instrument manifold.
3. Provide means for observing and collecting the instrument drain or vent valve flow.
4. Open vent or drain valve.
 - a. Observe flow cessation and any leakage rate.
 - b. Reset valve after test completion.
5. The head seal leak detection line cannot be tested in this manner. This valve will not be exposed to primary system pressure except under unlikely conditions of seal failure where it could be partially pressurized to reactor pressure. Any leakage path is restricted at the source and therefore this valve need not be tested. This valve is in a sensing line that is not safety related.
6. Valves will be accepted if a marked decrease in flow rate is observed and the leakage rate is acceptable.

3.7.E Bases

In conjunction with the Mark I Containment Short Term Program, a plant unique analysis was performed as described in the licensee's letter of October 4, 1976, which demonstrated a factor of safety of at least two for the weakest element in the suppression chamber support system and attached piping. The maintenance of drywell-suppression chamber differential pressure of 1.1 psid and a suppression chamber water level corresponding to a downcomer submergence range of three to four feet will assure the integrity of the suppression chamber when subjected to post-LOCA suppression pool hydrodynamic forces.