



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
<u>TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS</u>	
1	DEFINITIONS 1-1
1.1	RATED POWER 1-1
1.2	REACTOR OPERATING CONDITIONS 1-1
1.3	OPERABLE 1-2
1.4	PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LOGIC 1-2
1.5	INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE 1-3
1.6	QUADRANT POWER TILT 1-3
1.7	CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1-4
1.8	ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE 1-4
2	<u>SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS</u> 2.1-1
2.1	SAFETY LIMITS, REACTOR CORE 2.1-1
2.2	SAFETY LIMIT, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE 2.2-1
2.3	LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS, PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION 2.3-1
3	<u>LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION</u> 3.1-1
3.1	REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3.1-1
3.1.1	<u>Operational Components</u> 3.1-1
3.1.2	<u>Pressurization, Heatup, and Cooldown Limitations</u> 3.1-3
3.1.3	<u>Minimum Conditions for Criticality</u> 3.1-8
3.1.4	<u>Reactor Coolant System Activity</u> 3.1-10
3.1.5	<u>Chemistry</u> 3.1-12
3.1.6	<u>Leakage</u> 3.1-14
3.1.7	<u>Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity</u> 3.1-17

<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
3.1.8 <u>Single Loop Restrictions</u>	3.1-19
3.1.9 <u>Low Power Physics Testing Restrictions</u>	3.1-20
3.1.10 <u>Control Rod Operation</u>	3.1-21
3.2        HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION AND CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEMS	3.2-1
3.3        EMERGENCY CORE COOLING, REACTOR BUILDING COOLING, REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY, AND PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEMS	3.3-1
3.4        STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM	3.4-1
3.5        INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS	3.5-1
3.5.1 <u>Operational Safety Instrumentation</u>	3.5-1
3.5.2 <u>Control Rod Group and Power Distribution Limits</u>	3.5-7
3.5.3 <u>Engineered Safety Features Protective System             Actuation Setpoints</u>	3.5-10
3.5.4 <u>Incore Instrumentation</u>	3.5-12
3.6        REACTOR BUILDING	3.6-1
3.7        AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS	3.7-1
3.8        FUEL LOADING AND REFUELING	3.8-1
3.9        RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS	3.9-1
3.10       MAXIMUM POWER RESTRICTIONS	3.10-1
19.        3.11      REACTOR BUILDING POLAR CRANE AND AUXILIARY HOIST	3.11-1
19.        3.12      SECONDARY SYSTEM ACTIVITY	3.12-1
4 <u>SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS</u>	4.1-1
4.1       OPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW	4.1-1
4.2       REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE	4.2-1
4.3       TESTING FOLLOWING OPENING OF SYSTEM	4.3-1
4.4       REACTOR BUILDING	4.4-1
4.4.1 <u>Containment Leakage Tests</u>	4.4-1
4.4.2 <u>Structural Integrity</u>	4.4-7
4.4.3 <u>Hydrogen Purge System</u>	4.4-11
4.5       EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS AND REACTOR BUILDING COOLING SYSTEMS PERIODIC TESTING	4.5-1

		<u>Page</u>
	4.5.1 <u>Emergency Core Cooling Systems</u>	4.5-1
18.	4.5.2 <u>Reactor Building Cooling Systems</u>	4.5-4
	4.5.3 <u>Penetration Room Ventilation System</u>	4.5-7
	4.5.4 <u>Low Pressure Injection System Leakage</u>	4.5-9
	4.6        EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM PERIODIC TESTING	4.6-1
	4.7        REACTOR CONTROL ROD SYSTEM TESTS	4.7-1
	4.7.1 <u>Control Rod Drive System Functional Tests</u>	4.7-1
	4.7.2 <u>Control Rod Program Verification (Group vs. Core Position)</u>	4.7-3
	4.8        MAIN STEAM STOP VALVES	4.8-1
	4.9        EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP PERIODIC TESTING	4.9-1
	4.10       REACTIVITY ANOMALIES	4.10-1
	4.11       ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEILLANCE	4.11-1
	4.12       CONTROL ROOM FILTERING SYSTEM	4.12-1
	4.13       FUEL SURVEILLANCE	4.13-1
	4.14       REACTOR BUILDING PURGE FILTERING SYSTEM	4.14-1
5	<u>DESIGN FEATURES</u>	5.1-1
	5.1        SITE	5.1-1
	5.2        CONTAINMENT	5.2-1
	5.3        REACTOR	5.3-1
	5.4        FUEL STORAGE	5.4-1
6	<u>ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS</u>	6.1-1
	6.1        ORGANIZATION, REVIEW, AND AUDIT	6.1-1
	6.2        ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF AN ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE	6.2-1
	6.3        ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT A SAFETY LIMIT IS EXCEEDED	6.3-1
	6.4        STATION OPERATING PROCEDURES	6.4-1

		<u>Page</u>
6.5	STATION OPERATING RECORDS	6.5-1
6.6	STATION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS	6.6-1
6.7	RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS	6.7-1

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table No.</u>		<u>Page</u>
2.3-1	Reactor Protective System Trip Setting Limits	2.3-7
3.5.1-1	Instrument Operating Conditions	3.5-3
4.1-1	Instrument Surveillance Requirements	4.1-4
4.1-2	Minimum Equipment Check Frequency	4.1-8
4.1-3	Minimum Sampling Frequency	4.1-9
4.11-1	Environmental Surveillance Program	4.11-2
6.1-1	Minimum Operating Shift Requirements	6.1-7

## LIST OF FIGURES

<u>Figure</u>		<u>Page</u>
2.1-1	Core Protection Safety Limits	2.1-4
2.1-2	Core Protection Safety Limits	2.1-5
2.1-3	Core Protection Safety Limits	2.1-6
2.3-1	Protective System Maximum Allowable Set Points	2.3-5
2.3-2	Protective System Maximum Allowable Set Points	2.3-6
3.1.2-1	Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations	3.1-6
3.1.2-2	Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limitations	3.1-7
3.5.4-1	Incore Instrumentation Specification Axial Imbalance Indication	3.5-14
3.5.4-2	Incore Instrumentation Specification Radial Flux Indication	3.5-15
3.5.4-3	Incore Instrumentation Specification	3.5-16
6.1-1	Station Organization Chart	6.1-5
6.1-2	Management Organization Chart	6.1-6

## INTRODUCTION

These Technical Specifications apply to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1 and are in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Section 50.36. The bases, which provide technical support or reference the pertinent FSAR section for technical support of the individual specifications, are included for informational purposes and to clarify the intent of the specification. These bases are not part of the Technical Specifications, and they do not constitute limitations or requirements for the licensee.

## TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

### 1 DEFINITIONS

The following terms are defined for uniform interpretation of these specifications.

#### 1.1 RATED POWER

Rated power is defined as a steady state reactor core output of 2568 MWt.

#### 1.2 REACTOR OPERATING CONDITIONS

##### 1.2.1 Cold Shutdown

The reactor is in the cold shutdown condition when it is subcritical by at least 1 percent  $\Delta k/k$  and  $T_{avg}$  is no more than 200°F. Pressure is defined by Specification 3.1.2.

##### 1.2.2 Hot Shutdown

The reactor is in the hot shutdown condition when it is subcritical by at least 1 percent  $\Delta k/k$  and  $T_{avg}$  is at or greater than 530F.

##### 1.2.3 Reactor Critical

The reactor is critical when the neutron chain reaction is self-sustaining and  $K_{eff} = 1.0$ .

##### 1.2.4 Hot Standby

The reactor is in the hot standby condition when all of the following conditions exist:

- a.  $T_{avg}$  is greater than 525°F.
- b. The reactor is "just" critical.
- c. Indicated neutron power on the power range channels is less than 2 percent of rated power.

##### 1.2.5 Power Operation

The reactor is in a power operating condition when the indicated neutron power is above 2 percent of rated power as indicated on the power range channels.

#### 1.2.6 Refueling Shutdown

The reactor is in the refueling shutdown condition when, even with all rods removed, the reactor would be subcritical by at least 1 percent  $\Delta k/k$  and the coolant temperature at the low pressure injection pump suction is no more than 140°F. Pressure is defined by Specification 3.1.2. A refueling shutdown refers to a shutdown to replace or rearrange all or a portion of the fuel assemblies and/or control rods.

#### 1.2.7 Refueling Operation

An operation involving a change in core geometry by manipulation of fuel or control rods when the reactor vessel head is removed.

#### 1.2.8 Refueling Period

Time between normal refuelings of the reactor, not to exceed 18 months without prior approval of the AEC.

#### 1.2.9 Startup

The reactor shall be considered in the startup mode when the shutdown margin is reduced with the intent of going critical.

### 1.3 OPERABLE

A component or system is operable when it is capable of performing its intended function within the required range. The component or system shall be considered to have this capability when: (1) it satisfies the limiting conditions for operation defined in Specification 3, and (2) it has been tested periodically in accordance with Specification 4 and has met its performance requirements.

### 1.4 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LOGIC

#### 1.4.1 Instrument Channel

An instrument channel is the combination of sensor, wires, amplifiers and output devices which are connected for the purpose of measuring the value of a process variable for the purpose of observation, control and/or protection. An instrument channel may be either analog or digital in nature.

#### 1.4.2 Reactor Protective System

The reactor protective system is shown in Figures 7-1 and 7-6 of the FSAR. It is that combination of protective channels and associated circuitry which forms the automatic system that protects the reactor by control rod trip. It includes the four protective channels, their associated instrument channel inputs, manual trip switch, all rod drive control protective trip breakers and activating relays or coils.

#### 1.4.3 Protective Channel

A protective channel as shown in Figure 7-1 of the FSAR (one of three or one of four independent channels, complete with sensors, sensor power supply units, amplifiers and bistable modules provided for every reactor protective safety parameter) is a combination of instrument channels forming a single digital output to the protective system's coincidence logic. It includes a shutdown bypass circuit, a protective channel bypass circuit and reactor trip module and provision for insertion of a dummy bistable.

#### 1.4.4 Reactor Protective System Logic

This system utilizes reactor trip module relays (coils and contacts) in all four of the protective channels as shown in Figure 7-1 of the FSAR, to provide reactor trip signals for de-energizing the six control rod drive trip breakers. The control rod drive trip breakers are arranged to provide a one out of two times two logic. Each element of the one out of two times two logic is controlled by a separate set of two out of four logic contacts from the four reactor protective channels.

#### 1.4.5 Engineered Safety Features System

This system utilizes relay contact output from individual channels arranged in three analog sub-systems and two two-out-of-three logic sub-systems as shown in Figure 7-3 of the FSAR. The logic sub-system is wired to provide appropriate signals for the actuation of redundant Engineered Safety Features equipment on a two-of-three basis for any given parameter.

#### 1.4.6 Degree of Redundancy

The difference between the number of operable channels and the number of channels which when tripped will cause an automatic system trip.

## 1.5 INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE

### 1.5.1 Trip Test

A trip test is a test of logic elements in a protective channel to verify their associated trip action.

### 1.5.2 Channel Test

A channel test is the injection of an internal or external test signal into the channel to verify its proper output response; including alarm and/or trip initiating action where applicable.

### 1.5.3 Instrument Channel Check

An instrument channel check is a verification of acceptable instrument performance by observation of its behavior and/or state; this verification includes comparison of output and/or state of independent channels measuring the same variable.

### 1.5.4 Instrument Channel Calibration

An instrument channel calibration is a test, and adjustment (if necessary), to establish that the channel output responds with acceptable range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel measures or an accurate simulation of these values. Calibration shall encompass the entire channel, including equipment actuation, alarm, or trip and shall be deemed to include the channel test.

### 1.5.5 Heat Balance Check

A heat balance check is a comparison of the indicated neutron power and core thermal power.

### 1.5.6 Heat Balance Calibration

An adjustment of the power range channel amplifiers output to agree with the core thermal power as determined by a heat balance on the secondary side of the steam generator considering all heat losses and additions.

## 1.6 QUADRANT POWER TILT

Quadrant to average power tilt is expressed in percent as defined by the following equation:

$$100 \left( \frac{\text{Power in any core quadrant}}{\text{Average for all quadrants}} - 1 \right)$$

To obtain quadrant power the outputs of the upper and lower detector sections will be averaged. If one of the core detectors is out of service, the three operable detectors or the incore detectors will be used in calculating the average.

## 1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Containment integrity exists when the following conditions are satisfied:

- a. The equipment hatch is closed and sealed and both doors of the personnel hatch and emergency hatch are closed and sealed except as in b below.
- b. At least one door on each of the personnel hatch and emergency hatch is closed and sealed during refueling or personnel passage through these hatches.
- c. All non-automatic containment isolation valves and blind flanges are closed as required.
- d. All automatic containment isolation valves are operable or locked closed.
- e. The containment leakage determined at the last testing interval satisfies Specification 4.4.1.

## 1.8 ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE

An abnormal occurrence means the occurrence of any plant condition that:

- a. Results in a protective instrumentation setting in excess of a Limiting Safety System Setting as established in the Technical Specifications, or
- b. Exceeds a Limiting Condition for Operation as established in the Technical Specifications, or
- c. Causes, ~~as defined by 10CFR200~~, any uncontrolled or unplanned release of radioactive material from the site, or X
- d. Results in engineered safety system component malfunction or system or component malfunction which could render a safety system incapable of performing its intended safety function, or X  
*or reactor protective system*
- e. Results in abnormal degradation of one of the several boundaries which are designed to contain the radioactive materials resulting from the fission process, or
- f. Results in uncontrolled or unanticipated changes in reactivity greater than 1%  $\Delta k/k$  except for trip.

g. Results in or if uncorrected can result in an unsafe condition due to observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls.

18. | h. Results in conditions arising from natural or offsite man-made events |  
that affect or threaten to affect the safe operation of the plant. |

## 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS, REACTOR CORE

Applicability

Applies to reactor thermal power, reactor power imbalance, reactor coolant system pressure, coolant temperature, and coolant flow during power operation of the plant.

Objective

To maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding.

Specification

The combination of the reactor system pressure and coolant temperature shall not exceed the safety limit as defined by the locus of points established in Figure 2.1-1. If the actual pressure/temperature point is below and to the right of the line, the safety limit is exceeded.

The combination of reactor thermal power and reactor power imbalance (power fraction in top half of core minus power fraction in the bottom half of the core) shall not exceed the safety limit as defined by the locus of points (solid line) for the specified flow set forth in Figure 2.1-2. If the actual-reactor-thermal-power/reactor-power-imbalance point is above the line for the specified flow, the safety limit is exceeded.

Bases

To maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding and to prevent fission product release, it is necessary to prevent overheating of the cladding under normal operating conditions. This is accomplished by operating within the nucleate boiling regime of heat transfer, wherein the heat transfer coefficient is large enough so that the clad surface temperature is only slightly greater than the coolant temperature. The upper boundary of the nucleate boiling regime is termed "departure from nucleate boiling" (DNB). At this point there is a sharp reduction of the heat transfer coefficient, which would result in high cladding temperatures and the possibility of cladding failure. Although DNB is not an observable parameter during reactor operation, the observable parameters of neutron power, reactor coolant flow, temperature, and pressure can be related to DNB through the use of the W-3 correlation.<sup>(1)</sup> The W-3 correlation has been developed to predict DNB and the location of DNB for axially uniform and non-uniform heat flux distributions. The local DNB ratio (DNBR), defined as the ratio of the heat flux that would cause DNB at a particular core location to the actual heat flux, is indicative of the margin to DNB. The minimum value of the DNBR, during steady-state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated transients is limited to 1.3. A DNBR of 1.3 corresponds to a 94.3% probability at a 99% confidence level that DNB will not occur; this is considered a conservative margin to DNB for all operating conditions. The difference between the actual core outlet pressure and the indicated reactor coolant system pressure has been considered in determining the core protection safety limits. The difference in these two pressures is

## 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS, REACTOR CORE

Applicability

Applies to reactor thermal power, reactor power imbalance, reactor coolant system pressure, coolant temperature, and coolant flow during power operation of the plant.

Objective

To maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding.

Specification

The combination of the reactor system pressure and coolant temperature shall not exceed the safety limit as defined by the locus of points established in Figure 2.1-1. If the actual pressure/temperature point is below and to the right of the line, the safety limit is exceeded.

The combination of reactor thermal power and reactor power imbalance (power fraction in top half of core minus power fraction in the bottom half of the core) shall not exceed the safety limit as defined by the locus of points (solid line) for the specified flow set forth in Figure 2.1-2. If the actual-reactor-thermal-power/reactor-power-imbalance point is above the line for the specified flow, the safety limit is exceeded.


Bases

To maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding and to prevent fission product release, it is necessary to prevent overheating of the cladding under normal operating conditions. This is accomplished by operating within the nucleate boiling regime of heat transfer, wherein the heat transfer coefficient is large enough so that the clad surface temperature is only slightly greater than the coolant temperature. The upper boundary of the nucleate boiling regime is termed "departure from nucleate boiling" (DNB). At this point there is a sharp reduction of the heat transfer coefficient, which would result in high cladding temperatures and the possibility of cladding failure. Although DNB is not an observable parameter during reactor operation, the observable parameters of neutron power, reactor coolant flow, temperature, and pressure can be related to DNB through the use of the W-3 correlation.<sup>(1)</sup> The W-3 correlation has been developed to predict DNB and the location of DNB for axially uniform and non-uniform heat flux distributions. The local DNB ratio (DNBR), defined as the ratio of the heat flux that would cause DNB at a particular core location to the actual heat flux, is indicative of the margin to DNB. The minimum value of the DNBR, during steady-state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated transients is limited to 1.3. A DNBR of 1.3 corresponds to a 94.3% probability at a 99% confidence level that DNB will not occur; this is considered a conservative margin to DNB for all operating conditions. The difference between the actual core outlet pressure and the indicated reactor coolant system pressure has been considered in determining the core protection safety limits. The difference in these two pressures is

For each curve of Figure 2.1-3, a pressure-temperature point above and to the left of the curve would result in a DNBR greater than 1.3 or a local quality at the point of minimum DNBR less than 15% for that particular reactor coolant pump situation. The 1.3 DNBR curve for four pump operation is more restrictive than any other reactor coolant pump situation because any pressure/temperature point above and to the left of the four pump curve will be above and to the left of the other curves.

#### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 3.2.3.1.1
- (2) FSAR, Section 3.2.3.1.1.c
- (3) FSAR, Section 3.2.3.1.1.k
- (4) The following papers which were presented at the Winter Annual Meeting, ASME, November 18, 1969, during the "Two-phase Flow and Heat Transfer in Rod Bundles Symposium":
  - (a) Wilson, et.al.  
"Critical Heat Flux in Non-Uniform Heater Rod Bundles."
  - (b) Gellerstedt, et.al.  
"Correlation of a Critical Heat Flux in a Bundle Cooled by Pressurized Water."




CORE PROTECTION SAFETY LIMIT



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 2.1 - 1

THERMAL POWER LEVEL, %




CURVE	REACTOR COOLANT FLOW (LB/HR)
1	$131.3 \times 10^6$
2	$98.1 \times 10^6$
3	$64.4 \times 10^6$
4	$60.1 \times 10^6$

CORE PROTECTION SAFETY LIMITS



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 2.1 - 2



CURVE	REACTOR COOLANT FLOW (LBS/HR)	POWER	PUMPS OPERATING (TYPE OF LIMIT)
1	$131.3 \times 10^6$ (100%)	114%	FOUR PUMPS (DNBR LIMIT)
2	$60.1 \times 10^6$ (45.8%)	66%	TWO PUMPS IN ONE LOOP (QUALITY LIMIT)
3	$98.1 \times 10^6$ (74.7%)	88.5%	THREE PUMPS (DNBR LIMIT)
4	$64.4 \times 10^6$ (49.0%)	60%	ONE PUMP IN EACH LOOP (QUALITY LIMIT)

### CORE PROTECTION SAFETY LIMITS



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 2.1 - 3

## 2.2 SAFETY LIMITS - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE

### Applicability

Applies to the limit on reactor coolant system pressure.

### Objective

To maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant system and to prevent the release of significant amounts of fission product activity.

### Specification

- 2.2.1 The reactor coolant system pressure shall not exceed 2750 psig when there are fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel.
- 2.2.2 The setpoint of the pressurizer code safety valves shall be in accordance with ASME, Boiler and Pressurizer Vessel Code, Section III, Article 9, Summer 1967.

### Bases

The reactor coolant system<sup>(1)</sup> serves as a barrier to prevent radionuclides in the reactor coolant from reaching the atmosphere. In the event of a fuel cladding failure, the reactor coolant system is a barrier against the release of fission products. Establishing a system pressure limit helps to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant system. The maximum transient pressure allowable in the reactor coolant system pressure vessel under the ASME code, Section III, is 110% of design pressure.<sup>(2)</sup> The maximum transient pressure allowable in the reactor coolant system piping, valves, and fittings under USAS Section B31.7 is 110% of design pressure. Thus, the safety limit of 2750 psig (110% of the 2500 psig design pressure) has been established.<sup>(2)</sup> The settings, the reactor high pressure trip (2355 psig) and the pressurizer safety valves (2500 psig)<sup>(3)</sup> have been established to assure never reaching the reactor coolant system pressure safety limit. The initial hydrostatic test was conducted at 3125 psig (125% of design pressure) to verify the integrity of the reactor coolant system. Additional assurance that the Reactor Coolant pressure does not exceed the safety limit is provided by setting the pressurizer electromatic relief valve at 2255 psig.

### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 4
- (2) FSAR, Section 4.3.10.1
- (3) FSAR, Section 4.2.4

Applicability

Applies to instruments monitoring reactor power, reactor power imbalance, reactor coolant system pressure, reactor coolant outlet temperature, flow, number of pumps in operation, and high react. - building pressure.

Objective

To provide automatic protective action to prevent any combination of process variables from exceeding a safety limit.

Specification

The reactor protective system trip setting limits and the permissible bypasses for the instrument channels shall be as stated in Table 2.3-1. and Figure 2.3-2.

The pump monitors shall produce a reactor trip for the following conditions:

- a. Loss of two pumps and reactor power level is greater than 55%.
- b. Loss of two pumps in one reactor coolant loop and reactor power level is greater than 0.0%. (Reactor power level trip set point is reset to 55% for single loop operation.)
- c. Loss of one or two pumps during two-pump operation.

Basics

The reactor protective system consists of four instrument channels to monitor each of several selected plant conditions which will cause a reactor trip if any one of these conditions deviates from a pre-selected operating range to the degree that a safety limit may be reached.

The trip setting limits for protective system instrumentation are listed in Table 2.3-1. The safety analysis has been based upon these protective system instrumentation trip set points plus calibration and instrumentation errors.

Nuclear Overpower

A reactor trip at high power level (neutron flux) is provided to prevent damage to the fuel cladding from reactivity excursions too rapid to be detected by pressure and temperature measurements.

During normal plant operation with all reactor coolant pumps operating, reactor trip is initiated when the reactor power level reaches 107.5% of rated power. Adding to this the possible variation in trip set points due to calibration and instrument errors, the maximum actual power at which a trip would be actuated could be 114%, which was used in the safety analysis. (4)

### Overpower Trip Based on Flow and Imbalance

The power level trip set point produced by the reactor coolant system flow is based on a power-to-flow ratio which has been established to accommodate the most severe thermal transient considered in the design, the loss-of-coolant flow accident from high power. The analysis in Section 14 demonstrates that the specified power to flow ratio is adequate to prevent a DNBR of less than 1.3 should a low flow condition exist due to any electrical malfunction.

The power level trip set point produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides both high power level and low flow protection in the event the reactor power level increases or the reactor coolant flow rate decreases. The power level trip set point produced by the power to flow ratio provides overpower DNB protection for all modes of pump operation. For every flow rate there is a maximum permissible power level, and for every power level there is a minimum permissible low flow rate. Typical power level and low flow rate combinations for the pump situations of Table 2.3-1 are as follows:

1. Trip would occur when four reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 110% and reactor flow rate is 100%, or flow rate is 90.9% and power level is 100%.
2. Trip would occur when three reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 82.5% and reactor flow rate is 75%, or flow rate is 68.2% and power level is 75%.
3. Trip would occur when two reactor coolant pumps are operating in a single loop if power is 55.0% and the operating loop flow rate is 50.0% or flow rate is 45.5% and power level is 50%.
4. Trip would occur when one reactor coolant pump is operating in each loop (total of two pumps operating) if the power is 54.0% and reactor flow rate is 49.0% or flow rate is 45.5% and the power level is 50%.

For safety calculations the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors for the power level were used.

The power-imbalance boundaries are established in order to prevent reactor thermal limits from being exceeded. These thermal limits are either power peaking kw/ft limits or DNBR limits. The reactor power imbalance (power in the top half of core minus power in the bottom half of core) reduces the power level trip produced by the power-to-flow ratio such that the boundaries of Figure 2.3-2 are produced. The power-to-flow ratio reduces the power level trip and associated reactor power-reactor power-imbalance boundaries by 1.10% for a 1% flow reduction.

### Pump Monitors

The pump monitors prevent the minimum core DNBR from decreasing below 1.3 by tripping the reactor due to the loss of reactor coolant pump(s). The circuitry monitoring pump operational status provides redundant trip protection for DNB by tripping the reactor on a signal derived from that of the power-to-flow ratio. The pump monitors also restrict the power level for the number of pumps in operation.

### Reactor Coolant System Pressure

During a startup accident from low power or a slow rod withdrawal from high power, the system high pressure set point is reached before the nuclear overpower trip set point. The trip setting limit shown in Figure 2.3-1 for high reactor coolant system pressure (2355 psig) has been established to maintain the system pressure below the safety limit (2750 psig) for any design transient. (1)

The low pressure (1800 psig) and variable low pressure ( $13.26T_{out} - 5989$ ) trip setting limits shown in Figure 2.3-1 have been established to maintain the DNB ratio greater than or equal to 1.3 for those design accidents that result in a pressure reduction. (2,3)

Due to the calibration and instrumentation errors the safety analysis used a variable low reactor coolant system pressure trip set point of ( $13.26T_{out} - 6029$ ).

### Coolant Outlet Temperature

The high reactor coolant outlet temperature trip setting limit (619 F) shown in Figure 2.3-1 has been established to prevent excessive core coolant temperatures in the operating range. Due to calibration and instrumentation errors, the safety analysis used a trip set point of 620 F.

### Reactor Building Pressure

The high reactor building pressure trip setting limit (4 psig) provides positive assurance that a reactor trip will occur in the unlikely event of loss-of-coolant accident, even in the absence of a low reactor coolant system pressure trip.

### Shutdown Bypass

In order to provide for control rod drive tests, zero power physics testing, and startup procedures, there is provision for bypassing certain segments of the reactor protection system. The reactor protection system segments which can be bypassed are shown in Table 2.3-1. Two conditions are imposed when the bypass is used:

1. By administrative control the nuclear overpower trip set point must be reduced to a value  $\leq 5.0\%$  of rated power during reactor shutdown.
2. A high reactor coolant system pressure trip set point of 1720 psig is automatically imposed.

The purpose of the 1720 psig high pressure trip set point is to prevent normal operation with part of the reactor protection system bypassed. This high pressure trip set point is lower than the normal low pressure trip set point so that the reactor must be tripped before the bypass is initiated. The over power trip set point of  $\leq 5.0\%$  prevents any significant reactor power from being produced when performing the physics tests. Sufficient natural circulation<sup>(5)</sup> would be available to remove 5.0% of rated power if none of the reactor coolant pumps were operating.

### Single Loop Operation


Single loop operation is permitted only after the reactor has been tripped. After the pump contact monitor trip has occurred the following actions will permit single loop operation:

1. Reset the pump contact monitor power level trip set point to 55.0%.
2. Trip one of the two protective channels receiving outlet temperature information from sensors in the idle loop.

Tripping one of the two protection channels receiving outlet temperature information from the idle loop assures a protective system trip logic of one out of two.

### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.2
- (2) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.7
- (3) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.8
- (4) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.3
- (5) FSAR, Section 14,1.2.6




PROTECTIVE SYSTEM MAXIMUM  
ALLOWABLE SET POINTS



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 2.3 - 1



PROTECTIVE SYSTEM MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SET POINTS



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 2.3 - 2

Table 2.3-1  
Reactor Protective System Trip Setting Limits

RPS Segment	Four Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Operating Power -100% Rated)	Three Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Operating Power -75% Rated)	Two Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating in A Single Loop (6) (Operating Power -46% Rated)	One Reactor Coolant Pump Operating in Each Loop (Operating Power -49% Rated)	Shutdown Bypass
1. Nuclear Power Max. (X Rated)	107.5	107.5	107.5	107.5	5.0(3)
2. Nuclear Power Max. Based on Flow (2) and Imbalance, (X Rated)	1.10 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.10 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.10 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.10 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	Bypassed
3. Nuclear Power Max. Based on Pump Monitors, (X, Rated)	NA	NA	55% (5)	55%	Bypassed
4. High Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Max.	2355	2355	2355	2355	1720(4)
5. Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Min.	1800	1800	1800	1800	Bypassed
6. Variable Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Min.	(13.26T <sub>out</sub> -5989)(1)	(13.26T <sub>out</sub> -5989)(1)	(13.26T <sub>out</sub> -5969)(1)	(13.26T <sub>out</sub> -5989)(1)	Bypassed
7. Reactor Coolant Temp. F., Max.	619	619	619	619	619
8. High Reactor Building Pressure, psig, Max.	4	4	4	4	4

(1) T<sub>out</sub> is in degrees Fahrenheit (\*F).

(2) Reactor Coolant System Flow, X.

(3) Administratively controlled reduction set  
only during reactor shutdown.

(4) Automatically set when other segments of  
the RPS are bypassed.

(5) Reactor power level trip set point produced  
by pump contact monitor reset to 55.0X.

(6) Specification 3.1.8 applies. Trip one of the  
two protection channels receiving outlet temper-  
ature information from sensors in the idle loop.

19.

2.3-7

### 3 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

#### 3.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

##### Applicability

Applies to the operating status of the reactor coolant system.

##### Objective

To specify those limiting conditions for operation of the reactor coolant system components which must be met to ensure safe reactor operation.

##### Specification

#### 3.1.1 Operational Components

##### a. Reactor Coolant Pumps

1. Whenever the reactor is critical, single pump operation shall be prohibited, single loop operation shall be restricted to testing, and other pump combinations permissible for given power levels shall be as shown in Table 2-3.1.
2. The boron concentration in the reactor coolant system shall not be reduced unless at least one reactor coolant pump or one low pressure injection pump is circulating reactor coolant.

##### b. Steam Generator

1. One steam generator shall be operable whenever the reactor coolant average temperature is above 250°F.

##### c. Pressurizer Safety Valves

1. All pressurizer code safety valves shall be operable whenever the reactor is critical.
2. At least one pressurizer code safety valve shall be operable whenever all reactor coolant system openings are closed, except for hydrostatic tests in accordance with the ASME Section III Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

##### Bases

A reactor coolant pump or low pressure injection pump is required to be in operation before the boron concentration is reduced by dilution with makeup water. Either pump will provide mixing which will prevent sudden positive reactivity changes caused by dilute coolant reaching the reactor. One low pressure injection pump will circulate the equivalent of the reactor coolant system volume in one half hour or less. (1)

The low pressure injection system suction piping is designed for 300°F and 370 psig; thus the system with its redundant components can remove decay heat when the reactor coolant system is below this temperature. (2,3)

One pressurizer code safety valve is capable of preventing overpressurization when the reactor is not critical since its relieving capacity is greater than that required by the sum of the available heat sources which are pump energy, pressurizer heaters, and reactor decay heat. (4) Both pressurizer code safety valves are required to be in service prior to criticality to conform to the system design relief capabilities. The code safety valves prevent overpressure for a rod withdrawal accident at hot shutdown. (5) The pressurizer code safety valve lift set point shall be set at 2500 psig  $\pm$  1% allowance for error and each valve shall be capable of relieving 300,000 lb/hr of saturated steam at a pressure no greater than 3% above the set pressure.

#### References

- (1) FSAR Tables 9-11 and 4-3 through 4-7.
- (2) FSAR Sections 4.2.5.1 and 9.5.2.3.
- (3) FSAR Section 4.2.5.4.
- (4) FSAR Sections 4.3.10.4 and 4.2.4.
- (5) FSAR Sections 4.3.7 and 14.1.2.2.3.

### 3.1.2 Pressurization, Heatup, and Cooldown Limitations

#### Specification

##### 3.1.2.1 Hydro Tests:

For thermal steady state system hydro test the system may be pressurized to the limits set forth in Specification 2.2 when there are fuel assemblies in the core and to ASME Code Section III limits when no fuel assemblies are present provided:

- a. Prior to initial criticality the reactor coolant system temperature is 118°F or greater or
- b. After initial criticality and during the first two years of operation the reactor coolant system temperature is 215°F or greater.

##### 3.1.2.2 Leak Tests

- a. Leak tests may be conducted under the provisions of 3.1.2.1 a and b above or
- b. After initial criticality and during the first two years of operation the system may be tested to a pressure of 1150 psig provided that the system temperature is 175°F or greater.

3.1.2.3 For the first two years of power operation ( $1.7 \times 10^6$  thermal megawatt days) the reactor coolant pressure and the system heatup and cooldown rates (with the exception of the pressurizer) shall be limited in accordance with Figure 3.1.2-1 and Figure 3.1.2-2, and are as follows:

##### Heatup:

Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature shall be to the right of and below the limit line in Figure 3.1.2-1. The heatup rates shall not exceed those shown on Figure 3.1.2-1.

##### Cooldown:

Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature for a specific cooldown shall be to the left of and below the limit line in Figure 3.1.2-2. Cooldown rates shall not exceed those shown on Figure 3.1.2-2.

3.1.2.4 The secondary side of the steam generator shall not be pressurized above 200 psig if the temperature of the vessel shell is below 100°F.

3.1.2.5 The pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates shall not exceed 100F/hr. The spray shall not be used if the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the spray fluid is greater than 410°F.

3.1.2.6 Within two years of power operation, Figures 3.1.2-1 and 3.1.2-2 shall be updated in accordance with appropriate criteria accepted by the AEC.

## Bases

All reactor coolant system components are designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes. (1) These cyclic loads are introduced by unit load transients, reactor trips, and unit heatup and cooldown operations. The number of thermal and loading cycles used for design purposes are shown in Table 4-8 of the FSAR. The maximum unit heatup and cooldown rate of 100°F per hour satisfies stress limits for cyclic operation. (2) The 200 psig pressure limit for the secondary side of the steam generator at a temperature less than 100°F satisfies stress levels for temperatures below the DTT. (3) The reactor vessel plate material and welds have been tested to verify conformity to specified requirements and a maximum NDTT value of 20°F has been determined based on Charpy V-Notch tests. The maximum NDTT value obtained for the steam generator shell material and welds was 40°F.

Figures 3.1.2-1 and 3.1.2-2 contain the limiting reactor coolant system pressure-temperature relationship for operation at DTT<sup>(4)</sup> and below to assure that stress levels are low enough to preclude brittle fracture. These stress levels and their bases are defined in Section 4.3.3 of the FSAR.

As a result of fast neutron irradiation in the region of the core, there will be an increase in the NDTT with accumulated nuclear operation. The predicted maximum NDTT increase for the 40-year exposure is shown on Figure 4.10:<sup>(4)</sup> The actual shift in NDTT will be determined periodically during plant operation by testing of irradiated vessel material samples located in this reactor vessel.<sup>(5)</sup> The results of the irradiated sample testing will be evaluated and compared to the design curve (Figure 4-11 of FSAR) being used to predict the increase in transition temperature.

- The design value for fast neutron ( $E > 1$  MeV) exposure of the reactor vessel is  $3.0 \times 10^{10}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup>--s at 2,568 MWt rated power and an integrated exposure of  $3.0 \times 10^{19}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> for 40 years operation.<sup>(6)</sup> The calculated maximum values are  $2.2 \times 10^{10}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup>--s and  $2.2 \times 10^{19}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> integrated exposure for 40 years operation at 80 percent load. (4) Figure 3.1.2-1 is based on the design value which is considerably higher than the calculated value. The DTT value for Figure 3.1.2-1 is based on the projected NDTT at the end of the first two years of operation. During these two years, the energy output has been conservatively estimated to be  $1.7 \times 10^6$  thermal megawatt days, which is equivalent to 655 days at 2,568 MWt core power. The projected
18. | fast neutron exposure of the reactor vessel for the two years is  $1.7 \times 10^{18}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> which is based on the  $1.7 \times 10^6$  thermal megawatt days and the design value for fast neutron exposure.

The actual shift in NDTT will be established periodically during plant operation by testing vessel material samples which are irradiated cumulatively by securing them near the inside wall of the vessel in the core area. To compensate for the increases in the NDTT caused by irradiation, the limits on the pressure-temperature relationship are periodically changed to stay within the established stress limits during heatup and cooldown.

18. The NDTT shift and the magnitudes of the thermal and pressure stresses are sensitive to integrated reactor power and not to instantaneous power level. Figure 3.1.2-1 and 3.1.2-2 are applicable to reactor core thermal ratings up to 2,568 MWt.

The pressure limit line on Figure 3.1.3-1 has been selected such that the reactor vessel stress resulting from internal pressure will not exceed 15 percent yield strength considering the following:

1. A 25 psi error in measured pressure.
2. System pressure is measured in either loop.
3. Maximum differential pressure between the point of system pressure measurement and reactor vessel inlet for all operating pump combinations.


For adequate conservatism in fracture toughness including size (thickness) effect, a maximum pressure of 550 psig below 275°F with a maximum heatup and cooldown rate of 50°F/hr has been imposed for the initial two year period as shown on Figure 3.1.2-1. During this two year period, a fracture toughness criterion applicable to Oconee Unit 1 beyond this period will be developed by the AEC. It will be based on the evaluation of the fracture toughness properties of heavy section (thickness) steels, both irradiated and unirradiated, for the AEC-HSST program and the PVRC program, and with considerations of test results of the Oconee Unit 1 reactor surveillance program.

The spray temperature difference restriction is imposed to maintain the thermal stresses at the pressurizer spray line nozzle below the design limit. Temperature requirements for the steam generator correspond with the measured NDTT for the shell.

#### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR Section 4.1.2.4
- (2) ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, Section III, N-415
- (3) FSAR Section 4.3.10.5
- (4) FSAR Section 4.3.3
- (5) FSAR Section 4.4.6
- (6) FSAR Sections 4.1.2.8 and 4.3.3

POINT	TEMP.	PRESS.
A	40	550
B	275	550
C	275	1400
D	380	2275



Indicated Reactor Coolant System Temperature, °F



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP LIMITATIONS  
 (APPLICABLE UP TO A<sub>N</sub> INTEGRATED EXPOSURE  
 OF  $1.7 \times 10^{18}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> OR DTT - 144 °F)

Figure 3.1.2-1


POINT	TEMP	PRESS
A	380	2275
B	275	1400
C	275	550
D	250	550
E	250	450
F	175	450
G	175	200
H	120	200

RC PUMP COMBINATIONS ALLOWABLE:

ABOVE 185F ALL

BELOW 185F 1-A, 1-B; 0-A, 2-B; 1-A, 0-B; 0-A, 1-B

- (1) WHEN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (DH) IS OPERATING WITHOUT ANY RC PUMPS OPERATING, INDICATED DH RETURN TEMP. TO THE REACTOR VESSEL SHALL BE USED.
- (2) IN THE TEMPERATURE RANGE 260F TO 175F, A MAXIMUM STEP TEMPERATURE CHANGE OF 75F IS ALLOWABLE FOLLOWED BY A ONE HOUR MINIMUM HOLD ON TEMPERATURE. IF THE STEP CHANGE IS TAKEN BELOW 250F RC TEMPERATURE, THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE STEP SHALL BE THAT WHICH YIELDS A FINAL TEMPERATURE OF 175F. THE STEP TEMPERATURE CHANGE IS DEFINED AS RC TEMPERATURE (BEFORE STOPPING ALL RC PUMPS) MINUS THE DH RETURN TEMPERATURE TO THE REACTOR VESSEL.



REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COOLDOWN LIMITATIONS  
(APPLICABLE UP TO OTT = 185°F)



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 3.1.2 - 2

Rev. 19 5/5/72

### 3.1.3 Minimum Conditions for Criticality

#### Specification

- 3.1.3.1 The reactor coolant temperature shall be above 525°F except for portions of low power physics testing when the requirements of specification 3.1.9 shall apply.
- 3.1.3.2 Reactor coolant temperature shall be above DTT + 10°F.
- 3.1.3.3 When the reactor coolant temperature is below the minimum temperature specified in 3.1.3.1 above, except for portions of low power physics testing when the requirements of specification 3.1.9 shall apply, the reactor shall be subcritical by an amount equal to or greater than the calculated reactivity insertion due to depressurization.
- 3.1.3.4 The reactor shall be maintained subcritical by at least 1%  $\Delta k/k$  until a steam bubble is formed and a water level between 80 and 396 inches is established in the pressurizer.

#### Bases

At the beginning of life of the initial fuel cycle, the moderator temperature coefficient is expected to be slightly positive at operating temperatures with the operating configuration of control rods. <sup>(1)</sup> Calculations show that above 525°F, the consequences are acceptable.

Since the moderator temperature coefficient at lower temperatures will be less negative or more positive than at operating temperature, <sup>(2)</sup> start-up and operation of the reactor when reactor coolant temperature is less than 525°F is prohibited except where necessary for low power physics tests.

The potential reactivity insertion due to the moderator pressure coefficient <sup>(2)</sup> that could result from depressurizing the coolant from 2100 psia to saturation pressure of 900 psia is approximately 0.1%  $\Delta k/k$ .

During physics tests, special operating precautions will be taken. In addition, the strong negative Doppler coefficient <sup>(1)</sup> and the small integrated  $\Delta k/k$  would limit the magnitude of a power excursion resulting from a reduction of moderator density.

The requirement that the reactor is not to be made critical below DTT + 10F provides increased assurances that the proper relationship between primary coolant pressure and temperatures will be maintained relative to the NDTT of the primary coolant system. Heatup to this temperature will be accomplished by operating the reactor coolant pumps.

If the shutdown margin required by Specification 3.5.2 is maintained, there is no possibility of an accidental criticality as a result of a decrease of coolant pressure.

The requirement for pressurizer bubble formation and specified water level when the reactor is less than 1% subcritical will assure that the reactor

coolant system cannot become solid in the event of a rod withdrawal accident or a start-up accident. (3)

REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 3
- (2) FSAR, Section 3.2.2.1.4
- (3) FSAR, Supplement 3, Answer 14.4.1

### 3.1.4 Reactor Coolant System Activity

#### Specification

The total activity of the reactor coolant due to nuclides with half lives longer than 30 minutes shall not exceed  $224/E$  microcuries per ml whenever the reactor is critical.  $E$  is the average (mean) beta and gamma energies per disintegration, in MeV, weighted in proportion to the measured activity of the radionuclides in reactor coolant samples.

#### Bases

The above specification is based on limiting the consequences of a postulated accident involving the double-ended rupture of a steam generator tube. The rupture of a steam generator tube enables reactor coolant and its associated activity to enter the secondary system where volatile isotopes could be discharged to the atmosphere through condenser air-ejectors and through steam safety valves (which may lift momentarily). Since the major portion of the activity entering the secondary system is due to noble gases, the bulk of the activity would be discharged to the atmosphere. The activity release continues until the operator stops the leakage by reducing the reactor coolant system pressure below the set point of the steam safety valves and isolates the faulty steam generator. The operator can identify the faulty steam generator by using the  $^{16}\text{N}$  detectors on the steam lines in conjunction with the off-gas monitors on the condenser air ejector lines; thus he can isolate the faulty steam generator within 34 minutes after the tube break occurred. During that 34 minute period, a maximum of 2760 ft<sup>3</sup> of 580°F reactor coolant leaked into the secondary system. (This is equivalent to a cold makeup volume of 1980 ft<sup>3</sup>).

The activity discharged to the atmosphere as the result of a steam generator tube rupture will not be increased by the loss of station power since condenser cooling water flow can be maintained by gravity flow from Lake Keowee through the emergency condenser cooling water discharge to the Keowee Hydro tailrace.

The controlling dose for the steam generator tube rupture accident is the whole-body dose resulting from immersion in the cloud of released activity. To insure that the public is adequately protected, the specific activity of the reactor coolant will be limited to a value which will insure that the whole-body dose at the site boundary will not exceed 0.5 Rem should a steam generator tube rupture accident occur.

Although only volatile isotopes will be released from the secondary system, the following whole-body dose calculation conservatively assumes that all of the radioactivity which enters the secondary system with the reactor coolant is released to the atmosphere. Both the beta and gamma radiation from these isotopes contribute to the whole-body dose. The gamma dose is dependent on the finite size and configuration of the cloud. However, the analysis employs the simple model of a semi-infinite cloud, which gives an upper limit to the potential gamma dose. The semi-infinite cloud model is applicable to the beta dose because of the short range of beta radiation in air. It is further assumed that meteorological conditions during the course of the accident correspond to Pasquill Type F and 1 meter per second wind speed, resulting in a X/Q value of  $1.16 \times 10^{-4}$  sec/m<sup>3</sup>, which includes a correction factor of 2.2 to the dilution

calculated by the Pasquill method. This correction factor was shown appropriate by on site diffusion measurements using SF<sub>6</sub> (sulfur hexafluoride) as a gas tracer.

The combined gamma and beta whole body dose from a semi-infinite cloud is given by:

$$\text{Dose (Rem)} = \frac{1}{2}[\bar{E} \cdot A \cdot V \cdot X/Q \cdot (3.7 \times 10^{10} \text{ dps/Ci}) \cdot (1.33 \times 10^{-11} \text{ Rem/MeV/m}^3)]$$

$$\text{Dose (Rem)} = 0.246 \cdot \bar{E} \cdot A \cdot V \cdot X/Q$$

$$A_{\text{max}} (\mu\text{Ci/cc}) = \frac{(\text{Dose})_{\text{max}}}{0.246 \cdot \bar{E} \cdot V \cdot X/Q} = \frac{0.5}{0.246 \times \bar{E} \times 78.25 \times 1.16 \times 10^{-4}}$$

$$A_{\text{max}} (\mu\text{Ci/cc}) = 224/\bar{E}$$

Where

A = Reactor coolant activity ( $\mu\text{Ci/ml} = \text{Ci/m}^3$ )

V = Reactor coolant volume at 580°F leaked into secondary system ( $2763 \text{ ft}^3 = 78.25 \text{ m}^3$ )

X/Q = Atmospheric dispersion coefficient at site boundary for a two hour period ( $1.16 \times 10^{-4} \text{ sec/m}^3$ )

$\bar{E}$  = Average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (MeV)

Calculations required to determine  $\bar{E}$  will consist of the following:

1. Quantitative measurement of the specific activity (in units of  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$ ) of radionuclides with half lives longer than 30 minutes, which make up at least 95% of the total activity in reactor coolant samples.
2. A determination of the average beta and gamma decay energies per disintegration for each nuclide, measured in (1) above, by utilizing known decay energies and decay schemes (e.g., Table of Isotopes, Sixth Edition, March 1968).
3. A calculation of  $\bar{E}$  by the average beta and gamma energy for each radionuclide in proportion to its specific activity, as measured in (1) above.

#### REFERENCES

FSAR, Section 14.1.2.10

3.1.5 Chemistry

Specification

19. | 3.1.5.1 If the concentration of oxygen in the primary coolant exceeds 0.1 ppm during power operation, corrective action shall be initiated within eight hours to return oxygen levels to  $\leq 0.1$  ppm.
19. | 3.1.5.2 If the concentration of chloride in the primary coolant exceeds 0.10 ppm during power operation, corrective action shall be initiated within eight hours to return chloride levels to  $\leq 0.10$  ppm.
- 3.1.5.3 If the concentration of fluorides in the primary coolant exceeds 0.10 ppm following modifications or repair to the primary system involving welding, corrective action shall be initiated within eight hours to return fluoride levels to  $\leq 0.10$  ppm.
- 3.1.5.4 If the concentration limits of oxygen, chloride or fluoride in 3.1.5.1, 3.1.5.2 and 3.1.5.3 above are not restored within 24 hours the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours thereafter. If the normal operational limits are not restored within an additional 24-hour period, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within 24-hours thereafter.
- 3.1.5.5 If the oxygen concentration and the chloride or fluoride concentration of the primary coolant system individually exceed 1.0 ppm, the reactor shall be immediately brought to the hot shutdown condition using normal shutdown procedure and action is to be taken immediately to return the system to within normal operation specifications. If normal operating specifications have not been reached in 12 hours, the reactor shall be brought to a cold shutdown condition using normal procedure.

Bases

By maintaining the chloride, fluoride and oxygen concentration in the reactor coolant within the specifications, the integrity of the reactor coolant system is protected against potential stress corrosion attack. (1,2)

The oxygen concentration in the reactor coolant system is normally expected to be below detectable limits since dissolved hydrogen is used when the reactor is critical and a residual of hydrazine is used when the reactor is subcritical to control the oxygen. The requirement that the oxygen concentration not exceed 0.1 ppm during power operation is added assurance that stress corrosion cracks will not occur. (4)

If the oxygen, chloride, or fluoride limits are exceeded, measures can be taken to correct the condition (e.g., switch to the spare demineralizer, replace the ion exchange resin, increase the hydrogen concentration in the makeup tank, etc.) and further because of the time dependent nature of any adverse effects arising from chlorides or oxygen concentrations in excess of the limits, it is unnecessary to shutdown immediately, since the condition can be corrected.

- The oxygen and halogen limits specified are at least an order of magnitude below concentrations which could result in damage to materials found in the reactor coolant system even if maintained for an extended period of time. (4) Thus, the period of eight hours to initiate corrective action and the period of 24 hours to perform corrective action to restore the concentration within the limits have been established. The eight hour period to initiate corrective action allows time to ascertain that the chemical analyses are correct and to locate the source of contamination. If corrective action has not been effective at the end of 24 hours, then the reactor coolant system will be brought to the hot shutdown condition within 12 hours and corrective action will continue. If the operational limits are not restored within an additional 24 hour period, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours thereafter.
- 19.

The maximum limit of 1 ppm for the oxygen and halogen concentration that will not be exceeded was selected as the hot shutdown limit because these values have been shown to be safe at 500°F. (3)

#### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 4.1.2.7
- (2) FSAR, Section 9.2.2
- (3) Stress Corrosion of Metals, Logan
- (4) Corrosion and Wear Handbook, O. J. DePaul, Editor

### 3.1.6 Leakage

#### Specification

- 3.1.6.1 If the total reactor coolant leakage rate exceeds 10 gpm, the reactor shall be shutdown within 24 hours of detection.
- 3.1.6.2 If unidentified reactor coolant leakage (excluding normal evaporative losses) exceeds 1 gpm or if any reactor coolant leakage is evaluated as unsafe, the reactor shall be shutdown within 24 hours of detection.
- 3.1.6.3 If any reactor coolant leakage exists through a non-isolable fault in a RCS strength boundary (such as the reactor vessel, piping, valve body, etc.), the reactor shall be shutdown and cooldown to the cold shutdown condition shall be initiated within 24 hours of detection.
- 3.1.6.4 If reactor shutdown is required by Specification 3.1.6.1, 3.1.6.2 or 3.1.6.3, the rate of shutdown and the conditions of shutdown shall be determined by the safety evaluation for each case and justified in writing as soon thereafter as practicable.
- 3.1.6.5 Action to evaluate the safety implication of reactor coolant leakage shall be initiated within 4 hours of detection. The nature, as well as the magnitude, of the leak shall be considered in this evaluation. The safety evaluation shall assure that the exposure of offsite personnel to radiation is within the guidelines of 10CFR20.
- 3.1.6.6 If reactor shutdown is required per Specification 3.1.6.1, 3.1.6.2 or 3.1.6.3 the reactor shall not be restarted until the leak is repaired or until the problem is otherwise corrected.
- 3.1.6.7 When the reactor is critical and above 2% power, two reactor coolant leak detection systems of different operating principles shall be in operation, with one of the two systems sensitive to radioactivity. The systems sensitive to radioactivity may be out-of-service for 48 hours provided two other means are available to detect leakage.
- 3.1.6.8 Indicated leakage of reactor coolant shall be considered actual leakage unless (1) the indicated leak cannot be substantiated by direct observation or other indication or (2) a safety problem does not exist. Loss of reactor coolant through reactor coolant pump seals and system valves to connecting systems which vent to the gas vent header and from which coolant can be returned to the reactor coolant system shall not be considered as reactor coolant leakage and shall not be subject to the consideration of Specifications 3.1.6.1 - 3.1.6.6 except that such losses when added to leakage shall not exceed 30 gpm.

#### Bases

Every reasonable effort will be made to reduce reactor coolant leakage including evaporative losses (which may be on the order of .5 gpm) to the lowest possible rate and at least below 1 gpm in order to prevent a large leak from masking the presence of a smaller leak. Water inventory balances radiation monitoring equipment, boric acid crystalline deposits, and physical inspections can disclose

reactor coolant leaks. Any leak of radioactive fluid, whether from the reactor coolant system primary boundary or not can be a serious problem with respect to in-plant radioactivity contamination and cleanup or it could develop into a still more serious problem; and therefore, first indications of such leakage will be followed up as soon as practicable.

Although some leak rates on the order of GPM may be tolerable from a dose point of view, especially if they are to closed systems, it must be recognized that leaks in the order of drops per minute through any of the walls of the primary system could be indicative of materials failure such as by stress corrosion cracking. If depressurization, isolation and/or other safety measures are not taken promptly, these small breaks could develop into much larger leaks, possibly into a gross pipe rupture. Therefore, the nature of the leak, as well as the magnitude of the leakage must be considered in the safety evaluation.

When the source of leakage has been identified, the situation can be evaluated to determine if operation can safely continue. This evaluation will be performed by the Operating Staff and will be documented in writing and approved by the Superintendent. Under these conditions, an allowable reactor coolant system leakage rate of 10 gpm has been established. This explained leakage rate of 10 gpm is also well within the capacity of one high pressure injection pump and makeup would be available even under the loss of off-site power condition.

If leakage is to the reactor building it may be identified by one or more of the following methods:

- a. The reactor building air particulate monitor is sensitive to low leak rates. The rates of reactor coolant leakage to which the instrument is sensitive are .10 gpm to greater than 30 gpm, assuming corrosion product activity and no fuel cladding leakage. Under these conditions, an increase in coolant leakage of 1 gpm is detectable within 10 minutes after it occurs.
- b. The iodine monitor, gaseous monitor and area monitor are not as sensitive to corrosion product activity.<sup>(1)</sup> It is calculated that the iodine monitor is sensitive to an 8 gpm leak and the gaseous monitor is sensitive to a 230 gpm leak based on the presence of tramp uranium (no fission products from tramp uranium are assumed to be present). However, any fission products in the coolant will make these monitors more sensitive to coolant leakage.
- c. In addition to the radiation monitors, leakage is also monitored by a level indicator in the reactor building normal sump. Changes in normal sump level may be indicative of leakage from any of the systems located inside the reactor building such as reactor coolant system, low pressure service water system, component cooling system and steam and feedwater lines or condensation of humidity within the reactor building atmosphere. The sump capacity is 15 gallons per inch of height and each graduation on the level indicates  $\frac{1}{2}$  inch of sump height. This indicator is capable of detecting changes on the order of 7.5 gallons of leakage into the sump. A 1 gpm leak would therefore be detectable within less than 10 minutes.

- d. Total reactor coolant system leakage rate is periodically determined by comparing indications of reactor power, coolant temperature, pressurizer water level and letdown storage tank level over a time interval. All of these indications are recorded. Since the pressurizer level is maintained essentially constant by the pressurizer level controller, any coolant leakage is replaced by coolant from the letdown storage tank resulting in a tank level decrease. The letdown storage tank capacity is 31 gallons per inch of height and each graduation on the level recorder represents 1 inch of tank height. This inventory monitoring method is capable of detecting changes on the order of 31 gallons. A 1 gpm leak would therefore be detectable within approximately one half hour.

As described above, in addition to direct observation, the means of detecting reactor coolant leakage are based on 2 different principles, i.e., activity, sump level and reactor constant inventory measurements. Two systems of different principles provide, therefore, diversified ways of detecting leakage to the reactor building.

The upper limit of 30 gpm is based on the contingency of a complete loss of station power. A 30 gpm loss of water in conjunction with a complete loss of station power and subsequent cooldown of the reactor coolant system by the turbine bypass system (set at 1,040 psia) and steam driven emergency feedwater pump would require more than 60 minutes to empty the pressurizer from the combined effect of system leakage and contraction. This will be ample time to restore electrical power to the station and makeup flow to the reactor coolant system.

#### REFERENCES

FSAR Section 11.1.2.4.1

### 3.1.7 Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity

#### Specification

The maximum moderator temperature coefficient at full power shall not exceed  $+0.9 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^\circ F$ .

#### Bases

The accident analysis described in the FSAR (1) was done for a range of moderator temperature coefficient values including  $+0.9 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^\circ F$ . The maximum positive value of the moderator coefficient used in the calculation of clad temperature (2) for the loss-of-coolant accident was  $+0.9 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^\circ F$ . The threshold value of the positive moderator coefficient that allows azimuthal xenon oscillations is greater than  $+0.9 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^\circ F$ .

When the hot zero power value is corrected to obtain the hot full power value, the following corrections will be applied.

#### A. Uncertainty in isothermal measurement

The measured moderator temperature coefficient will contain uncertainty on the account of the following:

1.  $\pm 0.2^\circ F$  in the  $\Delta T$  of the base and perturbed conditions.
2. Uncertainty in the reactivity measurement of  $\pm 0.1 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k$ .

Proper corrections will be added for the above conditions to result in a conservative moderator coefficient.

#### B. Doppler coefficient at hot zero power

During the isothermal moderator coefficient measurement at hot zero power, the fuel temperature will increase by the same amount as the moderator. The measured temperature coefficient must be increased by  $0.16 \times 10^{-4} (\Delta k/k)/^\circ F$  to obtain a pure moderator temperature coefficient.

C. Moderator temperature change

The hot zero power measurement must be reduced by  $.09 \times 10^{-4}$   $(\Delta k/k)/^{\circ}F$ . This corrects for the difference in water temperature at zero power (532<sup>o</sup>F) and 15% power (580<sup>o</sup>F) and for the increased fuel temperature effects at 15% power. Above this power, the average moderator temperature remains 580<sup>o</sup>F. However, the coefficient,  $\alpha_m$ , must also be adjusted for the interaction of an average moderator temperature with increased fuel temperatures. This correction is  $-.001 \times 10^{-4} \Delta\alpha_m/\Delta\%$  power. It adjusts the 15% power  $\alpha_m$  to the moderator coefficient at any power level above 15% power. For example, to correct to 100% power,  $\alpha_m$  is adjusted by  $(-.001 \times 10^{-4})$  (85%), which is  $-.085 \times 10^{-4} \Delta\alpha_m$ .

D. Dissolved boron concentration

This correction is for any difference in boron concentration, if required, between zero and full power. Since the moderator coefficient is more positive for greater dissolved boron concentrations, the sign of the correction depends on whether boron is added or removed. The correction is  $0.16 \times 10^{-6} \Delta\alpha_m/\Delta PPM$ . (The magnitude of the correction varies slightly with boron concentration; the value presented above, however, is valid for a range in boron concentrations from 1000 to 1400 ppm.)

E. Control rod insertion

This correction is for the difference in control rod worth ( $\% \Delta k/k$ ) in the core between zero and full power. The correction is  $0.17 \times 10^{-4} \Delta\alpha_m/\% \Delta k/l$ , where the sign for rod worth change is negative for rod insertion, because the moderator coefficient is more negative for a larger rod worth in the core.

F. Isothermal to distributed temperature

The correction for spatially distributed moderator temperature has been found to be less than or equal to zero. Therefore, zero is a conservative correction value for distributed effects.

G. Azimuthal xenon stability

Before commercial operation a test will be performed to verify that divergent azimuthal xenon oscillations do not occur.

REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 14
- (2) FSAR, Section 3
- (3) FSAR, Section 14.2.2.3.4

### 3.1.8 Single Loop Restrictions

#### Specification

The following special limitations are placed on single loop operation in addition to the limitations set forth in Specification 2.3.

19. |
- 3.1.8.1 Single loop operation is authorized for test purposes only.
  - 3.1.8.2 At least 23 incore detectors meeting the requirements of Technical Specification 3.5.4.1 and 3.5.4.2 shall be available throughout this test to check gross core power distribution.
  - 3.1.8.3 The pump monitor trip set point shall be set at no greater than 50% of rated power.
  - 3.1.8.4 The outlet reactor coolant temperature trip set point shall be set at no greater than 610°F.
  - 3.1.8.5 At 15% of rated power and every 10% of rated power above 15%, measurements shall be taken of each operable incore neutron detector and each operable incore thermocouple, reactor coolant loop flow rates and vessel inlet and outlet temperatures, and evaluation of this data determined to be acceptable before proceeding to higher power levels.
  - 3.1.8.6 DRL shall be notified of the scheduled date of single loop testing. Upon completion of test, results shall be reported to DRL. Subsequent single loop operation shall be contingent upon written approval by DRL.

#### Bases

The purpose of single loop testing is to (1) supplement the 1/6 scale model test information, (2) verify predicted flow through the idle loop, (3) verify changes in power level do not affect flow distribution or core power distribution, and (4) demonstrate that limiting safety system settings (pump monitor trip set point and reactor coolant outlet temperature trip set point) can be conservatively adjusted taking into account instrument errors.

Limiting the pump monitor trip set point to 50% of rated power and the reactor coolant outlet temperature trip set point to 610°F to perform this confirmatory testing assures operation well within the core protective safety limits shown in Figure 2.1-3, curve 2.

Incore thermocouples will be installed and data will be taken to check outlet core temperature profiles. This data will be used in evaluating test results.

3.1.9 Low Power Physics Testing Restrictions

Specification

The following special limitations are placed on low power physics testing.

3.1.9.1 Reactor Protective System Requirements

- a. Below 1720 psig Shutdown Bypass trip setting limits shall apply in accordance with Table 2.3-1.
- b. Above 1800 psig nuclear overpower trip shall be set at less than 5.0%. Other settings shall be in accordance with Table 2.3-1.

3.1.9.2 Startup rate rod withdrawal hold shall be in effect at all times.

Bases

19. | Technical Specification 3.1.9.2 will apply to both the source and intermediate ranges. |

The above specification provides additional safety margins during low power physics testing.

### 3.1.10 Control Rod Operation

#### Specification

- 3.1.10.1 Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature for control rod operation shall be to the left of and above the limiting pressure versus temperature curve as shown in Figure 3.1.10-1.
- 3.1 10.2 The dissolved gas concentration shall not exceed 100 standard cc/liter.
- 3.1 10.3 If either the limits of 3.1.10.1 or 3.1.10.2 are exceeded, the center control rod drive mechanism shall be checked for accumulation of undissolved gases.


#### Base:

The limiting pressure versus temperature curve for dissolved gases is determined by the equilibrium pressure versus temperature curve for the dissolved gas concentration of 100 std. cc/liter of water. This equilibrium total pressure is the sum of the partial pressure of the dissolved gases plus the partial pressure of water at a given temperature.

By maintaining the reactor coolant temperature and pressure as specified above, any dissolved gases in the reactor coolant system are maintained in solution.

Although the dissolved gas concentration is expected to be approximately 20-40 std. cc/liter of water, the dissolved gas concentration is conservatively assumed to be 100 std. cc/liter of water at the reactor vessel outlet temperature.

If either the maximum dissolved gas concentration (100 std. cc/liter of water) is exceeded or the operating pressure falls below or to the right of the limiting pressure versus temperature curve, the center CRDM should be checked for accumulation of undissolved gases.



LIMITING PRESSURE VS TEMPERATURE  
CURVE FOR 100 STD CC/LITER H<sub>2</sub>O



CCONEE NUCLEAR STATION  
Figure 3.1.10 - 1  
Rev. 18 3/10/72  
(New Page)

Applicability

Applies to the high pressure injection and the chemical addition systems.

Objective

To provide for adequate boration under all operating conditions to assure ability to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown condition.

Specification

The reactor shall not be critical unless the following conditions are met:

- 3.2.1 Two high pressure injection pumps are operable except as specified in 3.3.
- 3.2.2 A source of concentrated soluble boric acid in addition to the borated water storage tank, is available and operable. This can be either:
  - a. The boric acid mix tank containing at least the equivalent of 450 ft<sup>3</sup> of 10,600 ppm boron as boric acid solution at a temperature of at least 10°F above the crystallization temperature. System piping and valves necessary to establish a flow path from the tank to the high pressure injection system shall also be operable and shall have at least the same temperature requirement as the boric acid mix tank. One associated boric acid pump shall be operable. If the daily average air temperature in the vicinity of this tank and associated flow path piping is less than 85°F, at least one channel of heat tracing shall be in operation for this tank and piping.
  - b. The concentrated boric acid storage tank containing at least the equivalent of 550 ft<sup>3</sup> of 8700 ppm boron as boric acid solution with a temperature of at least 10°F above the crystallization temperature. System piping and valves necessary to establish a flow path from the tank to the high pressure injection system shall be operable and shall have the same temperature requirement as the concentrated boric acid storage tank. One associated boric acid pump shall be operable. If the daily average air temperature in the vicinity of this tank is less than 70°F, at least one channel of heat tracing shall be in operation for this tank and associated piping.

Bases

The high pressure injection system and chemical addition system provide control of the reactor coolant system boron concentration.<sup>(1)</sup> This is normally accomplished by using any of the three high pressure injection pumps in series with a boric acid pump associated with either the boric acid mix tank or the concentrated boric acid storage tank. An alternate method of boration will be use of the high pressure injection pumps taking suction directly from the borated water storage tank.<sup>(2)</sup>

The quantity of boric acid in storage from any of the 3 above mentioned sources is sufficient to borate the reactor coolant system to a 1% subcritical margin in the cold condition at the end of core life. The maximum required is the equivalent of 396 ft<sup>3</sup> of 10,600 ppm boron as boric acid solution. A minimum of 450 ft<sup>3</sup> of 10,600 ppm boron as boric acid solution in the boric acid mix tank, a minimum of 550 ft<sup>3</sup> of 8,700 ppm boron as boric acid solution in the concentrated boric acid storage tank or a minimum of 350,000 gallons of 1800 ppm boron as boric acid solution in the borated water storage tank(3) will satisfy the requirements. The specification assures that at least two of these supplies are available whenever the reactor is critical so that a single failure will not prevent boration to a cold condition. The required amount of boric acid can be added in several ways. The quickest method allows for the necessary boron addition in less than one hour. The slowest method (using one 10 gpm pump taking suction from the boric acid storage tank) would require approximately 3 hours to inject enough boron to keep the reactor 1% subcritical with xenon in the core. As xenon decays out, more boron would have to be added. Therefore, in order to account for xenon decay, the 10 gpm pump would pump for something less than 5 hours. At this time, the reactor coolant system would be at a temperature of approximately 175°F and the core would be more than 1% subcritical.

The concentration of boron in the boric acid mix tank and concentrated boric acid storage tank may be higher than the concentration which would crystallize at ambient conditions. For this reason and to assure a flow of boric acid is available when needed these tanks and their associated piping will be kept 10°F above the crystallization temperature for the concentration present. Once in the high pressure injection system, the concentrate is sufficiently well mixed and diluted so that normal system temperatures assure boric acid solubility.

The boric acid mix tank concentration of 10,600 ppm boron corresponds to a precipitation temperature of 80°F, and the concentrated boric acid storage tank concentration of 8700 ppm corresponds to a precipitation temperature of 68°F. It is expected that the surface temperatures of these tanks and associated piping will be 10°F above the precipitation temperatures. If the air temperature should approach a precipitation temperature, at least one channel of heat tracing in service assures that heat losses to the atmosphere will be made up to maintain this 10°F margin.

#### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 9.1; 9.2
- (2) FSAR Figure 6.2
- (3) Technical Specification 3.3

3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING, REACTOR BUILDING COOLING, REACTOR BUILDING  
SPRAY AND PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEMS

Applicability

Applies to the emergency core cooling, reactor building cooling, reactor building spray and reactor building penetration room ventilation systems.

Objective

To define the conditions necessary to assure immediate availability of the emergency core cooling, reactor building cooling, reactor building spray and reactor building penetration room ventilation systems.

Specification

3.3.1 The reactor shall not be made critical, unless the following conditions are met:

a. Injection System

- (1) The borated water storage tank shall contain a minimum of 350,000 gallons of water having a minimum concentration of 1,800 ppm boron at a temperature not less than 40°F. The manual valve, LP-28, on the discharge line from the borated water storage tank shall be locked open.
- (2) Two out of three high pressure injection pumps shall be operable.
- (3) Two Engineered Safety feature low pressure injection pumps shall be operable.
- (4) Two low pressure injection coolers shall be operable.
- (5) Two BWST level instrument channels shall be operable.
- (6) The two reactor building emergency sump isolation valves shall be either manually or remote-manually operable.

b. Core Flooding System

- (1) The two core flooding tanks shall each contain a minimum of  $1040 \pm 30$  ft<sup>3</sup> of borated water at  $600 \pm 25$  psig.
- (2) Core flooding tank boron concentration shall not be less than 1,800 ppm boron.
- (3) The electrically operated discharge valves from the core flood tank shall be open and breakers locked open and tagged.
- (4) Two core flood tank pressure instrument channels shall be operable.

c. Reactor Building Spray System and Reactor Building Cooling System

The following subsystems shall be operable:

- (1) Two reactor building spray pumps and their associated spray nozzle headers.
- (2) Three reactor building cooling fans and associated cooling units.

d. Low Pressure Service Water System

- (1) Two low pressure service water pumps shall be operable.
- (2) The valve in the LPSW discharge from the reactor building cooler (LPSW 108) shall be locked open.

e. Reactor Building Penetration Room Ventilation System

Both penetration room fans and their associated filters shall be operable. Manual operated system valves (PR-12, PR-14, PR-16, and PR-18) shall be locked open.

- f. Engineered Safety feature valves and interlocks associated with each of the above systems shall be operable.

18. 3.3.2 Except as noted in 3.3.3 below, maintenance shall be allowed during power operation on any component(s) in the high pressure injection, core flooding, low pressure injection, low pressure service water, reactor building spray, or penetration room ventilation systems which will not remove more than one train of each system from service. Components shall not be removed from service so that the affected system train is inoperable for more than 24 consecutive hours. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3.1 within 24 hours, the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours. If the requirements of Specification 3.3.1 are not met within an additional 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

3.3.3 Exceptions to 3.3.2 shall be as follows:

- a. Both core flooding tanks shall be operational at all times.
  - b. Both motor operated valves associated with the core flooding tanks shall be fully open at all times.
  - c. One reactor building cooling fan and associated cooling unit shall be permitted to be out-of-service for seven days provided only one reactor building spray pump and associated spray nozzle header is out of service at the same time per Specification 3.3.2.
- No more than one*

18. 3.3.4 Prior to initiating maintenance on any of the components, the duplicate (redundant) component shall be tested to assure operability.

Rev. 18 3/10/72

### Bases

The requirements of Specification 3.3.1 assure that, before the reactor can be made critical, adequate engineered safety features are operable. Two high pressure injection pumps and two low pressure injection pumps are specified. However, only one of each is necessary to supply emergency coolant to the reactor in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. Both core flooding tanks are required as a single core flood tank has insufficient inventory to reflood the core.(1)

The borated water storage tanks are used for two purposes:

- A. As a supply of borated water for accident conditions.
- B. As a supply of borated water for flooding the fuel transfer canal during refueling operation.(2)

350,000 gallons of borated water are required to supply emergency core cooling and reactor building spray in the event of a loss-of-core cooling accident. This amount fulfills requirements for emergency core cooling. The borated water storage tank capacity of 388,000 gallons is based on refueling volume requirements. Heaters maintain the borated water supply at a temperature to prevent freezing. The boron concentration is set at the amount of boron required to maintain the core 1 percent subcritical at 70°F without any control rods in the core. This concentration is 1,338 ppm boron while the minimum value specified in the tanks is 1,300 ppm boron.

The post accident reactor building cooling may be accomplished by three cooling units, by two spray units or by a combination of two cooling units and one spray unit. The specified requirements assure that the required post accident components are available.(3)

The spray system utilizes common suction lines with the low pressure injection system. If a single train of equipment is removed from either system, the other train must be assured to be operable in each system.

When the reactor is critical, maintenance is allowed per Specification 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 provided requirements in Specification 3.3.4 are met which assure operability of the duplicate components. Operability of the specified components shall be based on the results of testing as required by Technical Specification 4.5. The maintenance period of up to 24 hours is acceptable if the operability of equipment redundant to that removed from service is demonstrated immediately prior to removal. The basis of acceptability is a low likelihood of failure within 24 hours following such demonstration.

In the event that the need for emergency core cooling should occur, functioning of one train (one high pressure injection pump, one low pressure injection pump, and both core flooding tanks) will protect the core and in the event of a main coolant loop severance, limit the peak clad temperature to less than 2,300°F and the metal-water reaction to that representing less than 1 percent of the clad.

Three low pressure service water pumps serve Oconee Units 1 and 2 and two low pressure service water pumps serve Oconee Unit 3. There is a manual cross-connection on the supply headers for Units 1, 2 and 3.

One low pressure service water pump per unit is required for normal operation. The normal operating requirements are greater than the emergency requirements following a loss-of-coolant accident.

A single train of reactor building penetration room ventilation equipment retains full capacity to control and minimize the release of radioactive materials from the reactor building to the environment in post-accident conditions.

#### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 14.2.2.3
- (2) FSAR, Section 9.5.2
- (3) FSAR, Section 14.2.2.3.5
- (4) FSAR, Section 6.4

### 3.4 STEAM & POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM

#### Applicability

Applies to the turbine cycle components for removal of reactor decay heat.

#### Objective

To specify minimum conditions of the turbine cycle equipment necessary to assure the capability to remove decay heat from the reactor core.

#### Specification

The reactor shall not be heated above 250°F unless the following conditions are met:

- 3.4.1 Capability to remove a decay heat load of 5 percent full reactor power from at least one of the following means:
  - a. A hotwell pump, condensate booster pump, and a main feedwater pump.
  - b. The emergency feedwater pump.
  - c. A hotwell pump and a condensate booster pump.
- 3.4.2 The sixteen steam system safety valves are operable.
- 3.4.3 The turbine bypass system shall have four valves operable.
- 3.4.4 A minimum of 72,000 gallons of water per operating unit shall be available in the upper surge tank, condensate storage tank, and hotwell.
- 3.4.5 The emergency condenser circulating water system shall be operable as per Specification 4.1.

#### Bases

The feedwater system and the turbine bypass system are normally used for decay heat removal and cooldown above 250°F. Feedwater makeup is supplied by operation of a hotwell pump, condensate booster pump and a main feedwater pump.

The feedwater flow required to remove decay heat corresponding to 5 percent full power with saturated steam in the pressure range from 30 psia (saturation pressure at 250F) to 1065 psia (lowest setting of steam safety valve) as a function of feedwater temperature is:

<u>*F</u>	<u>Flow, GPM</u>
60	750
90	770
120	790
180	840

One hotwell pump plus one condensate booster pump will supply at least 3000 GPM at 550 psia, and one hotwell pump plus one booster pump plus one main feed pump will supply at least 3000 gpm at 1065 psia. The emergency feed pump will supply 1080 gpm at 1065 psia.

In the event of complete loss of electrical power, feedwater is supplied by a turbine driven emergency feedwater pump which takes suction from the upper surge tanks and hotwell. Decay heat is removed from steam generator by steam relief through the turbine bypass system to the condenser. Condenser cooling water flow is provided by a siphon effect from Lake Keowee through the condenser for final heat rejection to the Keowee Hydro Plant tailrace.

The minimum amount of water in the upper surge tank and condensate storage tank is the amount needed for 11 hours of operating per unit. This is based on the conservative estimate of normal makeup being 0.5% of throttle flow. Throttle flow at full load, 11,200,000 lbs/hr., was used to calculate the operation time. For decay heat removal the operation time with the volume of water specified would be considerably increased due to the reduced throttle flow.

19. | The relief capacity of the sixteen steam system safety valves is 13,105,000 lbs/hr. The capacity of the four turbine bypass valves is 2,817,000 lbs/hr.

REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 10

### 3.5 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS

#### 3.5.1 Operational Safety Instrumentation

##### Applicability

Applies to unit instrumentation and control systems.

##### Objective

To delineate the conditions of the unit instrumentation and safety circuits necessary to assure reactor safety.

##### Specifications

19. | 3.5.1.1 The reactor shall not be in a startup mode or in a critical state unless the requirements of Table 3.5.1-1, Columns A and B are met.
19. | 3.5.1.2 In the event that the number of protective channels operable falls below the limit given under Table 3.5.1-1, Columns A and B; operation shall be limited as specified in Column C.
19. | 3.5.1.3 For on-line testing or in the event of a protective instrument or channel failure, a key-operated channel bypass switch associated with each reactor protective channel may be used to lock the channel trip relay in the untripped state. Status of the untripped state shall be indicated by a light. Only one channel bypass key shall be accessible for use in the control room. Only one channel shall be locked in this untripped state or contain a dummy bistable at any one time.
- 3.5.1.4 The key-operated shutdown bypass switch associated with each reactor protective channel shall not be used during reactor power operation.
- 3.5.1.5 During startup when the intermediate range instruments come on scale, the overlap between the intermediate range and the source range instrumentation shall not be less than one decade. If the overlap is less than one decade, the flux level shall not be greater than that readable on the source range instruments until the one decade overlap is achieved.
19. | 3.5.1.6 In the event that one of the trip devices in either of the sources supplying power to the control rod drive mechanisms fails in the untripped state, the power supplied to the rod drive mechanisms through the failed trip device shall be manually removed within 30 minutes. The condition will be corrected and the remaining trip devices shall be tested within eight hours. If the condition is not corrected and the remaining trip devices tested within the eight hour period, the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition within an additional four hours.

## Bases

Every reasonable effort will be made to maintain all safety instrumentation in operation. A startup is not permitted unless three power range neutron instrument channels and two channels each of the following are operable: four reactor

coolant temperature instrument channels, four reactor coolant flow instrument channels, four reactor coolant pressure instrument channels, four pressure-temperature instrument channels, four flux-imbalance flow instrument channels, four power-number of pumps instrument channels, and high reactor building pressure instrument channels. The engineered safety features actuation system must have two analog channels functioning correctly prior to startup.

Operation at rated power is permitted as long as the systems have at least the redundancy requirements of Column B (Table 3.5.1-1). This is in agreement with redundancy and single failure criteria of IEEE 2/9 as described in FSAR Section 7.

There are four reactor protective channels. A fifth channel that is isolated from the reactor protective system is provided as a part of the reactor control system. Normal trip logic is two out of four. Required trip logic for the power range instrumentation channels is two out of three. Minimum trip logic on other channels is one out of two.

The four reactor protective channels were provided with key operated bypass switches to allow on-line testing or maintenance on only one channel at a time during power operation. Each channel is provided alarm and lights to indicate when that channel is bypassed. There will be one reactor protective system bypass switch key permitted in the control room. That key will be under the administrative control of the Shift Supervisor. Spare keys will be maintained in a locked storage accessible only to the Superintendent.

Each reactor protective channel key operated shutdown bypass switch is provided with alarm and lights to indicate when the shutdown bypass switch is being used. There are four shutdown bypass keys in the control room under the administrative control of the Shift Supervisor. These keys will not be used during reactor power operation.

19. The source range and intermediate range nuclear instrumentation overlap by one decade of neutron flux. This decade overlap will be achieved at  $10^{-10}$  amps on the intermediate range instrument.

Power is normally supplied to the control rod drive mechanisms from two separate parallel 600 volt sources. Redundant trip devices are employed in each of these sources. If any one of these trip devices fails in the untripped state on-line repairs to the failed device, when practical, will be made, and the remaining trip devices will be tested. Four hours is ample time to test the remaining trip devices and in many cases make on-line repairs.

## REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 7.1

TABLE 3.5.1-1

## INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

<u>Functional Unit</u>	(A) Minimum Operable Channels	(B) Minimum Degree Of Redundancy	(C) Operator Action If Conditions Of Column A and B Cannot Be Met
1. Nuclear Instrumentation Intermediate Range Channels	1	0	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (b)
2. Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Channels	1	0	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (b)(c)
3. RPS Manual Pushbutton	1	0	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
4. RPS Power Range Instrument Channels	3(a)	1(a)	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
5. RPS Reactor Coolant Temperature Instrument Channels	2(d)	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
6. RPS Pressure-Temperature Instruments Channels	2(d)	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
7. RPS Flux Imbalance Flow Instrument Channels	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
8. RPS Reactor Coolant Pressure			
a. High Reactor Coolant Pressure Instrument Channels	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
b. Low Reactor Coolant Pressure Channels	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
9. RPS Power-Number of Pumps Instrument Channels	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
10. RPS High Reactor Building Pressure Channels	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours

TABLE 3.5.1-1  
INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS (Cont'd)

<u>Functional Unit</u>	(A) Minimum Operable Analog Channels	(B) Minimum Degree Of Redundancy	(C) Operator Action if Conditions Of Column A and B Cannot Be Met
11. ESF High Pressure Injection System			
a. Reactor Coolant Pressure Instrument Channels	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
b. Reactor Building 4 PSIG Instrument Channels	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
c. Manual Pushbutton	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
12. ESF Low Pressure Injection System			
a. Reactor Coolant Pressure Instrument Channels	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
b. Reactor Building 4 PSIG Instrument Channels	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
c. Manual Pushbutton	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
13. ESF Reactor Building Isolation & Reactor Building Cooling System			
a. Reactor Building 4 PSIG Instrument Channel	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
b. Manual Pushbutton	2		Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
14. ESF Reactor Building Spray System			
a. Reactor Building 10 PSIG Instrument Channel	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)

TABLE 3.5.1-1

## INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS (Cont'd)

<u>Functional Unit</u>	(A) Minimum Operable Analog Channels	(B) Minimum Degree Of Redundancy	(C) Operator Action If Conditions Of Column A and B Cannot Be Met
b. Manual Pushbutton	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
15. Turbine Stop Valves Closure	2	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (f)(e)

- 
- (a) For channel testing, calibration, or maintenance, the minimum number of operable channels may be two and a degree of redundancy of one for a maximum of four hours.
- (b) When 2 of 4 power range instrument channels are greater than 10% full power, hot shutdown is not required.
- (c) When 1 of 2 intermediate range instrument channels is greater than  $10^{-10}$  amps, hot shutdown is not required.
- (d) Single loop operation at power (after testing and approval by the AEC/DRL) is not permitted unless the operating channels are the two receiving Reactor Coolant Temperature from operating loop.
- (e) If minimum conditions are not met within 48 hours after hot shutdown, the unit shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
- (f) One operable channel with zero minimum degree of redundancy is allowed for 24 hours before going to the hot shutdown condition.

3.5-6

Rev. 19 5/5/72  
(Page Deleted)

### 3.5.2 Control Rod Group and Power Distribution Limits

#### Applicability

This specification applies to power distribution and operation of control rods during power operation.

#### Objective

To assure an acceptable core power distribution during power operation, to set a limit on potential reactivity insertion from a hypothetical control rod ejection, and to assure core subcriticality after a reactor trip.

#### Specification

3.5.2.1 The available shutdown margin shall be not less than 1%  $\Delta k/k$  with the highest worth control rod fully withdrawn.

3.5.2.2 Operation with inoperable rods:

- a. Operation with more than one inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1 and 4.7.2.1, in the safety or regulating rod banks shall not be permitted.
- b. If a control rod in the regulating and/or safety rod banks is declared inoperable in the withdrawn position as defined in Specification 4.7.1.1 and 4.7.1.3, an evaluation shall be initiated immediately to verify the existence of 1%  $\Delta k/k$  hot shutdown margin. Boration may be initiated either to the worth of the inoperable rod or until the regulating and transient rod banks are fully withdrawn, whichever occurs first. Simultaneously a program of exercising the remaining regulating and safety rods shall be initiated to verify operability.
- c. If within one (1) hour of determination of an inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1, it is not determined that a 1%  $\Delta k/k$  hot shutdown margin exists combining the worth of the inoperable rod with each of the other rods, the reactor shall be brought to the hot standby condition until this margin is established.
- d. Following the determination of an inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1, all rods shall be exercised within 24 hours and exercised weekly until the rod problem is solved.

3.5.2.3 The worth of a single inserted control rod shall not exceed 0.5%  $\Delta k/k$  at rated power or 1.0%  $\Delta k/k$  at hot zero power except for physics testing when the requirements of Specification 3.1.9 shall apply.

3.5.2.4 Power distribution shall be within design thermal limits.

- a. If the quadrant power tilt exceeds 10% except for physics tests, power shall be limited to 80% of the thermal power allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination.
- b. If the quadrant power tilt exceeds 20% except for physics tests, power shall be limited to 60% of the thermal power allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination.
- c. If a control rod in the regulating and/or safety rod banks is declared inoperable per 4.7.1.2, power shall be reduced to 60% of the thermal power allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination.
- d. If a transient rod or APSR is declared inoperable the remaining rods in the group shall be trimmed to the same position and normal operation may continue with the following restriction for the inoperable bank:

- (1) No maneuvering or dilution cycle is allowed that requires movement of the transient rod bank.
- (2) The APSR bank shall not be moved but the imbalance limits as defined in Specification 2.1 apply.

3.5.2.5 Operating regulating rod group overlap shall not exceed 30% between two sequential groups.

3.5.2.6 The control rod drive patch panels shall be locked at all times with limited access to be authorized by the superintendent.

Bases

The 30% overlap between successive control rod groups is allowed since the worth of a rod is lower at the upper and lower part of the stroke. Control rods are arranged in groups or banks defined as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Function</u>
1	Safety
2	Safety
3	Safety
4	Safety
5	Regulating
6	Regulating
7	Xenon transient override
8	APSR (Axial Power Shaping Bank)

Control rod groups are withdrawn in sequence beginning with group 1. Groups 5, 6, and 7 are overlapped 25%. The normal position at power is for groups 6 and 7 to be partially inserted.

The minimum available rod worth provides for achieving hot shutdown by reactor trip at any time assuming the highest worth control rod remains in the full out position.

Inserted rod groups during power operation will not contain single rod worths greater than 0.5%  $\Delta k/k$ . This value has been shown to be safe by the safety analysis of the hypothetical rod ejection accident. (2) A single inserted control rod worth of 1.0%  $\Delta k/k$  at beginning of life, hot, zero power would result in the same transient peak thermal power and therefore the same environmental consequences as a 0.5%  $\Delta k/k$  ejected rod worth at rated power.

The quadrant power tilt limits set forth in Specification 3.5.2.3 have been established within the thermal analysis design base using the definition of quadrant power tilt given in Section 1.6.

During the physics testing program, the high flux trip setpoints are administratively set as follows to assure an additional safety margin is provided:

<u>Test Power</u>	<u>Trip Setpoint</u>
0	<5%
15	50%
40	50%
50	60%
75	85%

#### REFERENCES

(1) FSAR, Section 3.2.2.1.2

(2) FSAR, Section 14.2.2.2

3.5.3 Engineered Safety Features Protective System Actuation Setpoints

Applicability

This specification applies to the engineered safety features protective system actuation setpoints.

Objective

To provide for automatic initiation of the engineered safety features protective system in the event of a breach of RCS integrity.

Specification

The engineered safety features protective actuation setpoints and permissible bypasses shall be as follows:

19.

<u>Functional Unit</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Setpoint</u>
High Reactor Building Pressure	Reactor Building Spray	<del>30</del> <sup>10</sup> psig
	High-Pressure Injection	≤4 psig
	Low-Pressure Injection	≤4 psig
	Start Reactor Building Cooling & Reactor Building Isolation	≤4 psig
	Penetration Room Ventilation	≤4 psig
Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure	High Pressure Injection(1)	≥1500 psig
	Low Pressure Injection(2)	≥500 psig

(1) May be bypassed below 1750 psig and is automatically reinstated above 1750 psig.

(2) May be bypassed below 900 psig and is automatically reinstated above 900 psig.

Bases

High Reactor Building Pressure

The basis for the ~~30~~<sup>10</sup> psig and 4 psig setpoints for the high pressure signal is to establish a setting which would be reached immediately in the event of a DBA, cover the entire spectrum of break sizes and yet be far enough above normal operation maximum internal pressure to prevent spurious initiation.

Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure

The basis for the 1500 psig low reactor coolant pressure setpoint for high pressure injection initiation and 500 psig for low pressure injection is to

establish a value which is high enough such that protection is provided for the entire spectrum of break sizes and is far enough below normal operating pressure to prevent spurious initiation.(1)

References

- (1) FSAR, Section 14.2.2.3.

### 3.5.4 Incore Instrumentation

#### Applicability

Applies to the operability of the incore instrumentation system.

#### Objective

To specify the functional and operational requirements of the incore instrumentation system.

#### Specification

Above 80% of operating power determined by the reactor coolant pump combination, reference table 2.3.1, at least 23 individual incore detectors shall be operable to check gross core power distribution and to assist in the periodic calibration of the out-of-core detectors in regard to the core imbalance trip limits. The detectors shall be arranged as follows and may be a part of both basic arrangements.

#### 3.5.4.1 Axial Imbalance

- a. Three detectors in each of 3 strings shall lie in the same axial plane with 1 plane in each axial core half.
- b. The axial planes in each core half shall be symmetrical about the core mid-plane.
- c. The detector strings shall not have radial symmetry.

#### 3.5.4.2 Radial Tilt

- a. Two sets of 4 detectors shall lie in each core half. Each set of 4 shall lie in the same axial plane. The two sets in the same core half may lie in the same axial plane.
- b. Detectors in the same plane shall have quarter core radial symmetry.

#### Bases

A system of 52 incore flux detector assemblies with 7 detectors per assembly has been provided. The system includes data display and record functions and is used primarily for out-of-core nuclear instrumentation calibration and for core power distribution verification.


- A. The out-of-core nuclear instrumentation calibration includes:
  1. Calibration of the split detectors at initial reactor startup, during the power escalation program, and periodically thereafter.
  2. A comparison check with the incore instrumentation in the event one of the four out-of-core detector assemblies gives abnormal readings during operation.

3. Confirmation that the out-of-core axial power splits are as expected.
- B. Core power distribution verification includes:
1. Measurement at low power initial reactor startup to check that power distribution is consistent with calculations.
  2. Subsequent checks during operation to insure that power distribution is consistent with calculations.
  3. Indication of power distribution in the event that abnormal situations occur during reactor operation.
- C. The safety of unit operation at or below 80% of operating power<sup>(1)</sup> for the reactor coolant pump combinations without the core imbalance trip system has been determined by extensive 3-D calculations. This will be verified during the physics startup testing program.
- D. The minimum requirement for 23 individual incore detectors is based on the following:
1. An adequate axial imbalance indication can be obtained with 9 individual detectors. Figure 3.5.4-1 shows three detector strings with 3 detectors per string that will indicate an axial imbalance that is within 8% (calculated) of the real core imbalance. The three detector strings are the center one, one from the inner ring of symmetrical strings and one from the outer ring of symmetrical strings. Both steady state and design transient data from the Oconee 1 maneuvering analysis were used for comparison.
  2. Figure 3.5.4-2 shows a detection scheme which will indicate the radial power distribution with 16 individual detectors. The readings from 2 detectors in a radial quadrant at either plane can be compared with readings from the other quadrants to measure a radial flux tilt.
  3. Figure 3.5.4-3 combines Figures 3.5.4-1 and 3.5.4-2 to illustrate a set of 23 individual detectors that can be specified as a minimum for axial imbalance determination and radial tilt indication, as well as for the determination of gross core power distributions. Startup testing will verify the adequacy of this set of detectors for the above functions.
- E. At least 23 specified incore detectors will be operable to check power distribution above 80% power determined by reactor coolant pump combination. These incore detectors will be read out either on the computer or on a recorder. If 23 detectors in the specified locations are not operable, power will be decreased to or below 80% for the operating reactor coolant pump combination.

#### REFERENCE

- (1) FSAR, Section 4.1.1.3

IN CORE INSTRUMENTATION PLANES



Lack radial symmetry

Axial Plane

Top Axial Core Half

Bottom Axial Core Half


IN CORE INSTRUMENTATION SPECIFICATION  
AXIAL IMBALANCE INDICATION



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 3.5.4 - 1

INCORE INSTRUMENTATION PLANES



Radial Symmetry  
in this plane

Radial Symmetry  
in this plane


INCORE INSTRUMENTATION SPECIFICATION  
RADIAL FLUX TILT INDICATION



OCCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 3.5.4 - 2

INCORE INSTRUMENTATION PLANES



INCORE INSTRUMENTATION SPECIFICATION



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 3.5.4 - 3

3.6 REACTOR BUILDING

Applicability

Applies to the containment when the reactor is subcritical by less than 1%  $\Delta k/k$ .

Objective

To assure containment integrity during startup and operation.

Specification

- 3.6.1 Containment integrity shall be maintained whenever all three (3) of the following conditions exist:
- a. Reactor coolant pressure is 300 psig or greater.
  - b. Reactor coolant temperature is 200°F or greater.
  - c. Nuclear fuel is in the core.
- 3.6.2 Containment integrity shall be maintained when the reactor coolant system is open to the containment atmosphere and the requirements for a refueling shutdown are not met.
- 3.6.3 Positive reactivity insertions which would result in the reactor being subcritical by less than 1%  $\Delta k/k$  shall not be made by control rod motion or boron dilution whenever the containment integrity is not intact.
- 3.6.4 A reactor shall not be critical if the reactor building internal pressure exceeds 1.5 psig or 5 inches Hg vacuum.
- 3.6.5 Prior to criticality following refueling shutdown, a check shall be made to confirm that all manual containment isolation valves which should be closed are closed and tagged.

*State separately*  
*State separately*  
x  
x

Bases

The Reactor Coolant System conditions of cold shutdown assure that no steam will be formed and hence no pressure buildup in the containment if the Reactor Coolant System ruptures.

The selected shutdown conditions are based on the type of activities that are being carried out and will preclude criticality in any occurrence.

The reactor building is designed for an internal pressure of 59 psig and an external pressure 3.0 psi greater than the internal pressure. The design external pressure of 3.0 psi corresponds to a margin of 0.5 psi above the differential pressure that could be developed if the building is sealed with an internal temperature of 120°F with a barometric pressure of 29.0 inches of Hg and the building is subsequently cooled to an internal temperature of 80°F with a concurrent rise in barometric pressure to 31.0 inches of Hg. The weather conditions assumed here are conservative since an evaluation of

National Weather Service records for this area indicates that from 1918 to 1970 the lowest barometric pressure recorded is 29.05 inches of Hg. and the highest is 30.85 inches of Hg.

When containment integrity is established, the limits of 10 CFR 100 will not be exceeded should the maximum hypothetical accident occur.

REFERENCES

FSAR, Section 5

Applicability

Applies to the availability of off-site and on-site electrical power for station operation and for operation of station auxiliaries.

Objective

To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to provide for safe reactor operation and to provide for continuing availability of engineered safety features systems in an unrestricted manner and to prescribe safety evaluation and reporting requirements to be followed in the event that the auxiliary electric power systems become degraded.

Specification

- 3.7.1 Under normal conditions the reactor shall not be brought critical from a cold shutdown condition unless the following conditions are met:
- a. At least two 230 kV transmission lines shall be in service. One of these two lines may be out for test or maintenance for periods up to 24 hours once the reactor has been brought critical.
  - b. Start-up Transformer No. CT1 or CT2 shall be connected to the Unit 1 4160 V Main Feeder Bus No. 1 and No. 2.
  - c. An operable Keowee Hydro unit shall be available to supply power through the Underground Feeder Bus, Transformer No. CT4, and the Station 4160 V Standby Buses Nos. 1 or 2 feeding the associated 4160 Main Feeder Bus. The other Keowee Hydro unit shall be available to supply power through Start-up Transformer CT1 or CT2 to Unit 1 4160V Main Feeder Buses Nos. 1 and 2, except that, one Keowee Hydro Unit may be inoperable for periods not exceeding 24 hours for test or maintenance.
  - d. Reactor Coolant Pump Buses 1TA or 1TB shall be energized.
  - e. The two 4160 volt main feeder buses shall be energized except one may be de-energized for test or maintenance for periods not exceeding 24 hours after the reactor has been brought critical.
  - f. The three 4160 V Engineered Safety Features Switchgear Buses 1TC, 1TD, and 1TE shall be energized except one may be de-energized for test or maintenance for periods not exceeding 24 hours after the reactor has been brought critical.

- g. The three 600 V load centers 1X8, 1X9, and 1X10 plus the three 600V-208Y Engineered Safety Features MCC Buses 1XS1, 1XS2, and 1XS3 shall be energized, except that one string may be de-energized for test or maintenance for periods of not exceeding 24 hours after the reactor has been brought critical.
- h. The Unit 1 & 2 125 VDC instrumentation and control batteries with their respective chargers, buses, diode monitors, and diodes supplying vital instrumentation and control static inverters shown in Figure 8-5 of the FSAR, consistent with Notes 1 through 3 thereon, shall be operable except that one complete single string or any portion thereof of redundant chargers, batteries, buses and all associated isolating transfer diodes may be de-energized for test or maintenance for periods of not exceeding 24 hours.
19. i. The 125V DC switching station batteries with their respective chargers, buses, and isolating diodes shall be operable except single strings of redundant buses, chargers, batteries, and all of the related diode assemblies may be de-energized for test or maintenance for periods of not exceeding 24 hours.
- j. The Keowee batteries with their respective chargers, buses, and isolating diodes shall be operable except that redundant components may be de-energized for test or maintenance for periods not exceeding 24 hours.
- k. The level of the Keowee Reservoir shall be at least 775 feet above sea level.

3.7.2 In the event that all conditions in Specification 3.7.1 are met except that one of the two Keowee Hydro units becomes unavailable for longer than the test or maintenance period of 24 hours or the underground feeder circuit to the standby buses is lost, the reactor shall be permitted to remain critical or restarted provided the following restrictions are observed:

- a. A Lee Steam Station combustion turbine shall be operating and energizing the 4160 V standby power bus through the 100 kV transmission circuit which is completely separate from the system grid and non-safety-related loads. This shall be in effect prior to restart or within 30 minutes if at power when a Hydro unit is lost.
- b. The reactor coolant  $T_{avg}$  shall be above 500°F.
- c. Within 24 hours after loss of a hydro unit, or the underground feeder, this fact shall be reported to the Director, Division of Compliance, Region II, to be followed by a written report of the circumstances of the outage if it is expected to exceed 24 hours and the estimated time to return the Hydro unit or underground feeder circuit to operating condition.

3.7.3 In the event that all conditions of Specification 3.7.1 are met except that all 230 kV transmission lines are lost, the reactor shall be permitted to remain critical or restarted provided the following restrictions are observed:

- a. A Lee Station combustion turbine shall be operating and energizing the 4160 V standby power bus through the 100 kV transmission circuit which is completely separate from the system grid and non-safety-related loads. It shall be available prior to a restart or within 30 minutes if this degradation occurs during operation.
  - b. Within 24 hours of loss of all 230 kV transmission lines, this degradation shall be reported to the Director, Division of Compliance, Region II, in accordance with Specification 6.6. If the outage is expected to continue beyond 24 hours, the circumstances of the outage and the estimated time to return at least two 230 kV circuits to service shall be reported.
- 3.7.4 Any degradation beyond specification 3.7.2 or 3.7.3 above shall be reported to the Director, Division of Compliance, Region II, within 24 hours. A safety evaluation shall be performed by Duke Power Company for the specific situation involved which justifies the safest course of action to be taken. The results of this evaluation together with plans for expediting the return to the unrestricted operation conditions of specification 3.7.1 above shall be submitted in a written report to the Director, Division of Reactor Licensing, with a copy to the Director of Region II Compliance Office within 5 days.

#### Bases

The auxiliary electric power systems are so arranged that no single contingency can inactivate enough engineered safety features to jeopardize plant safety. These systems were designed to meet the following criteria:

"Alternate power systems shall be provided and designed with adequate independency, redundancy, capacity and testability to permit the functions required of the engineered safety features. As a minimum, the onsite power system and the offsite power system shall each, independently, provide this capacity assuming a failure of a single active component in each power system."

The auxiliary power system meets the above criteria and the intent of proposed AEC Criterion 17 (published February 20, 1971) with one exception. That exception is the Unit 1 startup transformer (CT1) whose loss would cause loss of all offsite power. This is acceptable because of the high reliability of such transformers and the relatively short period of time that will elapse before a redundant transformer, CT2, the Unit 2 startup transformer, is permanently installed as a redundant means of obtaining Unit 1 4160 ESF bus power from the 230 kV switchyard. The adequacies of the ac and dc systems are discussed below as are the bases for permitting degraded conditions for ac power.

### Capacity of AC Systems

The auxiliaries activated by ESF signals (4.8 MVA) plus other safety related auxiliaries activated by the operator following a loss-of-coolant accident (4.9 MVA) require a total ac power capacity of 9.7 MVA. The minimum ac power capacity available from the onsite power systems (Keowee Hydro Units) is 12 MVA (limited by transformer CT4) if furnished by the underground circuit or 45 MVA (limited by CT1 or CT2) if furnished through the 230 KV switchyard. The minimum capacity available from the multiple 230 KV offsite transmission lines is 45 MVA (limited by CT1 or CT2). Capacity available from the backup 100 KV offsite transmission line (Lee Station Gas Turbine Generator) is 12 MVA (limited by CT5).

Thus, the minimum available capacity from any one of the multiple sources of ac power, 12 MVA, is adequate.

### Capacity of DC Systems

Normally, ac power is rectified and supplies the dc system buses as well as keeping the storage batteries on these buses in a charged state. Upon loss of this normal ac source of power the dc auxiliary systems important to reactor safety have adequate stored capacity (ampere-hours) to independently supply their required emergency loads for at least 1 hour. One hour is considered to be conservative since there are redundant sources of ac power providing energy to these dc auxiliary systems. The loss of all ac power to any dc system is expected to occur very infrequently, and for very short periods of time. The following tabulation demonstrates the margin of installed battery charger rating and battery capacity when compared to 1 hour of operation (a) with ac power (in amps) and (b) without ac power (in ampere hours) for each of the three safety-related dc systems installed at Oconee:

#### A. 125 Vdc Instrumentation and Control Power System

Charger 1CA, 1CB or 1CS Rating	a. 600 amps ea.
Battery 1CA and 1CB Combined Capacity	b. 698 ampere-hours
Actual active loads on both 125 Vdc I & C buses 1DCA and 1DCB during 1st hour of LOCA	a. First min. - 1371 amps next 59 min. - 568.5 amps
	b. 581.9 ampere-hours

#### B. 125 Vdc Switching Station Power System

Charger SY-1, SY-2 or SY-S Rating	a. 50 amps ea.
Battery SY-1 or SY-2 Capacity	b. 14.4 ampere-hours
Actual active load per battery during 1st hour or LOCA	a. First min. - 130 amps next 59 min. - 10 amps
	b. 12 ampere-hours

#### 18. C. 125 Vdc Keowee Station Power System

Charger No. 1, No. 2 or Standby Rating	a. 200 amps ea.
Battery No. 1 or No. 2 Capacity	b. 233 ampere-hours

Actual active load per battery  
during 1st hour of LOCA

- a. First min. - 1031 amps  
next 59 min. - 179.4 amps
- b. 193.6 ampere-hours

#### Redundancy of A.C. Systems

There are three 4160 engineered safety feature switchgear buses. Each bus can receive power from either of two 4160 main feeder buses. Each feeder bus in turn can receive power from the 230 KV switchyard through the common Unit 1 startup transformer (CT1) or from the 4160 V standby bus. Unit 2 startup transformer (CT2) can be placed in service in one hour. The standby bus can receive power from the Hydro Station through the underground feeder circuit or from a combustion turbine generator at the Lee Steam Station over an isolated 100 KV transmission line. The 230 KV switchyard can receive power from the onsite Keowee Hydro Station or from several offsite sources via transmission lines which connect the Oconee Station with the Duke Power System power distribution network.

#### Redundancy of DC Systems

##### A. 125Vdc Instrument and Control Power System

All reactor protection and engineered safety features loads on this system can be powered from either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 125Vdc Instrument and Control Power Buses. The Unit 1 125Vdc Instrument and Control Power Buses can be powered from two battery banks and three battery chargers. As shown above, one battery (e.g., 1CA) can supply all loads for one hour. Also, one battery charger can supply all connected ESF and reactor protection loads.

##### B. 125Vdc Switching Station Power System

There are two essentially independent subsystems each complete with an ac/dc power supply (battery charger), a battery bank, a battery charger bus, motor control center (distribution panel). All safety-related equipment and the relay house in which it is located are Class I (Seismic) design. Each subsystem provides the necessary dc power to:

- a. continuously monitor operations of the protective relaying
- b. isolate Oconee (including Keowee) from all external 230 KV grid faults
- c. connect on-site power to Oconee from a Keowee hydro unit or
- d. restore off-site power to Oconee from non-faulted portions of the external 230 KV grid.

Provisions are included to manually connect a standby battery charger to either battery/charger bus.

##### C. 125Vdc Keowee Station Power System

There are essentially two independent physically separated Class I

(Seismic) subsystems, each complete with an ac/dc power supply (charger) a battery bank, a battery/charger bus and a dc distribution center. Each subsystem provides the necessary power to automatically or manually start, control and protect one of the hydro units.

An open or short in any one battery, charger or dc distribution center cannot cause loss of both hydro units.

The 230 KV sources, while expected to have excellent availability, are not under the direct control of the Oconee Station and, based on past experience can not be assumed to be available at all times.

The operation of the on-site hydro-station is under the direct control of the Oconee Station and requires no off-site power to startup. Therefore an on-site backup source of auxiliary power not subject to failure from the same cause as offsite power is provided in the form of twin hydro-electric turbine generators powered through a common penstock by water taken from Lake Keowee. The use of a common penstock is justified on the basis of past hydro-plant experience of the Duke Power Company (since 1919) which indicates that the cumulative need to dewater the penstock can be expected to be limited to about one day a year, principally for inspection, plus perhaps 4 days every tenth year. In all other cases it is expected that when one hydro unit is out for maintenance, the other unit will be available for service.

In the event that only one hydro unit is available to backup the off-site power sources, and it is considered important for the Oconee Unit 1 reactor to remain critical or return to criticality from a hot shutdown condition, the Lee Station combustion turbine is again available to assure a continued supply of shutdown power in the event that an external event should cause loss of all off-site power.

In a similar manner, in the event that none of the sources of off-site power is available and it is considered important to continue to maintain the Oconee Unit 1 reactor critical or return it to criticality from a hot shutdown condition a Lee Station gas turbine can be made available as an additional backup source of power, thus assuring continued availability of auxiliary power to perform an orderly shutdown of Oconee Unit 1 should a problem develop requiring shutdown of both hydro units.

There may be a rare occasion where both Hydro units are unexpectedly lost and there are compelling reasons to maintain the Oconee Unit 1 reactor critical or return it to criticality from hot shutdown conditions for a specific period of time rather than require it to remain subcritical or be shutdown. A scheduled shutdown for inspection or a shutdown to perform minor maintenance would not constitute a compelling reason. Factors to consider in justification of such a rare, limited period of criticality without the hydro station available would include number of offsite 230KV power sources available, availability of Unit 2 startup transformer, availability of the Lee Gas Turbine, weather conditions and all other factors which could bear on potential for loss of these power sources. Also, the evaluation should show that reactor safety will not be compromised if during operation under such further degradation, an additional loss of ac power should be suffered.

### 3.8 FUEL LOADING AND REFUELING

#### Applicability

Applies to fuel loading and refueling operations.

#### Objective

To assure that fuel loading and refueling operations are performed in a responsible manner.

#### Specification

- 3.8.1 Radiation levels in the reactor building refueling area shall be monitored by RIA-48 and RIA-49. Radiation levels in the spent fuel storage area shall be monitored by RIA-41. If any of these instruments becomes inoperable, portable survey instrumentation, having the appropriate ranges and sensitivity to fully protect individuals involved in refueling operation, shall be used until the permanent instrumentation is returned to service.
- 3.8.2 Core subcritical neutron flux shall be continuously monitored by at least two neutron flux monitors, each with continuous indication available, whenever core geometry is being changed. When core geometry is not being changed, at least one neutron flux monitor shall be in service.
- 3.8.3 At least one low pressure injection pump and cooler shall be operable.
- 3.8.4 During reactor vessel head removal and while loading and unloading fuel from the reactor, the boron concentration shall be maintained at not less than that required to shutdown the core to a  $k_{eff} \leq 0.99$  if all control rods were removed.
- 3.8.5 Direct communications between the control room and the refueling personnel in the reactor building shall exist whenever changes in core geometry are taking place.
- 3.8.6 During the handling of irradiated fuel in the reactor building at least one door on the personnel and emergency hatches shall be closed. The equipment hatch cover shall be in place with a minimum of four bolts securing the cover to the sealing surfaces.
- 3.8.7 Both isolation valves in lines containing automatic containment isolation valves shall be operable, or at least one shall be closed.
- 3.8.8 When two irradiated fuel assemblies are being handled simultaneously within the fuel transfer canal, a minimum of 10 feet separation shall be maintained between the assemblies at all times. Irradiated fuel assemblies may be handled with the Auxiliary Hoist provided no other irradiated fuel assembly is being handled in the fuel transfer canal.

18. | 3.8.9 If any of the above specified limiting conditions for fuel loading and refueling are not met, movement of fuel into the reactor core shall cease; action shall be initiated to correct the conditions so that the specified limits are met, and no operations which may increase the reactivity of the core shall be made.
- 3.8.10 The reactor building purge system, including the radiation monitor, RIA 45, which initiates purge isolation, shall be tested and verified to be operable immediately prior to refueling operations.
- 3.8.11 Irradiated fuel shall not be removed from the reactor until the unit has been subcritical for at least 72 hours.

#### Bases

Detailed written procedures will be available for use by refueling personnel. These procedures, the above specifications, and the design of the fuel handling equipment as described in Section 9.7 of the FSAR incorporating built-in interlocks and safety features, provide assurance that no incident could occur during the refueling operations that would result in a hazard to public health and safety. If no change is being made in core geometry, one flux monitor is sufficient. This permits maintenance on the instrumentation. Continuous monitoring of radiation levels and neutron flux provides immediate indication of an unsafe condition. The low pressure injection pump is used to maintain a uniform boron concentration. (1) The shutdown margin indicated in Specification 3.8.4 will keep the core subcritical, even with all control rods withdrawn from the core. (2) The boron concentration will be maintained above 1,300 ppm. Although this concentration is sufficient to maintain the core  $k_{eff} \leq 0.99$  if all the control rods were removed from the core, only a few control rods will be removed at any one time during fuel shuffling and replacement. The  $k_{eff}$  with all rods in the core and with refueling boron concentration is approximately 0.9. Specification 3.8.5 allows the control room operator to inform the reactor building personnel of any impending unsafe condition detected from the main control board indicators during fuel movement.

The specification requiring testing of the reactor building purge isolation is to verify that these components will function as required should a fuel handling accident occur which resulted in the release of significant fission products.

Specification 3.8.10 is required as the safety analysis for the fuel handling accident was based on the assumption that the reactor had been shutdown for 72 hours.(3)

#### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 9.7
- (2) FSAR, Section 14.2.2.1
- (3) FSAR, Section 14.2.2.1.2

### 3.9 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

#### Applicability

Applies to disposal of radioactive liquid, and gaseous wastes from the station.

#### Objective

To define the conditions for release of radioactive liquid waste to the Keowee Hydro dam tailrace and radioactive gases to the unit vent to assure that any radioactive material released is kept as low as practicable and, in any event, is within the limits of 10 CFR 20.

#### Specification

##### 3.9.1 General

Equipment installed in the radioactive waste systems shall be maintained and used to assure that except under unusual conditions, releases of radioactive materials in effluents will be kept at small fractions of the limits specified in 20.106 of 10 CFR 20. The Licensee is permitted the flexibility of operation, compatible with considerations of health and safety, to assure that the public is provided a dependable source of power under unusual operating conditions which may temporarily result in releases higher than such small fractions, but still within the limits specified in 20.106 of 10 CFR 20. It is expected that using this operational flexibility under unusual operating conditions the Licensee will exert his best efforts to keep levels of radioactive material in effluents as low as practicable.

##### 3.9.2 Liquid Wastes

- 3.9.2.1 Operating procedures shall be developed and used, and equipment which has been installed to maintain control over radioactive materials in liquid effluents produced during normal reactor operations, including expected occurrences, shall be maintained and used to keep levels of radioactive material in effluents released to unrestricted areas as low as practicable. Inputs to the low activity waste tank may be released directly to the Keowee tailrace without further processing than the filtration system so long as the effluents contain only trace quantities of radioactive material.
- 3.9.2.2 Prior to release to the Keowee Hydro dam tailrace, two independent samples of liquid wastes shall be analyzed to determine gross beta-gamma and/or isotopic activity concentrations.
- 3.9.2.3 Radioactive liquid waste shall be continuously monitored for flow and gross radioactivity concentration during release.
- 3.9.2.4 Wherein practicable, radioactive waste releases shall be coordinated with normal operation of the Keowee Hydro Station.

- 3.9.2.5. The release of radioactive liquid effluents shall be such that the concentration of radionuclides during discharge to the Keowee Hydro tailrace (based on a minimum dilution flow of 30 CFS or the available flow from the Keowee Hydro Station if operating) does not exceed the limits of 20.106 of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, for unrestricted areas.
- 3.9.2.6. Under unusual conditions when waste treatment equipment is inoperable, liquid waste shall be held up for decay for the maximum period practicable prior to release and every reasonable effort shall be made to return any such disabled equipment to its operable conditions before releases are made.
- 3.9.2.7. If the limits of Specification 3.9.2.5 cannot be met, radioactive liquid effluents shall not be released.
- 3.9.2.8. The continuous water sampler in the Keowee River near the site boundary shall be operable during discharge of liquid waste to the Keowee Hydro dam tailrace. If it is inoperable and the waste cannot be held up any longer, grab samples shall be taken in the Keowee River where the continuous sampler is located in order to determine the concentrations of radioactivity in the river during the batch discharge operation. Refer to Table 4.11-1 for sample frequency and analysis requirements.

### 3.9.3 Gaseous Wastes

- 3.9.3.1. The annual average release rates of gaseous and airborne particulate wastes shall be limited in accordance with the following equation:

$$[4.61 \times 10^{-6} \text{ sec/m}^3 \times \sum_1 Q_i / (\text{MPC})_i] \leq 1.0$$

where  $Q_i$  is the annual release rate in Ci/sec of any radionuclide in the gaseous wastes mixtures;  $(\text{MPC})_i$  is the permissible concentration for unrestricted areas in units of  $\text{Ci/m}^3$  ( $\mu\text{Ci/cc} = \text{Ci/m}^3$ ) for any radionuclide taken from Appendix B, Column 1, Table II of 10 CFR 20; and  $4.61 \times 10^{-6} \text{ sec/m}^3$  is the long term atmospheric dispersion factor  $(X/Q)$ , at the exclusion area boundary of 1609 meters for a ground level release.

- 3.9.3.2. For purpose of calculating permissible releases by the formula in 3.9.3.1, MPC for halogens and particulates with half-lives longer than eight days shall be reduced by a factor of 700 from their listed values in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Column 1, Table II.

3.9.3.3. During release of radioactive gaseous wastes from the gaseous waste disposal system to the unit vent, the following conditions shall be met:

- a. The gaseous radioactivity monitor, iodine monitor, and the particulate monitor in the unit vent shall be operable.
- b. The waste gases and particulates shall be passed through the high efficiency particulate filters and charcoal filters provided (except as noted in 3.9.3.9)

3.9.3.4 Purging of the reactor building shall be governed by the following conditions:

- a. Reactor building purge shall be through the high efficiency particulate filters and charcoal filters until the activity concentration is below the occupational limit inside the reactor building, at which time bypass may be initiated.
- b. Reactor building purge shall be through the high efficiency particulate filters and charcoal filters whenever irradiated fuel is being handled or any objects are being handled over irradiated fuel in the Reactor Building.
- c. The limits of 3.9.3.4a and 3.9.3.4.b shall be met or the containment shall not be purged.

3.9.3.5 During power operation, whenever the air ejector off-gas monitor is inoperable, grab samples shall be taken from the air ejector discharge and analyzed for gross radioactivity daily.

3.9.3.6 Potentially highly radioactive gaseous waste from the gaseous waste disposal system and vent headers of unit components shall be provided a minimum holdup of thirty days (except as noted in 3.9.3.7) when the release of the gaseous waste would exceed 1% of 10CFR20 limits as determined by the following equation:

$$[4.61 \times 10^{-6} \text{ sec/m}^3 \times Q_1 / (\text{MPC})_1] \leq 0.01$$

3.9.3.7. Under unusual conditions, gaseous waste may be discharged from the waste gas header directly to the unit vent for a period not to exceed seven days if the holdup system equipment is not available and the releases meet Specification 3.9.3.1 and 3.9.3.3. Every reasonable effort shall be made to re-establish the availability of the holdup system equipment.

3.9.3.8. Under unusual conditions, gaseous radioactive waste from the gaseous waste disposal system can be released to the unit vent without passing through the HEPA and charcoal filters if the filter system is inoperable. This mode of release may not exceed a seven-day period, and the release rate must be within the limits of Specification 3.9.3.1 and 3.9.3.3a.

- 3.9.3.9. Under unusual conditions, when the filter system is inoperable, gaseous wastes shall be held up for the maximum period practicable prior to release. Every reasonable effort shall be made to return inoperable filters to the operable condition before releases to the environment are made.
- 3.9.3.10 The maximum activity to be contained in one gas holdup tank shall be limited to 17,200 Ci/E. E will be assumed to be the same as the E of the noble gases in the reactor coolant system as determined in accordance with Table 4.1-3 of Specification 4.1.2.
- 3.9.3.11 Gaseous waste releases shall be restricted so as to yield concentrations in the area of the temporary construction workers' quarters in the east-southeast section of the exclusion area that are no greater than that which could exist at the normal 1609 meter exclusion area boundary.

#### Bases

Waste processing equipment shall be maintained and used in accordance with 10CFR50.36a and administrative procedures developed in accordance with 10CFR50.34a to assure that releases of radioactivity will be maintained as low as practicable with the intent to be less than 1% of the limits of 10CFR20 Appendix B Table 2 Column II after dilution with the total hydro flow occurring during discharge of liquid radioactive waste. Provision is made for flexibility of operation compatible with health and safety to be sure that the public is provided a dependable source of power. Even under unusual operating conditions, which may temporarily result in releases higher than usual, the limits of 10CFR20 will still be maintained. It is not intended that this waste be continually reprocessed. Such reprocessing would be the prerogative of the licensee.

Unusual operations, as used in these specifications, are those conditions existing when not all processing equipment is operable.

#### A. Liquid Wastes

Radioactive liquid wastes will be collected in waste storage tanks. Treatment of liquid wastes for recovery of the water by evaporation and/or ion exchange and disposal of concentrated evaporator bottoms and spent resin as solid wastes will be performed to maintain quantities of radioactive materials released as low as practicable. Contents of the low activity waste tank and the condensate test tank will be mixed and sampled for analysis to determine the resulting concentration upon dilution.

The minimum dilution flow without Keowee Hydro Station operation is 30 cfs and will be periodically verified. It is intended where practicable, to coordinate radioactive liquid waste releases with the operation of the Keowee Hydro Station to provide dilution flows greater than 30 cfs. However, calculations to determine batch discharge rates will be made on the basis of a 30 cfs dilution flow or the available flow from the Keowee Hydro Station if operating.

Inputs to the low activity waste tank are expected to contain only trace quantities of radioactivity and consequently may be released directly to the Keowee tailrace without further processing than the filters associated with the tank. In the event that significant activity, on the order of  $2 \times 10^{-8}$   $\mu\text{Ci/ml}$ , is found in the low activity waste tank, the contents will be processed either by evaporators and/or demineralizers. High activity wastes drain to either the miscellaneous waste holdup tank or the high activity waste tank.

The specification regarding returning inoperable equipment to the operable condition is intended to preclude unnecessary delays in recovering from unusual operating conditions in conformance with 10 CFR 50.36a.

#### B. Gaseous Wastes

Radioactive gases will be those resulting from the fission process and neutron activation. These gases will be collected in the waste gas tanks from the various liquid storage tanks associated with the reactor. Gaseous wastes in the reactor building atmosphere are released by purging to the unit vent. Any gaseous wastes in the Auxiliary Building atmosphere will be released through the ventilation system to the unit vent which is monitored.

Temporary construction quarters are located inside the exclusion area. During the period of time that these quarters are in use, administrative procedures will limit releases of gaseous waste in this sector of the exclusion area in accordance with appropriate meteorological restrictions. In addition to this, these quarters will be monitored to assure that the administrative procedures are effective and that the dose limits prescribed by regulations are not exceeded.

The long term atmospheric dilution factor (X/Q) at the exclusion area boundary of 1609 meters for a ground release as used in this specification incorporates results from  $\text{SF}_6$  (sulfur hexafluoride) gas tracer experiments (see Oconee FSAR Appendix 2A) and includes a 0.53 dilution factor for inversion occurrences at low wind speeds.

The (Y/Q) value to be used under Gaseous Wastes in Specification 3.9, is  $4.61 \times 10^{-6}$ .

High concentrations of airborne radioactivity are not expected in the containment unless the reactor has significant failed fuel and/or there is significant uncollected primary coolant leakage in the containment. In order to reduce the amount of radioactivity which would be purged to the atmosphere, the containment air will be exhausted

through high efficiency particulate and charcoal filters until continuous occupancy occupational exposure limits are attained in the containment. After these limits are attained, the maximum concentration of radioactivity at the site boundary would be approximately 0.12% of 10 CFR 20 Limits for unrestricted areas assuming the restrictive atmosphere diffusion factor applied to the accident analysis ( $1.16 \times 10^{-4}$  sec/m). However, containment purging would normally be timed to coincide with better atmospheric dispersion conditions. It is considered reasonable to allow by-passing of the purge filters under these conditions since with small concentrations of radioactivity little, if any, discernable health benefit would be achieved by using the filters while the useful life of the filters would be consumed. In addition, it is anticipated that the containment will be purged only on a periodic basis when personnel are required in the containment.

### 3.10 MAXIMUM POWER RESTRICTION

#### Applicability

Applies to the nuclear steam supply system of Unit 1 reactor.

#### Objective

To maintain a power margin in reserve until system performance has performed under operating conditions and design objectives have been verified.

#### Specification

Unit 1 power level may not be increased above 2452 MW<sub>T</sub> until operated in the range of 2352 to 2452 MW<sub>T</sub> for 30 days, except that 50 percent of the time the power can be as low as 2,000 MW<sub>T</sub>, and subsequent approval is granted by the AEC/DRL Regulatory Staff.

#### Bases

The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report section of the application for a construction permit was based on a maximum power level of 2452 MW<sub>T</sub>. Subsequent safety evaluations done as part of the Final Safety Analysis Report were done for power levels of 2568 MW<sub>T</sub>. However, since this is the first nuclear steam supply of this design to go into service, a power margin of 116 MW<sub>T</sub> is temporarily being held in reserve until the system has performed at significant power levels for a reasonable period of time. Following evaluation of the summary report of plant startup and power escalation test programs and evaluations, (required by these Technical Specifications), and in the absence of any significant deviation in plant performance from that predicted by design and required for safety, it is expected that this temporary restriction will be lifted.

19. | 3.11 REACTOR BUILDING POLAR CRANE AND AUXILIARY HOIST

Applicability

Applies to the use of the reactor building polar crane over the steam generator compartments and the fuel transfer canal and the Auxiliary Hoist over the fuel transfer canal.

Objective

To identify those conditions for which the operation of the reactor building polar crane and auxiliary hoist are restricted.

Specification

19. | 3.11.1 The reactor building polar crane shall not be operated over the fuel transfer canal when any fuel assembly is being moved.
19. | 3.11.2 The auxiliary hoist shall not be operated over the fuel transfer canal when any fuel assembly is being moved unless the hoist is being used to move that assembly.
19. | 3.11.3 During the period when the reactor vessel head is removed and irradiated fuel is in the reactor building and fuel is not being moved, the reactor building polar crane and auxiliary hoist shall be operated over the fuel transfer canal only where necessary and in accordance with approved operating procedures stating the purpose of such use.
19. | 3.11.4 When the reactor vessel head is removed and the polar crane is being operated in areas away from the fuel transfer canal, the flagman shall be located on top of the secondary shield wall when the polar crane hook is above the elevation of the fuel transfer canal.
19. | 3.11.5 During the period when the reactor coolant system is pressurized above 300 psig, and is above 200°F, and fuel is in the core, the reactor building polar crane shall not be operated over the steam generator compartments.

Bases

Restriction of use of the reactor building polar crane and auxiliary hoist over the fuel transfer canal when the reactor vessel head is removed to those operations necessary for the fuel handling and core internals operations is to preclude the dropping of materials or equipment into the reactor vessel and possibly damaging the fuel to the extent that an escape of fission products would result. The fuel transfer canal will be delineated by readily visible markers at an elevation above which the reactor building polar crane would not normally handle loads.

Restriction of use of the reactor building polar crane over the steam generator compartments during the time when steam could be formed from dropping a load on the steam generator or reactor coolant piping resulting in rupture of the system is required to protect against a loss of coolant accident.

### 3.12 SECONDARY SYSTEM ACTIVITY

#### Applicability

Applies to the limiting conditions of secondary system activity for operation of the reactor.

#### Objective

To limit the maximum secondary system activity.

#### Specification

The iodine-131 activity in the secondary side of a steam generator shall not exceed 1.4  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$ .

#### Bases

For the purpose of determining a maximum allowable secondary coolant activity, the activity contained in the mass released following a loss of load accident is considered. As stated in FSAR Section 14.1.2.8.2, 148,000 pounds of water is released to the atmosphere via the relief valves. A site boundary dose limit of 1.5 rem is used.

The whole body dose is negligible since any noble gases entering the secondary coolant system are continuously vented to the atmosphere by the condenser air ejector, thus, in the event of a loss of load incident there are only small quantities of these gases which would be released.

I-131 is the significant isotope because of its low MPC in air and because the other iodine isotopes have shorter half-lives, and therefore, cannot build up to significant concentrations in the secondary coolant, given the limitations on primary system leak rate and technical specification limiting activity. One-tenth of the contained iodine is assumed to reach the site boundary, making allowance for plateout and retention in water droplets. I-131 is assumed to contribute 70% of the total thyroid dose based on the ratio of I-131 to the total iodine isotopes given in Table 11-3 of the FSAR.

The maximum inhalation dose at the site boundary is then as follows:

$$\text{Dose (rem)} = C \cdot V \cdot B \cdot \text{DCF} \cdot (0.1) \cdot X/Q$$

C = Secondary coolant activity (2.0  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$  I-131 equivalent)

V = Secondary water volume released to atmosphere (90  $\text{m}^3$ )

B = Breathing rate ( $3.47 \times 10^{-4}$   $\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$ )

X/Q = Ground level release dispersion factor ( $1.16 \times 10^{-4}$   $\text{sec}/\text{m}^3$ )

DCF =  $1.48 \times 10^6$   $\text{rem}/\text{Ci}$

0.1 = Fraction of activity released

The resultant dose is 1.15 rem compared to the Radiation Protection Guide of 1.5 rem for an annual individual exposure in an unrestricted area.

#### 4 SURVEILLANCE STANDARDS

Specified intervals may be adjusted plus or minus 25% to accommodate normal test schedules.

##### 4.1 OPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW

###### Applicability

Applies to items directly related to safety limits and limiting conditions for operation.

###### Objective

To specify the minimum frequency and type of surveillance to be applied to unit equipment and conditions.

###### Specification

- 4.1.1 The minimum frequency and type of surveillance required for reactor protective system and engineered safety feature protective system instrumentation when the reactor is critical shall be as stated in Table 4.1-1.
- 4.1.2 Equipment and sampling test shall be performed as detailed in Tables 4.1-2 and 4.1-3.

###### Bases

###### Check

Failures such as blown instrument fuses, defective indicators, faulted amplifiers which result in "upscale" or "downscale" indication can be easily recognized by simple observation of the functioning of an instrument or system. Furthermore, such failures are, in many cases, revealed by alarm or annunciator action. Comparison of output and/or state of independent channels measuring the same variable supplements this type of built-in surveillance. Based on experience in operation of both conventional and nuclear systems, when the unit is in operation, the minimum checking frequency stated is deemed adequate for reactor system instrumentation.

###### Calibration

- 18. Calibration shall be performed to assure the presentation and acquisition of accurate information. The nuclear flux (power range) channels amplifiers shall be calibrated (during steady state operating conditions) when indicated neutron power and core thermal power differ by more than 2 percent. During non-steady state operation, the nuclear flux channels amplifiers shall be calibrated daily to

compensate for instrumentation drift and changing rod patterns and core physics parameters.

Channels subject only to "drift" errors induced within the instrumentation itself can tolerate longer intervals between calibrations. Process system instrumentation errors induced by drift can be expected to remain within acceptable tolerances if recalibration is performed at the intervals of each refueling period.

Substantial calibration shifts within a channel (essentially a channel failure) will be revealed during routine checking and testing procedures.

Thus, minimum calibration frequencies set forth are considered acceptable.

#### Testing

On-line testing of reactor protective channels is required once every four weeks on a rotational or perfectly staggered basis. The rotation scheme is designed to reduce the probability of an undetected failure existing within the system and to minimize the likelihood of the same systematic test errors being introduced into each redundant channel.

The rotation schedule for the reactor protective channels is as follows:

Channels A, B, C, &D	Before Startup
Channel A	One Week After Startup
Channel B	Two Weeks After Startup
Channel C	Three Weeks After Startup
Channel D	Four Weeks After Startup

The reactor protective system instrumentation test cycle is continued with one channel's instrumentation tested each week. Upon detection of a failure that prevents trip action, all instrumentation associated with the protective channels will be tested after which the rotational test cycle is started again. If actuation of a safety channel occurs, assurance will be required that actuation was within the limiting safety system setting.

The protective channels coincidence logic and control rod drive trip breakers are trip tested every four weeks. The trip test checks all logic combinations and is to be performed on a rotational basis. The logic and breakers of the four protective channels shall be trip tested prior to startup and their individual channels trip tested on a cyclic basis. Discovery of an unsafe failure requires the testing of all channel logic and breakers, after which the trip test cycle is started again.

The equipment testing and system sampling frequencies specified in Table 4.1-2 and Table 4.1-3 are considered adequate to maintain the equipment and systems in a safe operational status.

REFERENCE

FSAR Section 7.1.2.3.4

TABLE 4.1-1  
INSTRUMENT SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>CHANNEL DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CHECK</u>	<u>TEST</u>	<u>CALIBRATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Protective Channel Coincidence Logic	NA	M	NA	
2. Control Rod Drive Trip Breaker	NA	M	NA	
3. Power Range Amplifier	D(1)	NA	(1)	(1) Heat Balance Check daily. Heat balance calibration whenever indicated neutron power & core thermal power differ by more than 2%.
4. Power Range Channel	S	M	M(1)(2)	(1) Using incore instrumentation. (2) Axial offset upper & lower chambers after each startup if not done previous week.
5. Intermediate Range Channel	S(1)	P	NA	(1) When in service
6. Source Range Channel	S(1)	P	NA	(1) When in service
7. Reactor Coolant Temperature Channel	S	M	R	
8. High Reactor Coolant Pressure Channel	S	M	R	
9. Low Reactor Coolant Pressure Channel	S	M	R	
10. Flux-Reactor Coolant Flow Comparator	S	M	R	
11. Reactor Coolant Pressure Temperature Comparator	S	M	R	
12. Pump Flux Comparator	S	M	R	

4.1.4

TABLE 4.1-1 Cont.

<u>CHANNEL DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CHECK</u>	<u>TEST</u>	<u>CALIBRATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
13. High Reactor Building Pressure Channel	D	M	R	
14. High Pressure Injection Logic Channel	NA	M	NA	
15. High Pressure Injection Analog Channels				
a. Reactor Coolant Pressure Channel	S	M	R	
b. Reactor Building 4 psig Channel	S	M	R	
16. Low Pressure Injection Logic Channel	NA	B/M	NA	✓
17. Low Pressure Injection Analog Channels				
a. Reactor Coolant Pressure Channel	S	M	R	
b. Reactor Building 4 psig Channel	S	M	R	
18. Reactor Building Emergency Cooling and Isolation System Logic Channel	NA	B/M	NA	✓
19. Reactor Building Emergency Cooling and Isolation System Analog Channels				
a. Reactor Building 4 psig Channels	S	M	R	

TABLE 4.1-1 Cont.

<u>CHANNEL DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CHECK</u>	<u>TEST</u>	<u>CALIBRATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
20. Reactor Building Spray System Logic Channel	NA	B/M	NA	
21. Reactor Building Spray System Analog Channels				
a. Reactor Building 10 psig Channels	NA	M	R	
22. Pressurizer Temperature Channels	S	NA	R	
23. Control Rod Absolute Position	S(1)	NA	R(2)	(1) Check with Relative Position Indicator (2) Calibrate rod misalignment channel
24. Control Rod Relative Position	S(1)	NA	R(2)	(1) Check with Absolute Position Indicator (2) Calibrate rod misalignment channel
25. Core Flooding Tanks				
a. Pressure Channels	S	NA	R	
b. Level Channels	S	NA	R	
26. Pressurizer Level Channels	S	NA	R	
27. Letdown Storage Tank Level Channels	D	NA	R	
28. Radiation Monitoring Systems	W(1)	M	Q	(1) Check functioning of self-checking feature on each detector.
29. High and Low Pressure Injection Systems: Flow Channels	NA	NA	R	

TABLE 4.1-1 Cont.

<u>CHANNEL DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CHECK</u>	<u>TEST</u>	<u>CALIBRATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
30. Borated Water Storage Tank Level Indicator	W	NA	R	
31. Boric Acid Mix Tank				
a. Level Channel	NA	NA	R	
b. Temperature Channel	M	NA	R	
32. Concentrated Boric Acid Storage Tank				
a. Level Channel	NA	NA	R	
b. Temperature Channel	M	NA	R	
33. Containment Temperature	NA	NA	R	
34. Incore Neutron Detectors	M(1)	NA	NA	(1) Check functioning; including functioning of computer readout or recorder readout
35. Emergency Plant Radiation Instruments	M(1)	NA	R	(1) Battery Check
36. Environmental Monitors	M(1)	NA	R	(1) Check functioning
37. Strong Motion Accelerometer	Q(1)	NA	Q	(1) Battery Check
38. Reactor Building Emerg. Sump Level	NA	NA	R	
39. Steam Generator Water Level	W	NA	R	
40. Turbine Overspeed Trip			R	
41. Engineered Safeguards Channel 1 HP Injection Manual Trip	NA	R	NA	

4.1-7

19.

TABLE 4.1-1 Cont.

<u>CHANNEL DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CHECK</u>	<u>TEST</u>	<u>CALIBRATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
42. Engineered Safeguards Channel 2 HP Injection Manual Trip	NA	R	NA	
43. Engineered Safeguards Channel 3 LP Injection Manual Trip	NA	R	NA	
44. Engineered Safeguards Channel 4 LP Injection Manual Trip	NA	R	NA	
45. Engineered Safeguards Channel 5 RB Isolation & Cooling Manual Trip	NA	R	NA	
46. Engineered Safeguards Channel 6 RB Isolation & Cooling Manual Trip	NA	R	NA	
47. Engineered Safeguards Channel 7 Spray Manual Trip	NA	R	NA	
48. Engineered Safeguards Channel 8 Spray Manual Trip	NA	R	NA	
49. Reactor Manual Trip	NA	R	NA	

4.1-7a

S - Each Shift

T/W - Twice per week

R - Each Refueling Period

D - Daily

B/M - Every 2 months

NA- Not Applicable

W - Weekly

Q - Quarterly

B/W- Every two weeks

M - Monthly

P - Prior to each startup if not done previous week

Table 4.1-2

Minimum Equipment Test Frequency

<u>Item</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
1. Control Rods	Rod Drop Times of all full length rods	Each Refueling shutdown
2. Control Rod Movement	Movement of each rod	Every two weeks
3. Pressurizer Safety Valves	Setpoint	50% each refueling period
4. Main Steam Safety Valves	Setpoint	25% each refueling period
5. Refueling System Interlocks	Functional	Each refueling period
6. Turbine Steam Stop Valves	Movement of each stop valve	Monthly
7. Reactor Coolant System Leakage	Evaluate	Daily
8. Charcoal and High Efficiency Filters for Penetration Room, Control Room, and RB Purge Filters	DOP Test on HEPA filters. Freon Test on Charcoal Filter Units	Each refueling period and at any time work on filters could alter their integrity.
9. Emergency Condenser Cooling Water System	Functional	Each refueling period
10. High Pressure Service Water Pumps and Power Supplies	Functional	Monthly
11. Spent Fuel Cooling System	Functional	Each refueling period prior to fuel handling

TABLE 4.1-3

Minimum Sampling Frequency

<u>Item</u>	<u>Check</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
1. Reactor Coolant	a. Radio-Chemical Analysis <sup>(1)</sup>	Monthly
	$\bar{E}$ determination <sup>(2)</sup>	Semiannually
	b. Gross Beta-Gamma Activity <sup>(1)</sup>	5 times/week
	c. Tritium Radioactivity	Monthly
	d. Chemistry (Cl, F and O <sub>2</sub> )	5 times/week
e. Boron Concentration	2 times/week	
2. Borated Water Storage Tank Water Sample	Boron Concentration	Weekly and after each makeup
3. Core Flooding Tank Water Sample	Boron Concentration	Monthly and after each makeup
4. Spent Fuel Pool Water Sample	Boron Concentration	Monthly and after each makeup
5. Secondary Coolant	a. Gross Beta-Gamma Activity	Weekly
	b. Iodine Analysis <sup>(3)</sup>	
6. Concentrated Boric Acid Tank	Boron Concentration	Twice weekly
7. Low Activity Waste Tank & Condensate Test Tank	a. Gross Beta-Gamma Activity	Prior to release of each batch
	b. Isotopic Analysis	Quarterly
	c. Gamma Scan	Monthly
	d. Tritium	Quarterly
8. Waste Gas Decay Tank	a. Isotopic Analysis	Quarterly
	b. Gross Beta-Gamma Activity	Prior to release of each batch
9. Unit Vent Sampling System	a. Iodine Spectrum <sup>(4)</sup>	Weekly
	b. Particulates <sup>(4)</sup>	Weekly
10. Keowee Hydro Dam Dilution Flow	a. Measure Leakage Flow Rate	Annually
11. Condenser Air Partition Factor	a. Measure Iodine Partition Factor in Condenser	One time if and when primary to secondary leak develops

- (1) When radioactivity level is greater than 10 percent of the limits of Specification 3.1.4, the sampling frequency shall be increased to a minimum of once each day.
- (2) A determination will be started when gross beta-gamma activity analysis indicates greater than 10  $\mu\text{Ci/ml}$  and will be redetermined each 10  $\mu\text{Ci/ml}$  increase in gross beta-gamma activity analysis. A radio chemical analysis for this purpose shall consist of a quantitative measurement of 95% of radionuclides in reactor coolant with half lives of >30 minutes.
- (3) When gross activity increases by a factor of two above background, an iodine analysis will be made and performed thereafter when the gross beta-gamma activity increases by 10 percent.
- (4) When activity level exceeds 10 percent of the limits of Specification 3.9, the sampling frequency shall be increased to a minimum of once each day. This can be done by IRIA-44 (Unit Vent Iodine) monitor. When the gross activity release rate exceeds one percent of maximum release rate and the average gross activity release rate increases by 50 percent over the previous day, an analysis shall be performed for iodines and particulates. This can be done by IRIA-44 (Unit Vent Iodine Monitor) and RIA-43 (Unit Vent Particulate Monitor).

4.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE

Applicability

Applies to the surveillance of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary.

Objective

To assure the continued integrity of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary.

Specification

4.2.1 Prior to initial unit operation, an ultrasonic test survey shall be made of reactor coolant system pressure boundary welds as required to establish preoperational integrity and base line data for future inspections.

4.2.2 Post operational inspections of components shall be made in accordance with the methods and intervals indicated in IS-242 and IS-261 of Section XI of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, 1970, including 1970 Winter addenda, except as follows:

<u>IS-261 Item</u>	<u>Component</u>	<u>Exception</u>
1.4	Primary Nozzle to Vessel Welds	1 RC outlet nozzle to be inspected after approx. 3 1/3 years operation. 2nd RC outlet nozzle to be inspected after approx. 6 2/3 yrs operation. 4 RC inlet nozzles and 2 core flooding nozzles to be inspected at or near end of interval
3.3	Primary Nozzle to Safe End Welds	Not Applicable
4.3	Valve Pressure Retaining Bolting Larger than 2"	Not Applicable

6.1	Valve Body Welds	Not Applicable
6.3	Valve to Safe End Welds	Not Applicable
6.6	Integrally Welded Valve Supports	Not Applicable
6.7	Valve Supports & Hangers	Not Applicable

4.2.3 The structural integrity of the reactor coolant system boundary shall be maintained at the level required by the original acceptance standards throughout the life of the station. Any evidence, as a result of the tests outlined in Table IS-261 of Section XI of the code, that defects have developed or grown, shall be investigated, including evaluation of comparable areas of the reactor coolant system.

4.2.4 To assure the structural integrity of the reactor internals throughout the life of the unit, the two sets of main internals bolts (connecting the core barrel to the core support shield and to the lower grid cylinder) shall remain in place and under tension. This will be verified by visual inspection to determine that the welded bolt locking caps remain in place. All locking caps will be inspected after hot functional testing and whenever the internals are removed from the vessel during a refueling or maintenance shutdown. The core barrel to core support shield caps will be inspected each refueling shutdown.

4.2.5 Sufficient records of each inspection shall be kept to allow comparison and evaluation of future inspections.

4.2.6 The inservice inspection program shall be reviewed at the end of five years to consider incorporation of new inspection techniques and equipment which have been proven practical and the conclusions of this review and evaluation shall be discussed with the AEC/DRL.

4.2.7 The inspection of each reactor coolant pump flywheel shall include: a volumetric examination, in place, of the areas of higher stress concentration at the bore and key way at approximately three year intervals. A surface examination of exposed surfaces, and a complete volumetric examination at approximately 10 year intervals when disassembly and/or flywheel removal is required for maintenance or repair. Disassembly or flywheel removal is not required to perform these examinations.

4.2.8 Vessel specimen capsules shall be withdrawn at one, seven, twelve, and eighteen years. Withdrawal schedules may be modified to coincide with those refueling outages or unit shutdowns most closely approaching the withdrawal schedule. Specimens thus withdrawn shall be tested in accordance with ASTM-E-185-70. A copy of the test report shall be forwarded to DRL within 90 days.

4.2.9 During the first two refueling periods, two reactor coolant system piping elbows shall be ultrasonically inspected along their longitudinal welds (4" beyond each side) for clad bonding and for cracks in both the clad and base metal. The elbows to be inspected

18.

are numbers 7 and 9 in assemblies A57 and B57 respectively as identified in B&W Report 1364 dated December 1970.

#### Bases

The surveillance program has been developed to comply with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Coolant Systems, 1970, including 1970 Winter addenda, edition. The program places major emphasis on the area of highest stress concentrations and on areas where fast neutron irradiation might be sufficient to change material properties.

The vessel specimen surveillance program is based on equivalent exposure years of 1.76, 11.18, 20.41, and 30.0. The 1.76 year number is based on a 50°F shift of NDTT; the 30-year figure is based on 3/4 vessel service life; and the 11.18 and the 20.41 year figures are equally spaced between.

Early inspection of reactor coolant system piping elbows is considered desirable in order to reconfirm the integrity of the carbon steel base metal when explosively clad with sensitized stainless steel. If no degradation is observed during the two annual inspections, surveillance requirements will revert to Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

#### 4.3 TESTING FOLLOWING OPENING OF SYSTEM

##### Applicability

Applies to test requirements for Reactor Coolant System integrity.

##### Objective

To assure Reactor Coolant System integrity prior to return to criticality following normal opening, modification, or repair.

##### Specification

- 4.3.1 When Reactor Coolant System repairs or modifications have been made, these repairs or modifications shall be inspected and tested to meet all applicable code requirements prior to the reactor being made critical.
- 4.3.2 Following any opening of the Reactor Coolant System, it shall be leak tested at not less than 2285 psig prior to the reactor being made critical.
- 4.3.3 The limitations of Specification 3.1.2 shall apply.

##### Bases

Repairs or modifications made to the Reactor Coolant System are inspectable and testable under applicable codes, such as B 31.7, and ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI IS-400.

18. |

19. |

##### REFERENCES

FSAR, Section 4

4.4 REACTOR BUILDING

4.4.1 Containment Leakage Tests

Applicability

Applies to containment leakage.

Objective

To verify that leakage from the reactor building is maintained within allowable limits.

Specification

4.4.1.1 Integrated Leakage Rate Tests

4.4.1.1.1 Design Pressure Leakage Rate

The maximum allowable integrated leakage rate,  $L_a$ , from the reactor building at the 59 psig design pressure,  $P_p$ , shall not exceed 0.25 weight percent of the building atmosphere at that pressure per 24 hours.

4.4.1.1.2 Testing at Reduced Pressure

The periodic integrated leak rate test may be performed at a test pressure,  $P_t$ , of not less than 29.5 psig provided the resultant leakage rate,  $L_t$ , does not exceed a pre-established fraction of  $L_a$  determined as follows:

- a. Prior to reactor operation the initial value of the integrated leakage rate of the reactor building shall be measured at design pressure and at the reduced pressure to be used in the periodic integrated leakage rate tests. The leakage rates thus measured shall be identified as  $L_{pm}$  and  $L_{tm}$  respectively.
- b.  $L_t$  shall not exceed  $L_a \left[ \frac{L_{tm}}{L_{pm}} \right]$  for values of  $\frac{L_{tm}}{L_{pm}}$  below 0.7.
- c.  $L_t$  shall not exceed  $L_a \sqrt{\frac{P_t}{P_p}}$  for values of  $\frac{L_{tm}}{L_{pm}}$  above 0.7.
- d. If  $L_{tm}/L_{pm}$  is less than 0.3, the initial integrated test results shall be subject to review by the AEC to establish an acceptable value of  $L_t$ .

#### 4.4.1.1.3 Conduct of Tests

- 18.
- (a) The test duration shall be at least 24 hours, except that if both the following conditions are met, the test duration shall be at least 10 hours.
    - (1) All test conditions, including the test procedure, shall be similar to the initial integrated leakage rate tests.
    - (2) When the test is terminated, building pressure shall have stabilized and shall not be increasing.
  - (b) Test accuracy shall be verified by supplementary means, such as measuring the quantity of air required to return to the starting point or by imposing a known leak rate to demonstrate the validity of measurements.
  - (c) Closure of containment isolation valves for the purpose of the test shall be accomplished by the means provided for normal operation of the valves without preliminary exercises or adjustment.

#### 4.4.1.1.4 Frequency of Test

After the initial preoperational leakage rate test, two integrated leakage rate tests shall be performed at approximately equal intervals between each major shutdown for inservice inspection to be performed at 10 year intervals. In addition, an integrated test shall be performed at each 10 year interval, coinciding with the inservice inspection shutdown. The test shall coincide with a shutdown for major fuel reloading.

#### 4.4.1.1.5 Conditions for Return to Criticality

- a. If  $L_t$  is less than 50% of the value permitted in 4.4.1.1.2, local leakage rate testing need not be completed prior to return to criticality following a periodic integrated leakage rate test.
- b. If  $L_t$  is between 50 and 100% of the value permitted in 4.4.1.1.2 the return to criticality will be permitted conditioned upon demonstrating that local leakage rate measured at full design pressure, accounts for all leakage above 50% of  $L_t$ . If this cannot be demonstrated within 30 days of returning to criticality, the reactor shall be shutdown.

#### 4.4.1.1.6 Corrective Action and Retest

If repairs are necessary to meet the criteria of 4.4.1.1.1 or 4.4.1.1.2, the integrated leak rate test need not be repeated provided local leakage rate measurements are made before and after repair to demonstrate that the leakage rate reduction achieved by repairs reduces the overall measured integrated leak rate to an acceptable value.

#### 4.4.1.1.7 Report of Test Results

Each integrated leak rate test will be the subject of a summary technical report which will include a description of test methods used and a summary of local leak detection tests. Sufficient data and analysis shall be included to show that a stabilized leak rate was attained and to identify all significant required correction factors such as those associated with humidity and barometric pressure, and all significant errors such as those associated with instrumentation sensitivities and data scatter.

#### 4.4.1.2 Local Leakage Rate Tests

##### 4.4.1.2.1 Scope of Testing

The local leak rate shall be measured for each of the following components:

- (a) Personnel hatch
- (b) Emergency hatch
- (c) Equipment hatch seals
- (d) Fuel transfer tube seals
- (e) Reactor building normal sump drain line
- (f) Reactor coolant pump seal outlet line
- (g) Reactor coolant pump seal inlet line
- (h) Quench Tank drain line
- (i) Quench Tank return line
- (j) Quench Tank vent line
- (k) Normal makeup to reactor coolant system
- (l) High pressure injection line
- (m) Electrical penetrations
- (n) Reactor building purge inlet line
- (o) Reactor building purge outlet line
- (p) Reactor building sample lines
- (q) Reactor coolant letdown line

#### 4.4.1.2.2 Conduct of Tests

- (a) Local leak rate tests shall be performed at a pressure of not less than 59 psig.
- (b) Acceptable methods of testing are halogen gas detection, soap bubbles, pressure decay, hydrostatic flow or equivalent.

#### 4.4.1.2.3 Acceptance Criteria

The total leakage from all penetrations and isolation valves shall not exceed 0.125% of the reactor building atmosphere per 24 hours.

#### 4.4.1.2.4 Corrective Action and Retest

- (a) If at any time it is determined that the criterion of 4.4.1.2.3 above is exceeded, repairs shall be initiated immediately.
- (b) If conformance to the criterion of 4.4.1.2.3 is not demonstrated within 48 hours following detection of excessive local leakage, the reactor shall be shutdown and depressurized until repairs are effected and the local leakage meets the acceptance criterion as demonstrated by retest.

#### 4.4.1.2.5 Test Frequency

Local leak detection tests shall be performed at a frequency of at least each refueling period, except that:

- (a) The equipment hatch and fuel transfer tube seals shall be additionally tested after each opening.
- (b) The personnel hatch and emergency hatch outer door seals shall be tested at six month intervals, except when the hatches are not opened during that interval. In no case shall the test interval be longer than 12 months.

#### 4.4.1.3 Isolation Valve Functional Tests

Every three months, remotely operated reactor building isolation valves shall be stroked to the position required to fulfill their safety function unless such operation is not practical during plant operation. The latter valves shall be tested during each refueling period.

#### 4.4.1.4 Annual Inspection

A visual examination of the accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment structure and its components shall be performed annually and prior to any integrated leak test, to uncover any evidence of deterioration which may affect either the containment's structural integrity or leak-tightness. The dis-

covery of any significant deterioration shall be accompanied by corrective actions in accord with acceptable procedures, non-destructive tests, and inspections, and local testing where practical, prior to the conduct of any integrated leak test. Such repairs shall be reported as part of the test results.

#### 4.4.1.5 Reactor Building Modifications

Any major modification or replacement of components affecting the reactor building integrity shall be followed by either an integrated leak rate test or a local leak test, as appropriate, and shall meet the acceptance criteria of 4.4.1.1.4 and 4.4.1.2.3 respectively.

##### Bases(1)

The reactor building is designed for an internal pressure of 59 psig and a steam-air mixture temperature of 286°F. Prior to initial operation, the containment will be strength tested at 115% of design pressure and leak rate tested at the design pressure. The containment will also be leak tested prior to initial operation at approximately 50% of the design pressure. These tests will verify that the leakage rate from reactor building pressurization satisfies the relationships given in the specification.

The performance of a periodic integrated leakage rate test during plant life provides a current assessment of potential leakage from the containment in case of an accident that would pressurize the interior of the containment. In order to provide a realistic appraisal of the integrity of the containment under accident conditions, this periodic test is to be performed without preliminary leak detection surveys or leak repairs, and containment isolation valves are to be closed in the normal manner. The test pressure of 29.5 psig for the periodic integrated leakage rate test is sufficiently high to provide an accurate measurement of the leakage rate and it duplicates the pre-operational leakage rate test at 29.5 psig. The specification provides a relationship for relating the measured leakage of air at 29.5 psig to the potential leakage at 59 psig. The minimum of 24 hours was specified for the integrated leakage rate test to help stabilize conditions and thus improve accuracy and to better evaluate data scatter. The frequency of the periodic integrated leakage rate test is keyed to the refueling schedule for the reactor, because these tests can best be performed during refueling shutdowns.

The specified frequency of periodic integrated leakage rate tests is based on three major considerations. First is the low probability of leaks in the liner, because of conformance of the complete containment to a 0.25% leakage rate at 59 psig during pre-operational testing and the absence of any significant stresses in the liner during reactor operation. Second is the more frequent testing, at design pressure, of those portions of the containment envelope that are most likely to develop leaks during reactor operation (penetrations and isolation valves) and the low value (0.125%) of leakage that is specified as acceptable from penetrations and isolation valves. Third is the tendon stress surveillance program which provides assurance that an important part of the structural integrity of the containment is maintained.

leakage to the penetration room, which is permitted to be up to 50% of the total allowable containment leakage, is discharged through high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal filters to the unit vent. The filters are conservatively said to be 90% efficient for iodine removal.

More frequent testing of various penetrations is specified as these locations are more susceptible to leakage than the reactor building liner due to the mechanical closure involved. Particular attention is given to testing those penetrations with resilient sealing materials, penetrations that vent directly to the reactor building atmosphere, and penetrations that connect to the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. The basis for specifying a total leakage rate of 0.125% from penetrations and isolation valves is that at least one-half of the allowable integrated leakage rate will be from those sources. Valve operability tests are specified to assure proper closure or opening of the reactor building isolation valves to provide for isolation of functioning of Engineered Safety Features systems. Valves will be stroked to the position required to fulfill their safety function unless it is established that such testing is not practical during operation. Valves that cannot be full-stroke tested will be part-stroke tested during operation and full-stroke tested during each normal refueling shutdown.

#### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Sections 5 and 13.

#### 4.4.2 Structural Integrity

##### Applicability

Applies to the structural integrity of the reactor building.

##### Objective

To define the inservice surveillance program for the reactor building.

##### Specification

#### 4.4.2.1 Tendon Surveillance

For the initial surveillance program, covering the first five years of operation, nine tendons shall be selected for periodic inspection for symptoms of material deterioration or force reduction. The surveillance tendons shall consist of three horizontal tendons, one in each of three 120° sectors of the containment; three vertical tendons located at approximately 120° apart; and three dome tendons located approximately 120° apart. The following nine tendons have been selected as the surveillance tendons:

Dome	1D28
	2D28
	3D28
Horizontal	13H9
	51H9
	53H10
Vertical	23V14
	45V16
	61V16

##### 4.4.2.1.1 Lift-Off

Lift-off readings shall be taken for all 9 surveillance tendons.

##### 4.4.2.1.2 Wire Inspection and Testing

One surveillance tendon of each directional group shall be relaxed and one wire from each relaxed tendon shall be removed as a sample and visually inspected for corrosion or pitting. Tensile tests shall also be performed on a minimum of three specimens taken from the ends and middle of each of the three wires. The specimens shall be the maximum length acceptable for the test apparatus to be used and shall include areas representative of significant corrosion or pitting.

After the wire removal, the tendons shall be retensioned to the stress level measured at the lift-off reading and then checked by a final lift-off reading.

Should the inspection of one of the wires reveal any significant corrosion (pitting or loss of area), further inspection of the other two sets in that directional group will be made to determine the extent of the corrosion and its significance to the load-carrying capability of the structure. The sheathing filler will be sampled and inspected for changes in physical appearance.

Wire samples shall be selected in such a manner that with the third inspection (end of fifth year) wires from all 9 surveillance tendons shall have been inspected and tested.

#### 4.4.2.2 Inspection Intervals and Reports

The inspection intervals, measured from the date of the initial structural test, shall be one year, three years and every five years thereafter or as modified based on experience. Tendon surveillance may be conducted during reactor operation provided design conditions regarding loss of adjacent tendons are satisfied at all times.

A quantitative analytical report covering results of each inspection shall be submitted (required by Technical Specification 6.6.4.7.e) and shall especially address the following conditions, should they develop:

- (1) Broken wires.
- (2) The force-time trend line for any tendon, when extrapolated, that extends beyond either the upper or lower bounds of the predicted design band.
- (3) Unexpected changes in corrosion conditions or sheathing filler properties.

#### 4.4.2.3 End Anchorage Concrete Surveillance

- a. The end anchorages of the surveillance tendons and adjacent concrete surface will be inspected. In addition, other locations for surveillance will be determined by information obtained from design calculations, prestressing records, observations, and deformation measurements made during prestressing.
- b. The inspection interval will be one-half year and one year after the operation of Unit 1 and will occur during the warmest and coldest part of the year.
- c. The inspections made shall include:
  - (1) Visual inspection of the end anchorage concrete exterior surfaces.
  - (2) A determination of the temperatures of the liner plate area or containment interior surface in locations near the end anchorage concrete under surveillance.

- (3) Measurement of concrete temperatures at specific end anchorage concrete surfaces being inspected.
  - (4) The mapping of the predominant visible concrete crack patterns.
  - (5) The measurement of the crack widths, by use of optical comparators or wire feeler gauges.
  - (6) The measurement of movements, if any, by use of demountable mechanical extensometers.
- d. The measurements and observations shall be compared with those to which prestressed structures have been subjected in normal and abnormal load conditions and with those of preceding measurements and observations at the same location on the reactor containment.
  - e. The acceptance criteria shall be as follows:

If the inspections determine that the conditions are favorable in comparison with experience and predictions, the close inspections will be terminated by the last of the inspections stated in the schedule and a report will be prepared which documents the findings and recommends the schedule for future inspections, if any. If the inspections detect symptoms of greater than normal cracking or movements, an immediate investigation will be made to determine the cause.

#### 4.4.2.4 Liner Plate Surveillance

4.4.2.4.1 The liner plate will be examined prior to the initial pressure test in accessible areas to determine the following:

- a. Location of areas which have inward deformations. The magnitude of the inward deformations shall be measured and recorded. These areas shall be permanently marked for future reference and the inward deformations shall be measured between the angle stiffeners which are on 15-inch centers. The measurements shall be accurate to  $\pm .01$  inch. Temperature readings shall be obtained on both the liner plate and outside containment wall at the locations where inward deformations occur.
- b. Locations of areas having strain concentrations by visual examination with emphasis on the condition of the liner surface. The location of these areas shall be recorded.

4.4.2.4.2 Shortly after the initial pressure test and approximately one year after initial start-up, a reexamination of the areas located in Section 4.4.2.4.1 shall be made. Measurements of the inward deformations and observations of any strain concentrations shall be made.

- 4.4.2.4.3 If the difference in the measured inward deformations exceeds 0.25 inch (for a particular location) and/or changes in strain concentration exist, an investigation shall be made. The investigation will determine any necessary corrective action.
- 4.4.2.4.4 The surveillance program shall be discontinued after the one year after initial start-up inspection if no corrective action was needed. If corrective action is required, the frequency of inspection for a continued surveillance program shall be determined.

#### Bases

Provisions have been made for an in-service surveillance program, covering the first five years of the life of the unit, intended to provide sufficient evidence to maintain confidence that the integrity of the reactor building is being preserved. This program consists of tendon, tendon anchorage and liner plate surveillance.

To accomplish these programs, the following representative tendon groups have been selected for surveillance:

- Horizontal - Three 120° tendons comprising one complete hoop system below grade.
- Vertical - Three tendons spaced approximately 120° apart.
- Diagonal - Three tendons spaced approximately 120° apart.

The inspection during this initial five year period of at least one wire from each of the nine surveillance tendons (three wires per group per inspection) is considered sufficient representation to detect the presence of any wide spread tendon corrosion or pitting conditions in the structure. This program will be subject to review and revision as warranted based on studies and on results obtained for this and other prestressed concrete reactor buildings during this period of time.

#### REFERENCE

FSAR Section 5.6.2.2.

#### 4.4.3 Hydrogen Purge System

##### Applicability

Applies to testing Reactor Building Hydrogen Purge System.

##### Objective

To verify that this system and components are operable.

##### Specification

#### 4.4.3.1 Operating Tests

An in-place system test shall be performed during each refueling period using the written emergency procedures. These tests shall consist of visual inspection, hook-up of system, a flow measurement using flow instruments in the portable purging station and pressure drop measurements across the filter bank. Flow shall be design flow or higher, and pressure drops across the filter bank shall not exceed two times the pressure drop when new. Fan motors shall be operated continuously for at least one hour, and valves shall be proven operable. This test shall demonstrate that under simulated emergency conditions the system can be taken from storage and placed into operation within 48 hours.

#### 4.4.3.2 Filter Tests

During each refueling period, leakage tests using DOP on HEPA units and Freon-112 (or equivalent) on charcoal units shall be performed at design flow on the filter. Removal of 99.5% DOP by each entire HEPA filter unit and removal of 99.0% Freon-112 (or equivalent) by each entire charcoal absorber unit shall constitute acceptable performance. These tests must also be performed after any maintenance which may affect the structural integrity of either the filtration system units or of the housing.

#### 4.4.3.3 H<sub>2</sub> Detector Test

Hydrogen concentration instruments shall be calibrated each refueling period with proper consideration to moisture effect.

##### Bases


18. The purge system is composed of a portable purging station and a portion of the penetration room ventilation system. The purge system is operated as necessary to maintain the hydrogen concentration below the control limit. The purge discharge from the Reactor Building is taken from one of the penetration room ventilation system penetrations and discharged to the unit vent. A suction may be taken on the Reactor Building via isolation valve PR-7 (Figure 6-5 of the FSAR) using the existing vent and pressurization connections.

The purge rate is controlled through the use of a portable purging station (Insert, Figure 14A-5.1 of the FSAR). The station consists of a purge blower, dehumidifier, filter train, purge flowmeter, sample connection and flowmeter and associated piping and valves.

The blower is a rot. positive type rated 60 scfm. The dehumidifier consists of two redundant heating elements inserted in a section of ventilation duct. The function of the dehumidifier is to sufficiently increase the temperature of the entering air to assure 70 percent relative humidity entering the filter train with 100 percent saturated air entering the dehumidifier. The purpose of the dehumidifier is to assure optimum charcoal filter efficiency. Heating element control is provided by a thermostatic switch. Humidity indication is provided downstream of the heating elements by a humidity readout gage. The filter train provides prefiltration, high efficiency particulate filtration and charcoal filtration. The filter train assembly is identical in design to the waste gas filter train assembly which is rated at 200 scfm, thus conservatively capable of performing the assigned function. Face velocity to the charcoal filter is very low. The charcoal filter is composed of a module consisting of two inch deep double tray carbon cells. The purge flow to the unit vent is metered using a 0-60 scfm rotometer. The purge sample flow is metered using a 0-12 scfm rotometer. Both of these rotometers have an accuracy of  $\pm$  two percent of full scale, and each has remote readout capability. The purge discharge rate is controlled by a blower discharge throttling valve. The purge sample activities can be collected, counted and analyzed in the radio-chemistry laboratory. Makeup air to the Reactor Building is supplied by a compressed air system connection to one of the aforementioned existing vent and pressurization connections.

That portion of the penetration room ventilation system piping and valves which is used as a part of the purge system is permanently installed and is designed for seismic loading through the existing vent and pressurization connections. The remainder of the purge system is the portable purging station which is stored in an area where an earthquake will not damage it. Following a LOCA, there is adequate time before purging is required to permit checkout of the portable purging station and to optimize the system operation to minimize the total dose to the public.

4.4-12



4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM AND REACTOR BUILDING  
COOLING SYSTEM PERIODIC TESTING

4.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling Systems

Applicability

Applies to periodic testing requirement for emergency core cooling systems.

Objective

To verify that the emergency core cooling systems are operable.

Specification

4.5.1.1 System Tests

4.5.1.1.1 High Pressure Injection System

- (a) During each refueling period, a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate that the system is operable. A test signal will be applied to demonstrate actuation of the high pressure injection system for emergency core cooling operation.
- (b) The test will be considered satisfactory if control board indication verifies that all components have responded to the actuation signal properly; all appropriate pump breakers shall have opened or closed and all valves shall have completed their travel.

4.5.1.1.2 Low Pressure Injection System

- (a) During each refueling period, a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate that the system is operable. The test shall be performed in accordance with the procedure summarized below:
  - (1) A test signal will be applied to demonstrate actuation of the low pressure injection system for emergency core cooling operation.
  - (2) Verification of the engineered safety features function of the low pressure service water system which supplies cooling water to the low pressure coolers shall be made to demonstrate operability of the coolers.
- (b) The test will be considered satisfactory if control board indication verifies that all components have responded to the actuation signal properly; all appropriate pump breakers shall have opened or closed, and all valves shall have completed their travel.

#### 4.5.1.1.3 Core Flooding System

- (a) During each refueling period, a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate proper operation of the system. During pressurization of the Reactor Coolant System, verification shall be made that the check and isolation valves in the core flooding tank discharge lines operate properly.
- (b) The test will be considered satisfactory if control board indication of core flood tank level verifies that all valves have opened.

#### 4.5.1.2 Component Tests

##### 4.5.1.2.1 Pumps

At intervals not to exceed 3 months, the high pressure and low pressure injection pumps shall be started and operated to verify proper operation. Acceptable performance will be indicated if the pump starts, operates for fifteen minutes, and the discharge pressure and flow are within  $\pm 10\%$  of a point on the pump head curve.

##### 4.5.1.2.2 Valves - Power Operated

- (a) At intervals not to exceed three months each engineered safety features valve in the emergency core cooling systems and each engineered safety features valve associated with emergency core cooling in the low pressure service water system shall be tested to verify operability.
- (b) The acceptable performance of each power operated valve will be that motion is indicated upon actuation by appropriate signals.

#### Notes

The emergency core cooling systems are the principle reactor safety features in the event of a loss of coolant accident. The removal of heat from the core provided by these systems is designed to limit core damage.

The high pressure injection system under normal operating conditions has one pump operating. At least once per month, operation will be rotated to another high pressure injection pump. This will help verify that the high pressure injection pumps are operable.

The requirements of the low pressure service water system for cooling water are more severe during normal operation than under accident conditions. Rotation of the pump in operation on a monthly basis will verify that two pumps are operable.

The low pressure injection pumps are tested singularly for operability by opening the bled water storage tank outlet valves and the bypass valves

in the borated water storage tank fill line. This allows water to be pumped from the borated water storage tank through each of the injection lines and back to the tank.

With the reactor shutdown, the valves in each core flooding line are checked for operability by reducing the reactor coolant system pressure until the indicated level in the core flood tanks verify that the check and isolation valves have opened.

REFERENCE

FSAR Section 6

#### 4.5.2 Reactor Building Cooling Systems

##### Applicability

Applies to testing of the reactor building cooling systems.

##### Objective

To verify that the reactor building cooling systems are operable.

##### Specification

#### 4.5.2.1 System Tests

##### 4.5.2.1.1 Reactor Building Spray System

- (a) During each refueling period a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate proper operation of the system. A test signal will be applied to demonstrate actuation of the reactor building spray system (except for reactor building inlet valves to prevent water entering nozzles). Water will be circulated from the borated water storage tank through the reactor building spray pumps and returned through the test line to the borated water storage tank.
- (b) Station compressed air will be introduced into the spray headers to verify the availability of the headers and spray nozzles at least every five years.
- (c) The test will be considered satisfactory if visual observation and control board indication verifies that all components have responded to the actuation signal properly; the appropriate pump breakers shall have closed, all valves shall have completed their travel.

##### 4.5.2.1.2 Reactor Building Cooling System

- (a) During each refueling period, a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate proper operation of the system. The test shall be performed in accordance with the procedure summarized below:
  - (1) A test signal will be applied to actuate the reactor building cooling system for reactor building cooling operation.

(2) Verification of the engineered safety features function of the low pressure service water system which supplies coolant to the reactor building coolers shall be made to demonstrate operability of the coolers.

(b) The test will be considered satisfactory if control board indication verifies that all components have responded to the actuation signal properly; the appropriate pump breakers shall have completed their travel. Fans are running at half speed and heat removal capacity is no lower than 75% of the initial tested value.

#### 4.5.2.2 Component Tests

##### 4.5.2.2.1 Pumps

At intervals not to exceed 3 months the reactor building spray pumps shall be started and operated to verify proper operation. Acceptable performance will be indicated if the pump starts, operates for fifteen minutes, and the discharge pressure and flow are within  $\pm 10\%$  of a point on the pump head curve.

##### 4.5.2.2.2 Valves

At intervals not to exceed three months each engineered safety features valve in the reactor building spray and reactor building cooling system and each engineered safety features valve associated with reactor building cooling in the low pressure service water system shall be tested to verify that it is operable.

#### Bases

The reactor building cooling systems and reactor building spray system are designed to remove the heat in the containment atmosphere to prevent the building pressure from exceeding the design pressure.

The delivery capability of one reactor building spray pump at a time can be tested by opening the valve in the line from the borated water storage tank, opening the corresponding valve in the test line, and starting the corresponding pump. Pump discharge pressure and flow indication demonstrate performance.

With the pumps shut down and the borated water storage tank outlet closed, the reactor building spray injection valves can each be opened and closed by operator action. With the reactor building spray inlet valves closed, low pressure air or fog can be blown through the test connections of the reactor building spray nozzles to demonstrate that the flow paths are open.

The equipment, piping, valves, and instrumentation of the reactor building cooling system are arranged so that they can be visually inspected. The cooling units and associated piping are located outside the secondary concrete shield. Personnel can enter the reactor building during power operations to inspect and maintain this equipment. The service water piping and valves outside the reactor building are inspectable at all times. Operational tests and inspections will be performed prior to initial startup.

One low pressure service water pump will normally be operating. At least once per month, the operation will be rotated to another low pressure service water pump. Testing will be, therefore, unnecessary.

The reactor building fans are normally operated periodically, constituting the test that these fans are operable.

REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 6

### 4.5.3 Penetration Room Ventilation System

#### Applicability

Applies to testing of the reactor building penetration room ventilation system.

#### Objective

To verify that the penetration room ventilation system is operable.

#### Specification

##### 4.5.3.1 System Tests

4.5.3.1.1 At intervals not to exceed 3 months, a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate proper operation of the system. This test shall consist of visual inspection, a flow measurement using the flow instrument installed at the outlet of each unit and pressure drop measurements across each filter unit. In addition, a test signal will be applied to demonstrate proper actuation of the penetration room ventilation system. Fan motors shall be operated continuously for at least one hour, and the louvers and other mechanical system shall be proven operable and adjustable from their remote location.

4.5.3.1.2 The test will be considered satisfactory if control board indication verifies that all components have responded properly to the actuation signal, if flow rate through the system is design flow or higher, and if pressure drops across any filter bank do not exceed two times the pressure drop which existed when the filters were new.

##### 4.5.3.2 Filter Tests

No less frequently than each normal refueling period, "in-place" leakage tests using DOP on HEPA units and Freon-112 (or equivalent) on charcoal units shall be performed at design flow on each filter train. Removal of 99.5% DOP by each entire HEPA filter unit and removal of 99.0% Freon-112 (or equivalent) by each entire charcoal adsorber unit shall constitute acceptable performance. These tests must also be performed after any maintenance which may affect the structural integrity of the filtration system units.

#### Bases

The penetration room ventilation system is designed to collect and process potential reactor building penetration room leakage to minimize environmental activity levels resulting from post accident reactor building leaks. The system consists of a sealed penetration room, two redundant filter trains, and two redundant fans discharging to the unit vent. The entire system is activated by a 4 psig reactor building pressure engineered safety features signal and initially required no operator action.

Each filter train is constructed with a prefilter, an absolute filter, and a charcoal filter in series. The design flow rate through each of these filters is 1000 scfm, which is significantly higher than the approximately 15 scfm maximum leakage rate from the reactor building at a leak rate of 0.25% per day. Except for periodic ventilation of the penetration room, the penetration room ventilation system is not normally used. Quarterly testing of this system will show that the system is available for its engineered safety features function. During this test, the system will be inspected for such things as water, oil, or other foreign material, gasket deterioration, and unusual or excessive noise or vibration when the fan motor is running.

Less frequent testing will verify the efficiency of the absolute and charcoal filters.

#### 4.5.4 Low Pressure Injection System Leakage

##### Applicability

Applies to Low Pressure Injection System leakage.

##### Objective

To maintain a preventative leakage rate for the Low Pressure Injection System which will prevent significant offsite exposures.

##### Specification

###### 4.5.4.1 Acceptance Limit

The maximum allowable leakage from the Low Pressure Injection System components (which includes valve stems, flanges and pump seals) shall not exceed two gallons per hour.

###### 4.5.4.2 Test

During each refueling period the following tests of the Low Pressure Injection System shall be conducted to determine leakage:

- a. The portion of the Low Pressure Injection System, except as specified in (b), that is outside the containment shall be tested either by use in normal operation or by hydrostatically testing at 350 psig.
- b. Piping from the containment emergency sump to the low pressure injection pump suction isolation valve shall be pressure tested at no less than 59 psig.
- c. Visual inspection shall be made for excessive leakage from components of the system. Any excessive leakage shall be measured by collection and weighing or by another equivalent method.

##### Bases

The leakage rate limit for the Low Pressure Injection System is a judgment value based on assuring that the components can be expected to operate without mechanical failure for a period on the order of 200 days after a Loss of Coolant Accident. The test pressure (350 psig) achieved either by normal system operation or by hydrostatically testing, gives an adequate margin over the highest pressure within the system after a design basis accident. Similarly, the pressure test for the return lines from the containment to the Low Pressure Injection System (59 psig) is equivalent to the design pressure of the containment. The dose to the thyroid calculated as a result of this leakage is .76 rem for a 2 hr. exposure at the site boundary. (1)

REFERENCES

FSAR, Section 14.2.2.4.4.

4.6 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM PERIODIC TESTING

Applicability

Applies to the periodic testing and surveillance of the emergency power system.

Objective

To verify that the emergency power sources and equipment will respond promptly and properly when required.

Specification

4.6.1 At intervals not to exceed one month, a test of the Keowee Hydro units shall be performed to verify proper operation of these emergency power sources and associated equipment. This test shall assure that:

- a. Each hydro unit can be automatically started from the Oconee Control Room.
- b. Each hydro unit can be synchronized through the 230 kV overhead circuit to the startup transformers.
- c. Each hydro unit can energize the 13.8 kV underground feeder.

4.6.2 During each calendar year at a refueling outage, a test of the Keowee hydro units and emergency start circuits shall be performed to verify that each hydro unit and associated equipment is available to carry load within 25 seconds of a simulated requirement for engineered safety features.

19. 4.6.3 At intervals not to exceed the normal refueling outage, simulated emergency transfers to the 4160 volt main feeder buses shall be made to transformer CT1 and to the 4160 volt standby buses to verify proper operation.

4.6.4 At intervals not to exceed the normal refueling interval, the External Grid Trouble Protection System Logic shall be tested to demonstrate its ability to provide an isolated power path between Keowee and Oconee.

19. 4.6.5 At intervals not to exceed the normal refueling intervals, it shall be demonstrated that a Lee Station combustion turbine can be started and connected to the 100 kV line. It shall be demonstrated that the 100 kV line can be separated from the rest of the system and supply power to the 4160 volt main feeder buses.

19. 4.6.6 Batteries in the Instrument and Control, Keowee Station, and Switching Station 125 volt DC systems shall be tested as follows:

- a. The voltage and temperature of a pilot cell in each bank shall be measured and recorded daily, five days/week.
- b. The specified gravity and voltage of each cell shall be measured and recorded every month.
- 19. c. Before initial operation and at five-year intervals coincident with the refueling outages, a one-hour discharge test at the required emergency load will be made.
- 19. 4.6.7 The operability of the individual diode monitors in Instrument and Control and Keowee Station 125V DC system shall be verified on a monthly basis by imposing a simulated diode failure signal on the monitor.
- 19. 4.6.8 The peak inverse voltage capability of each auctioneering diode in the Instrument and Control, Switchyard, and Keowee Station 125V DC system shall be measured and recorded every six months.
- 19. 4.6.9 The tests specified in 4.6.6, 4.6.7, and 4.6.8 will be considered satisfactory if control room indication and/or visual examination demonstrate that all components have operated properly.

Bases

The Keowee Hydro units, in addition to serving as the emergency power sources for the Oconee Nuclear Station, are power generating sources for the Duke system requirements. As power generating units, they are operated frequently, normally on a daily basis at loads equal to or greater than required by Table 8.5 of the FSAR for ESF bus loads. Normal as well as emergency startup and operation of these units will be from the Oconee Unit 1 Control Room. The frequent starting and loading of these units to meet Duke system power requirements assures the continuous availability for emergency power for the Oconee auxiliaries and engineered safety features equipment. It will be verified that these units are available to carry load within 25 seconds, including instrumentation lag, after a simulated requirement for engineered safety features. To further assure the reliability of these units as emergency power sources, they will be, as specified, tested for automatic start on a monthly basis from the Oconee control room. These tests will include verification that each unit can be synchronized to the 230 kV bus and that each unit can energize the 13.8 kV underground feeder.

The interval specified for testing of transfer to emergency power sources is based on maintaining maximum availability of redundant power sources.

Starting a Lee Station gas turbine, separation of the 100 kV line from the remainder of the system, and charging of the 4160 volt main feeder buses are specified to assure the continuity and operability of this equipment.

REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 8

## 4.7 REACTOR CONTROL ROD SYSTEM TESTS

### 4.7.1 Control Rod Drive System Functional Tests

#### Applicability

Applies to the surveillance of the control rod system.

#### Objective

To assure operability of the control rod system.

#### Specification

- 4.7.1.1 The control rod trip insertion time shall be measured for each control rod at either full flow or no flow conditions following each refueling outage prior to return to power. The maximum control rod trip insertion time for an operable control rod drive mechanism, except for the Axial Power Shaping Rods (APSRs), from the fully withdrawn position to 3/4 insertion (104 inches travel) shall not exceed 1.66 seconds at reactor coolant full flow conditions or 1.32 seconds for no flow conditions. For the APSRs it shall be demonstrated that loss of power will not cause rod movement. If the trip insertion time above is not met, the rod shall be declared inoperable.
- 4.7.1.2 If a control rod is misaligned with its group average position by more than an indicated nine (9) inches, the rod shall be declared inoperable. However, if a safety rod absolute or relative position indication is inoperable and an energized out-limit light confirms the rod is fully withdrawn, the safety rod shall not be considered misaligned.
- 4.7.1.3 If a control rod cannot be exercised, or if neither absolute or relative position indication is operable, the rod shall be declared to be inoperable.

#### Basics

The control rod trip insertion time is the total elapsed time from power interruption at the control rod drive breakers until the control rod has completed 104 inches of travel from the fully withdrawn position. The specified trip time is based upon the safety analysis in FSAR, Section 14.

Each control rod drive mechanism shall be exercised by a movement of approximately two (2) inches of travel every two (2) weeks. This requirement shall apply to either a partial or fully withdrawn control rod at reactor operating conditions. Exercising the drive mechanisms in this manner provides assurance of reliability of the mechanisms.

A rod is considered inoperable if it cannot be exercised, if the trip insertion time is greater than the specified allowable time, or if the rod deviates from its group average position by more than nine (9) inches. Conditions for

operation with an inoperable rod are specified in Technical Specification 3.5.2.(2)

REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 14
- (2) Technical Specification 3.5.2

#### 4.7.2 Control Rod Program Verification (Group vs. Core Positions)

##### Applicability

Applies to surveillance of the control rod systems.

##### Objective

To verify that the designated control rod (by core position 1 through 69) is operating in its programmed functional position and group. (Rod 1 through 12, Group 1-8)

##### Specification

- 4.7.2.1 Whenever the control rod drive patch panel is locked (after inspection, test, reprogramming, or maintenance) each control rod drive mechanism shall be selected from the control room and exercised by a movement of two inches or less to verify that the proper rod has responded as shown on the unit computer printout of that rod.
- 4.7.2.2 Whenever power or instrumentation cables to the control rod drive assemblies atop the reactor or at the bulkhead are disconnected or removed, an independent verification check of their reconnection shall be performed.
- 4.7.2.3 Any rod found to be improperly programmed shall be declared inoperable until properly programmed.

##### Bases

Each control rod has a relative and an absolute position indicator system. One set of outputs goes to the plant computer identified by a unique number (1 through 69) associated with only one core position. The other set of outputs goes to a programmable bank of 69 edgewise meters in the control room. In the event that a patching error is made in the patch panel or connectors in the cables leading to the control rod drive assemblies or to the control room meter bank are improperly transposed upon reconnection, these errors and transpositions will be discovered by a comparative check by (1) selecting a specific rod from one group (e.g. Rod 1 in Regulating Group 6) (2) noting that the program-approved core position for this rod of the group (assume the approved core position is No. 53) (3) exercise the selected rod and (4) note that (a) the computer prints out both absolute and relative position response for the approved core position (assumed to be position No. 53) (b) the proper meter in the control room display bank (assumed to be Rod 1 in Group 6) in both absolute and relative meter positions. This type of comparative check will not assure detection of improperly connected cables inside the reactor building. For these, (Spec. 4.7.2.2) it will be necessary for a responsible person, other than the one doing the work, to verify by appropriate means that each cable has been matched to the proper control rod drive assembly.

## 4.8 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVES

### Applicability

Applies to the main steam stop valves.

### Objective

To verify the ability of the main steam stop valves to close upon signal and to verify the leak tightness of the main steam stop valves.

### Specification

- 4.8.1 Using Channels A and B the operation of each of the main steam stop valves shall be tested no less frequently than the normal refueling period interval to demonstrate a closure time of one second or less in Channel A and a closure time of 15 seconds or less for Channel B.
- 4.8.2 The leak rate through the main steam stop valves shall not exceed 25 cubic feet per hour at a pressure of 59 psig and shall be tested no less frequently than the normal refueling period.

### Bases

The main steam stop valves limit the reactor coolant system cooldown rate and resultant reactivity insertion following a main steam line break accident. Their ability to promptly close upon redundant signals will be verified at each scheduled refueling shutdown. Channel A solenoid valves are designed to close all four turbine stop valves in 240 milliseconds. The backup Channel B solenoid valves are designed to close the turbine stop valves in approximately 12 seconds. (1)

Using the maximum 15 second stop valve closing time, the fouled steam generator inventories, and the minimum tripped rod worth with the maximum stuck rod worth, an analysis similar to that presented in FSAR Section 14.1.2.9, (but considering a blowdown of both steam generators) shows that the reactor will remain sub-critical after reactor trip following a double-ended steam line break.

The main stop valves would become isolation valves in the unlikely event that there should be a rupture of a reactor coolant line concurrent with rupture of the steam generator feedwater header. The allowable leak rate of 25 cubic feet per hour is approximately 25 percent of total allowable containment leakage from all penetrations and isolation valves. (2)

### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Supplement 2, Page 2-7
- (2) Technical Specifications 4.4.1

#### 4.9 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP PERIODIC TESTING

##### Applicability

Applies to the periodic testing of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump.

##### Objective

To verify that the emergency feedwater pump and associated valves are operable.

##### Specification

###### 4.9.1 Test

On a three-month basis, the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump shall be operated on recirculation to the upper surge tank for a minimum of one hour.

###### 4.9.2 Acceptance Criteria

These tests shall be considered satisfactory if control board indication and visual observation of the equipment demonstrates that all components have operated properly

##### Bases

The three (3) month testing frequency will be sufficient to verify that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is operable. Verification of correct operation will be made both from the control room instrumentation and direct visual observation of the pump.

##### REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 10.2.2

FSAR, Section 14.1.2.8.3

#### 4.10 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES

##### Applicability

Applies to potential reactivity anomalies.

##### Objective

To require the evaluation of reactivity anomalies of a specified magnitude occurring during the operation of the unit.

##### Specification

Following a normalization of the computed boron concentration as a function of burnup, the actual boron concentration of the coolant shall be periodically compared with the predicted value. If the difference between the observed and predicted steady-state concentrations reaches the equivalent of one percent in reactivity, an evaluation as to the cause of discrepancy shall be made and reported to the Atomic Energy Commission.

##### Bases

To eliminate possible errors in the calculations of the initial reactivity of the core and the reactivity depletion rate, the predicted relation between fuel burnup and the boron concentration, necessary to maintain adequate control characteristics, must be adjusted (normalized) to accurately reflect actual core conditions. When full power is reached initially, and with the control rod groups in the desired positions, the boron concentration is measured and the predicted curve is adjusted to this point. As power operation proceeds, the measured boron concentration is compared with the predicted concentration and the slope of the curve relating burnup and reactivity is compared with that predicted. This process of normalization should be completed after about 10% of the total core burnup. Thereafter, actual boron concentration can be compared with prediction, and the reactivity status of the core can be continuously evaluated. Any reactivity anomaly greater than 1% would be unexpected, and its occurrence would be thoroughly investigated and evaluated.

The value of 1% is considered a safe limit since a shutdown margin of at least 1% with the most reactive rod in the fully withdrawn position is always maintained.

#### 4.11 ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEILLANCE

##### Applicability

Applies to the routine testing of the station environs for radiation and radioactive materials attributable to station operation and waste releases.

##### Objective

To establish a sampling schedule for the purpose of detecting, measuring and evaluating any significant effects of station operation and waste releases on the environment.

##### Specification

- 4.11.1 Environmental samples taken in accordance with Table 2-1a of the FSAR shall be collected and processed in accordance with Table 4.11-1.
- 4.11.2 Thermoluminescent dosimeters will be installed at various locations within the exclusion area including shoreline areas, and read quarterly.

##### Bases

The program will be conducted in accordance with Section 2.7 of the FSAR.

The sensitivity of counting used in the analyses (90% confidence level when counted for 20 minutes) is based on nominal background levels of 0.5 cpm alpha and 1.0 cpm beta.

Environmental monitoring results will be correlated with information on station radioactive waste releases, site meteorological data and radiological controls, and with information obtained from the installed process radiation monitoring system.

The Environmental Surveillance Program will provide means of detecting significant changes in levels of radioactivity. The results will demonstrate the effectiveness of station control over radioactive waste disposal operations and of compliance with Federal and State regulations for disposal of these materials.

The thermoluminescent dosimeter data will be used in conjunction with routine surveillance of recreational activities on the lake within the exclusion area to assure that the exposure of the public will be maintained to levels within the limits of 10CFR20 for unrestricted areas.

##### REFERENCES

FSAR, Section 2.7

*and as low as practicable*

*Include non-rad waste  
operation and thermal  
surveillance*

TABLE 4.11-1

## ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

<u>Type Samples</u>	<u>Schedule</u>	<u>Analysis</u>	
Water (1) (3)	Monthly	Gross Alpha & Beta Activity	Gamma Analysis*
Rain, Settled Dust	Monthly	"	"
Air Particulate	Monthly	"	"
Vegetation, Terrestrial(2)	Quarterly	"	"
Aquatic Organisms	Quarterly	"	"
Bottom Sediment	Quarterly	"	"
Radiation Dose & Dose Rate	Quarterly	mr & mr/hr	_____
Animals	Quarterly	_____	Sr <sup>90</sup> Cs <sup>137</sup>
Fish	Quarterly	_____	Sr <sup>90</sup> Cs <sup>137</sup> , K <sup>40</sup> , I <sup>131</sup>
Milk	Quarterly	_____	Sr <sup>90</sup> Cs <sup>137</sup> , K <sup>40</sup> , I <sup>131</sup>

\* Dependent on gross activity

- (1) Lakes Keowee and Hartwell will be sampled annually for tritium analysis.
- (2) Commercial Crops will be substituted when available.
- (3) The water samples from the Keowee River continuous sampler will be analyzed monthly for gross Alpha and Beta and undergo an isotopic analysis.

## 4.12 CONTROL ROOM FILTERING SYSTEM

### Applicability

Applies to control room filtering system components.

### Objective

To verify that these systems and components will be able to perform their design functions.

### Specification

#### 4.12.1 Operating Tests

System tests shall be performed at approximately quarterly intervals. These tests shall consist of visual inspection, a flow measurement using a flow instrument installed at the outlet of each unit and pressure drop measurements across each filter bank. Pressure drop across pre-filter shall not exceed 1" H<sub>2</sub>O and pressure drop across HEPA shall not exceed 2" H<sub>2</sub>O. Fan motors shall be operated continuously for at least one hour, and all louvers and other mechanical systems shall be proven operable.

#### 4.12.2 Filter Tests

During each refueling period, "in-place" leakage tests using DOP on HEPA units and Freon-112 (or equivalent) on charcoal units shall be performed at design flow on each filter train. Removal of 99.5% DOP by each entire HEPA filter unit and removal of 99.0% Freon-112 (or equivalent) by each entire charcoal adsorber unit shall constitute acceptable performance. These tests must also be performed after any maintenance which may affect the structural integrity of either the filtration system units or of the housing.

### Bases

The purpose of the control room filtering system is to limit the particulate and gaseous fission products to which the control area would be subjected during an accidental radioactive release in or near the Auxiliary Building. The system is designed with two 100 percent capacity filter trains each of which consists of a prefilter, high efficiency particulate filters, charcoal filters and a booster fan to pressurize the control room with outside air.

Since these systems are not normally operated, a periodic test is required to insure their operability when needed. Quarterly testing of this system will show that the system is available for its safety action. During this test the system will be inspected for such things as water, oil, or other foreign material; gasket deterioration, adhesive deterioration in the HEPA units; and unusual or excessive noise or vibration when the fan motor is running.

Annual testing will verify the efficiency of the charcoal and absolute filters.

#### 4.13 FUEL SURVEILLANCE

##### Applicability

Applies to the fuel surveillance program for fuel rods.

##### Objective

To specify the fuel surveillance program for fuel rods.

##### Specification

Measurements of the diameter and length will be made on selected peripheral rods of the following fuel assemblies both prior to operation and after their respective cycles:

- a. The center assembly after the first fuel cycle.
- b. Four assemblies from those removed after the second cycle (two containing all pressurized rods and two containing all unpressurized rods).
- c. Two assemblies containing all pressurized rods from those removed after the third cycle.

##### Bases

Oconee Unit 1 reactor contains eighty (80) fuel assemblies with initially pressurized fuel rods. The reference schedule for removing these fuel assemblies is as follows: Twelve (12) of these assemblies will be removed from the core and stored in the spent fuel pool at the end of the second fuel cycle. Twenty-eight (28) assemblies will be removed at the end of the third cycle. For some of the second and third fuel cycles in the specification, the fuel may be irradiated in Oconee Unit 3. The remaining forty (40) fuel assemblies with pressurized fuel rods will be removed at the end of the first fuel cycle and are scheduled to be charged to Oconee Unit 3. Eight (8) pressurized rods will be located on the periphery of the center fuel assembly, two in each outer row of rods, and the assembly is to be removed after the first cycle.

This program provides substantiating information for the first core in the present generation of B&W reactors. It provides fuel rods for examination at the end of the first, second, and third cycles to determine the extent, if any, of dimensional changes in diameter and length.

4.14 REACTOR BUILDING PURGE SYSTEM

Applicability

Applies to testing Reactor Building Purge Filters.

Objective

To verify that the Reactor Building Purge Filters will perform their design function.

Specification

During each refueling period, leakage tests using DOP on the HEPA filter and Freon-112 (or equivalent) on the charcoal unit shall be performed. Removal of 99.5% DOP by the HEPA filter unit and removal of 99.0% Freon-112 (or equivalent) by the charcoal adsorber unit shall constitute acceptable performance. These tests must also be performed after any maintenance which may affect the structural integrity of the filtration units or of the housing.

Bases

The reactor building purge filter is constructed with a prefilter, an absolute filter and a charcoal filter in series. This test will verify the efficiency of the absolute and charcoal filters.

*Include charcoal  
adsorbers in iodine  
monitors.*

5 DESIGN FEATURES

5.1 SITE

5.1.1 The Oconee Nuclear Station is approximately eight miles northeast of Seneca, South Carolina. Figure 2-3 of the Oconee FSAR shows the plan of the site. The minimum distance from the reactor center line to the boundary of the exclusion area and to the outer boundary of the low population zone as defined in 10 CFR 100.3, shall be one mile and six miles respectively.

5.1.2 For the purpose of satisfying 10 CFR Part 20, the "Restricted Area," for gaseous release purposes only, is the same as the exclusion area as defined above except that the temporary construction quarters (2) in the east southeast section of the exclusion area shall not, when occupied, be deemed to be within the restricted area.

REFERENCE

(1) FSAR, Section 2.2

(2) Technical Specification 3.9

## 5.2 CONTAINMENT

### Specification

The containment for this unit consists of three systems which are the reactor building, reactor building isolation system, and penetration room ventilation system.

#### 5.2.1 Reactor Building

The reactor building completely encloses the reactor and its associated reactor coolant system. It is a fully continuous re-enforced concrete structure in the shape of a cylinder with a shallow domed roof and flat foundation slab. The cylindrical portion is prestressed by a post tensioning system consisting of horizontal and vertical tendons. The dome has a three-way post tensioning system. The structure can withstand the loss of 3 horizontal and 3 vertical tendons in the cylinder wall or adjacent tendons in the dome without loss of function. The foundation slab is conventionally re-enforced with high strength re-enforcing steel. The entire structure is lined with 1/4" welded steel plate to provide vapor tightness.

The internal volume of the reactor building is approximately  $1.91 \times 10^6$  cu. ft. The approximate inside dimensions are: diameter--116'; height--208 1/2'. The approximate thickness of the concrete forming the buildings are: cylindrical wall--3 3/4'; dome--3 1/4'; and the foundation slab--8 1/2'.

The concrete containment structure provides adequate biological shielding for both normal operation and accident situations. Design pressure and temperature are 59 psig and 286°F, respectively.

The reactor building is designed for an external atmospheric pressure of 3.0 psi greater than the internal pressure. This is greater than the differential pressure of 2.5 psig that could be developed if the building is sealed with an internal temperature of 120°F with a barometric pressure of 29.0 inches of Hg and the building is subsequently cooled to an internal temperature of 80°F with a concurrent rise in barometric pressure to 31.0 inches of Hg. Since the building is designed for this pressure differential, vacuum breakers are not required.

Penetration assemblies are seal welded to the reactor building liner. Access openings, electrical penetrations, and fuel transfer tube covers are equipped with double seals. Reactor building purge penetrations and reactor building atmosphere sampling penetrations are equipped with double valves having resilient seating surfaces. (1)

The principal design basis for the structure is that it be capable of withstanding the internal pressure resulting from a loss of coolant accident, as defined in FSAR Section 14 with no loss of integrity. In this event the total energy contained in the water of the reactor coolant system is assumed to be released into the reactor building through a break in the reactor coolant piping. Subsequent pressure behavior is determined by the building volume, engineered safety features, and the combined influence of energy sources and heat sinks.

#### 5.2.2 Reactor Building Isolation System

Leakage through all fluid penetrations not serving accident-consequence-limiting systems is to be minimized by a double barrier so that no single, credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in loss-of-isolation or intolerable leakage. The installed double barriers take the form of closed piping systems, both inside and outside the reactor building and various types of isolation valves. (2)

#### 5.2.3 Penetration Room Ventilation System

This system is designed to collect, control, and minimize the release of radioactive materials from the reactor building to the environment in post-accident conditions. It may also operate intermittently during normal conditions as required to maintain satisfactory temperature in the penetrations rooms. When the system is in operation, a slight negative pressure will be maintained in the penetration room to assure inleakage. (3)

#### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR Section 5.1
- (2) FSAR Section 5.2
- (3) FSAR Section 5.3

## 5.3 REACTOR

### Specification

#### 5.3.1 Reactor Core

- 5.3.1.1 The reactor core contains approximately 94.1 metric tons of slightly enriched uranium dioxide pellets. The pellets are encapsulated in Zircaloy-4 tubing to form fuel rods. The reactor core is made up of 177 fuel assemblies, of which 80 are prepressurized with helium. Each fuel assembly contains 208 fuel rods. (1)
- 5.3.1.2 The fuel assemblies shall form an essentially cylindrical lattice with an active height of 144 in. and an equivalent diameter of 128.9 in. (2)
- 5.3.1.3 The average enrichment of the initial core for Unit 1 is a nominal 2.1 weight percent of  $U^{235}$ . Three fuel enrichments are used in the initial core. The highest enrichment is less than 2.2 weight percent of  $U^{235}$ .
- 5.3.1.4 There are 61 full-length control rod assemblies (CRA) and 3 axial power shaping rod assemblies (APSR) distributed in the reactor core as shown in FSAR Figure 3-46. The full-length CRA contain a 134 inch length of silver-indium-cadmium alloy clad with stainless steel. The APSR contain a 36 inch length of silver-indium-cadmium alloy. (3)
- 5.3.1.5 Reload fuel assemblies and rods shall conform to design and evaluation described in FSAR and shall not exceed an enrichment of 3.2 percent of  $U^{235}$ .

#### 5.3.2 Reactor Coolant System

- 5.3.2.1 The design of the pressure components in the reactor coolant system shall be in accordance with the code requirements. (4)
- 5.3.2.2 The reactor coolant system and any connected auxiliary systems exposed to the reactor coolant conditions of temperature and pressure, shall be designed for a pressure of 2,500 psig and a temperature of 650°F. The pressurizer and pressurizer surge line shall be designed for a temperature of 670°F. (5)

5.3.2.3 The maximum reactor coolant system volume shall be 11,830 ft<sup>3</sup>.

REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR Section 3.2.1
- (2) FSAR Section 3.2.2
- (3) FSAR Section 3.2.4
- (4) FSAR Section 4.1.3
- (5) FSAR Section 4.1.2

## 5.4 NEW AND SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES

### Specification

#### 5.4.1 New Fuel Storage

5.4.1.1 New fuel will normally be stored in the spent fuel pool serving the respective unit. The fuel assemblies are stored in racks in parallel rows, having a nominal center to center distance of 21 inches in both directions. This spacing is sufficient to maintain a K effective of less than .9 when flooded with unborated water, based on fuel with an enrichment of 3.5 weight percent U<sup>235</sup>.

5.4.1.2 New fuel may also be stored in the fuel transfer canal. The fuel assemblies are stored in five racks in a row having a nominal center to center distance of 2' 1 3/4". One rack is oversized to receive a failed fuel assembly container. The other four racks are normal size and are capable of receiving new fuel assemblies.

5.4.1.3 New fuel may also be stored in shipping containers.

#### 5.4.2 Spent Fuel Storage

5.4.2.1 Irradiated fuel assemblies will be stored, prior to offsite shipment, in the stainless steel lined spent fuel pool, which is located in its respective auxiliary building. Each pool is sized to accommodate a full core of irradiated fuel assemblies in addition to the concurrent storage of the largest quantity of new and spent fuel assemblies predicted by the fuel management program.

5.4.2.2 Whenever there is fuel in the pool (except the initial core loading), the spent fuel pool is filled with water borated to the concentration that is used in the reactor cavity and fuel transfer canal during refueling operations.

5.4.2.3 Spent fuel may also be stored in storage racks in the fuel transfer canal when the canal is at refueling level.

5.4.2.4 The spent fuel pool and fuel transfer canal racks are designed for an earthquake force of 0.1g ground motion.

### REFERENCES

FSAR, Section 9.7

6. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.1 ORGANIZATION, REVIEW AND AUDIT

Introduction

Administrative controls relate to the organization and management procedures, record keeping, review and audit systems, and reporting that are considered necessary to provide the assurance and evidence that the station will be managed in a dependable manner.

The administrative controls specify the administrative tools and functions necessary for safe operation. They also define the administrative action to be taken in the event operating limits or safety limits are exceeded.

Specification

These administrative controls in regard to operations, review and audit become effective at the time of issuance of the facility license by the AEC, and after normal design and construction activities have been essentially completed.

6.1.1 Organization

6.1.1.1 The Superintendent is directly responsible for the safe operation of the facility.

6.1.1.2 In all matters pertaining to actual operation and maintenance and to these Technical Specifications, the Superintendent shall report to and be directly responsible to the Assistant Vice President, Steam Production. The organization is shown in Figure 6.1-2.

6.1.1.3 The station organization for operation, Technical Support, and Maintenance shall be functionally as shown in Figure 6.1-1.

6.1.1.4 Unit 1 minimum operating shift staffing will be according to Table 6.1-1. This minimum operating staff shall be permitted to assist in the pre-licensing activity of Units 2 & 3 only to the extent that it does not affect their full availability for Unit 1 operation.

6.1.1.5 Incorporated in the staff of the station shall be supervisory and professional personnel meeting the minimum requirements specified in FSAR Section 12.2 encompassing the training and experience described in Section 4 of the "Proposed Standard for Selection and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants" prepared by the ANS-3 committee, Draft 9 dated 7/3/69.

6.1.1.6 Retraining and replacement of station personnel shall be in accordance with Section 5.5 of the Proposed Standard for Selection and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants, ANS-3, Draft No. 9, dated 7/3/69

6.1.1.7 AEC/DRL licensed operators shall be provided as follows:

19. |
- a. At least two licensed reactor operators shall be at the station, one of whom shall be in the control room, at all times when there is fuel in the reactor vessel. One of these operators shall hold a Senior Reactor Operator license; further,
  - b. Two licensed reactor operators shall be in the control room during startup and scheduled shutdown of a reactor, and during recovery from reactor trips caused by transients or emergencies.
  - c. At least one licensed reactor operator shall be in the reactor building when fuel handling operations are in progress in the reactor building. An operator holding a Senior Reactor Operators license shall be in charge of all fuel handling activities.

+  
Reactor Protection Procedures

18. | 6.1.2 Review and Audit

In matters of nuclear safety and radiation exposure, review and audit of station operation, maintenance and technical matters shall be provided by two committees as follows (Reference Figure 6.1.2):

6.1.2.1. Station Review Committee

a. Membership

Assistant Superintendent--Chairman  
Operating Engineer  
Technical Support Engineer

At least two other members of the station supervisory staff appointed by the Superintendent.

The Superintendent shall appoint an acting chairman in the absence of the Assistant Superintendent.

b. Meeting Frequency

This committee shall meet at least once each month and as required on call by the chairman.

c. Quorum

The chairman plus two members shall constitute a quorum.

d. Responsibilities

The committee shall have the following responsibilities:

18. |
- (1) Review all new procedures or proposed changes to existing procedures as determined by the Station Superintendent to affect operational safety.
  - (2) Review station operation and safety considerations.
  - (3) Review abnormal occurrences and violations of Technical Specifications and make recommendations to prevent recurrence.
18. |
- (4) Review all proposed tests that affect nuclear safety or radiation safety.
  - (5) Review proposed changes to Technical Specifications and changes or modifications to the Station design.

e. Authority

The Station Review Committee shall make recommendations to the Superintendent regarding Specification 6.1.2-1-d.

f. Records

Minutes shall be kept at the Station of all meetings of the Committee and copies sent to the Superintendent, Assistant Vice President Steam Production, and the chairman of the General Office Review Committee.

6.1.2.2. General Office Review Committee

- a. The Executive Vice President and General Manager, shall appoint a General Office Review Committee having the following membership:

Chairman

Steam Production Department---3 members (including the Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent but not other Oconee Nuclear Station personnel)

Engineering Department---2 members

Others deemed advisable (may include consultant from outside the Company)

The Committee shall elect a vice chairman.

- b. At least one-half of the members of the committee shall have extensive nuclear experience and all members shall be engineering or science graduates. Members, except Superintendent shall not have direct line responsibility for production and shall meet the minimum qualifications of Section 4.6 of the proposed standard of Specification 6.1.1.5.

c. Quorum

The Chairman or Vice Chairman plus three members shall constitute a quorum.

d. As a safety review and audit backup to the normal operating organization, the GORC shall;

- (1) Audit procedures or proposed changes to procedures which may affect nuclear safety or radiation exposure.
- (2) Review proposed station design changes or modifications which affect nuclear safety.
- (3) Review all requests to the AEC/DRL for changes in Technical Specifications that involve unreviewed safety questions (10CFR50.59)
- (4) Review abnormal occurrences and violations of Technical Specifications and make recommendations to prevent recurrence.
- (5) Periodically, audit station operating records, logs, reports, and tests.
- (6) Make recommendations concerning the above items to the appropriate individuals. A copy of these recommendations shall be forwarded to the Executive Vice President and General Manager; Senior Vice President, Engineering and Construction; Senior Vice President Production and Transmission; Vice President, Design Engineering and Asst. Vice President, Steam Production.
- (7) Audit Station Review Committee minutes.
- (8) Conduct special reviews or investigations as requested by the Assistant Vice President, Steam Production.


e. Meeting Frequency

This committee shall meet at least three times per year at intervals not to exceed five months and as required on call by the chairman.

f. Records

Minutes shall be kept of all meetings of the committee. Copies of the minutes shall be sent to the Executive Vice President and General Manager; Senior Vice President Engineering and Construction; Senior Vice President, Production and Transmission; Vice President, Design Engineering; Assistant Vice President, Steam Production; and Superintendent. A copy of these minutes shall be kept on file at the station.

6.1-5




STATION ORGANIZATION CHART



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 6.1-1

6.1-5



SRO - Senior Reactor Operator License

RO - Reactor Operator License

\* License not required for initial operation of Unit 1

STATION ORGANIZATION CHART



OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Figure 6.1-1

TABLE 6.1-1  
 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION  
 MINIMUM OPERATING SHIFT REQUIREMENTS  
 UNIT 1

Shift Supervisor	1
SRO	
Control Operator	1
RO	
Asst. Control Operator*	1
RO	
Utility Operator	2
	5
Men/Shift	5
SRO/Shift	1
RO/Shift	1

SRO--AEC/DRL Senior Reactor Operator License  
 RO--AEC/DRL Reactor Operator License

\*Not AEC/DRL licensed for initial operation

6.2 ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF AN ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE

Specification

- 6.2.1 Any abnormal occurrence shall be investigated promptly by the Superintendent.
- 6.2.2 The Superintendent shall promptly notify the Assistant Vice President, Steam Production, of any abnormal occurrence and shall cause the Station Review Committee to perform a review and prepare a written report which shall describe the circumstances leading up to and resulting from the occurrence and shall recommend appropriate action to prevent or minimize the probability of a recurrence.
- 6.2.3 The Station Review Committee report shall be submitted to the General Office Review Committee for review and approval of any recommendations. Copies shall also be sent to the Superintendent and the Assistant Vice President, Steam Production.
19. 6.2.4 The Senior Vice President, Production-Transmission, shall report the circumstances of any abnormal occurrence to the AEC as specified in Section 6.6, Station Reporting Requirements.

6.3 ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT A SAFETY LIMIT IS EXCEEDED

Specification

If a safety limit is exceeded:

- 6.3.1 The reactor shall be shut down immediately and maintained in a safe shutdown condition until otherwise authorized by the AEC.
19. | 6.3.2 The Superintendent shall make an immediate report to the Assistant Vice President, Steam Production; the Senior Vice President, Production and Transmission; and the Chairman of the General Office Review Committee. |
19. | 6.3.3 The circumstances shall be promptly reported to the AEC by the Senior Vice President, Production-Transmission as indicated in Section 6.6, Station Reporting Requirements. |
19. | 6.3.4 The Superintendent shall direct the Station Review Committee to perform an analysis of the circumstances leading up to and resulting from the situation together with recommendations to prevent a recurrence. The report covering this analysis shall be sent to the General Office Review Committee for review and approval. Copies of this report shall also be submitted to the Superintendent; Assistant Vice President, Steam Production; the Senior Vice President, Production and Transmission; the Chairman of the General Office Review Committee; the Senior Vice President, Engineering and Construction; Vice President, Design Engineering, and the Executive Vice President and General Manager. Appropriate analyses or reports shall be submitted to the AEC by the Senior Vice President, Production-Transmission as indicated in Section 6.6, Station Reporting Requirements. |

6.4 STATION OPERATING PROCEDURES

Specification

- 6.4.1 The station shall be operated and maintained in accordance with approved procedures. Detailed written procedures with appropriate check-off lists and instructions shall be provided for the following conditions:
- a. Normal startup, operation and shutdown of the complete facility and of all systems and components involving nuclear safety of the facility.
  - b. Refueling operations.
  - 18. | c. Actions taken to correct specific and foreseen potential malfunctions of systems or components involving nuclear safety and radiation levels, including responses to alarms, suspected primary system leaks and abnormal reactivity changes.
  - d. Emergency procedures involving potential or actual release of radioactivity.
  - 18. | e. Preventive or corrective maintenance which could affect nuclear safety of the reactor or radiation exposure to personnel.
  - f. Station survey following an earthquake.
  - g. Radiation control procedures.
  - h. Operation of radioactive waste management systems.
  - i. Control of pH in recirculated coolant after loss of coolant accident. Procedure shall state that pH will be sampled and appropriate caustic added to coolant within 30 minutes after switchover to recirculation mode of core cooling.
- 6.4.2 All procedures listed in Specification 6.4.1, and changes thereto, shall be reviewed by the Station Review Committee prior to approval by the Superintendent for use except as provided in Specification 6.4.3 below.
- 6.4.3 Written procedures shall be strictly adhered to in all matters relating to nuclear safety. Temporary minor changes which do not change the intent of the original procedure and which are not safety related are permitted only on documented approval of the appropriate supervisors.
- 6.4.4 Quarterly selected drills shall be conducted on site emergency procedures including assembly preparatory to evacuation off site and a check of the adequacy of communications with off-site support groups.
- 6.4.5 Respiratory protective program approved by AEC shall be in force.

6.4.6

18. If the Superintendent concludes that a proposed major change in the facility or operating procedures, tests, or experiments involving systems that are nuclear safety or radiation exposure related does not involve a change in the Technical Specifications or is an unreviewed safety question, he may order the change, test, or experiment to be made, but shall enter a description thereof in the operating records of the facility and shall send a copy of the pertinent instructions to the Chairman of the General Office Review Committee. If the Chairman of that Committee, upon reviewing such instructions, is of the opinion that the change, test or experiment is of such a nature as to warrant consideration by the Committee, he shall order such consideration.

6.4.7

18. If the Superintendent desires to make a change in the facility or operating procedures or to conduct a test or experiment which in his opinion might involve a change in the Technical Specifications, might involve an unreviewed safety question or might otherwise not be in accordance with said License, he shall not order such change, test, or experiment until he has referred the matter to the General Office Review Committee for review and report. If that Committee is of the opinion that the proposed change, test, or experiment does not require approval by the Atomic Energy Commission under the terms of said License, it shall so report in writing to the Superintendent, together with a statement of the reasons for the Committee decision. The Superintendent may then proceed with the change, test or experiment. If, on the other hand, the Committee is of the opinion that approval of the Atomic Energy Commission is required, the Committee shall review the request for such approval, including an appropriate safety analysis in support of the request, and forward the report and request to the Senior Vice President, Engineering and Construction, and Senior Vice President, Production and Transmission, shall thereupon forward the report and request to the Atomic Energy Commission for approval unless, after review, the Vice Presidents either (a) disagree with the opinion of the Committee that approval of the Atomic Energy Commission is required, or (b) decide that the proposed change, test or experiment is not necessary.

Specification

The following records shall be prepared and retained for five (5) years unless a longer period is required by applicable regulations. All records shall be retained in a manner convenient for review.

- a. Records of normal station operation including power levels and periods of operation at each power level.
- b. Records of principal maintenance activities, including inspection, repairs, substitution or replacement of principal items of equipment pertaining to nuclear safety.
- c. Reports of abnormal occurrences and safety limits exceeded.
- d. Records of periodic checks, tests, and calibrations performed to verify that requirements specified under surveillance standards are being met. All equipment failing to meet surveillance requirements and the corrective action taken shall be recorded.
- \*e. Records of changes made in the station as described in the FSAR.
- \*f. Special nuclear material inventory records.
- \*g. Routine station radiation surveys and monitoring records.
- \*h. Records of environmental monitoring surveys.
- \*i. Records of radiation exposure for all station personnel, contractors and visitors to the station as required by 10 CFR 20.
- \*j. Records of radioactive waste disposal.
- k. Records of reactor physics tests and other special tests pertaining to nuclear safety.
- l. Changes to Operating Procedures.
- m. Shift Supervisors log.
- n. By-product material inventory records and source leak test results.
- o. Station Review Committee and General Office Review Committee minutes.

\*These items will be permanently retained.

6.6 STATION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Specification

In addition to reports required by applicable regulations, the following information shall be provided to the Atomic Energy Commission:

6.6.1 Events requiring notification within 24 hours (by telephone or telegraph to the Director of Region II Compliance Office followed by a written report within 10 days to the Director, Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC, Washington, D.C. 20545; with a copy to the Director of Region II Compliance Office:

- a. Abnormal occurrences specified in the Definitions Section of the Technical Specifications.
- b. Any significant variation of measured values in a non-conservative direction from corresponding predicted values of safety connected parameters during initial criticality.

The written report, and to the extent possible the preliminary telephone or telegraph report, shall describe, analyze, and evaluate safety implications, and outline the corrective actions and measures taken or planned to prevent recurrence of a. and b. above.

6.6.2 Events requiring reports within 30 days (in writing) to the Director, Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC, Washington, D.C. 20545; with a copy to the Director of Region II Compliance Office:

- a. Any change in transient or accident analyses, as described in the Safety Analysis Report, which involves an unreviewed safety question as defined in Paragraph 50.59 (c) of 10 CFR 50.
- b. Any changes in station operating organization which involve positions for which minimum qualifications are specified in the Technical Specifications, or in personnel assigned to these positions.

6.6.3 Events requiring reports within 60 days (in writing) to the Director, Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC, Washington, D.C. 20545; with a copy to the Director of Region II Compliance Office:

- a. Upon receipt of a new operating license or amendment to a facility license involving the planned increase in reactor power level or the installation of a new core, a summary report of unit startup and power escalation test programs and evaluations of results thereof shall be submitted within 60 days following completion of testing or commencement of commercial power, whichever comes first.

b. Any changes in the station or corporate organizations as shown on Figures 6.1-1 and 6.1-2.

6.6.4 A Semi-Annual Station Operations Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Director, Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC, Washington, D.C. 20545, within 60 days after the end of each reporting period.

The report shall provide the following information (summarized on a monthly basis) and shall cover the six month period or fraction thereof, ending June 30 and December 31. The due date for the first report shall be calculated from the date of initial criticality.

6.6.4.1 Operations Summary

a. A narrative summary of operating experience and of changes in facility design that relate to safe operation, performance characteristics (including fuel performance) and operating procedures related to safety occurring during the reporting period.

b. A summary of results of surveillance tests and inspections.

6.6.4.2 Power Generation

A summary of the nuclear and electrical output of the unit during the reporting period, and the cumulative total outputs since initial criticality, including:

- a. Gross thermal power generated (in MWH).
- b. Gross electrical power generated (in MWH).
- c. Net electrical power generated (in MWH).
- d. Number of hours the reactor was critical.
- e. Number of hours the generator was on line.
- f. Histogram of thermal power versus time.

6.6.4.3 Shutdowns

Descriptive material covering all outages occurring during the reporting period. The following information shall be provided for each outage:

- a. The cause of the outage.
- b. The method of shutting down the reactor; e.g., trip, automatic rundown, or manually controlled deliberate shutdown.
- c. Duration of the outage in hours.

19. |

- d. Unit status during the outage; e.g., cold shutdown, hot shutdown, or hot standby.
- e. Corrective and preventive action taken to preclude recurrence of each unplanned outage.

#### 6.6.4.4 Maintenance

A discussion of electrical, mechanical and general maintenance performed during the report period having potential effects on the safety of the facility.

Specific systems involved shall be identified and information shall be provided on:

- a. The nature of the maintenance; e.g., routine or emergency.
- b. The effect, if any, on the safe operation of the reactor.
- c. The cause of any malfunction for which corrective maintenance was required.
- d. The results of any such malfunction.
- e. Corrective and preventive action taken to preclude recurrence.

#### 6.6.4.5 Radioactive Effluent Releases

Information relative to the quantities of liquid, gaseous and solid radioactive effluents released from the facility, and the effluent volumes used in maintaining the releases within the limits of 10 CFR 20 shall be provided as follows:

##### a. Liquid Releases

- (1) Total radioactivity (in curies) released, other than tritium, and concentration at the Keowee Hydro Unit tailrace averaged over a year.
- (2) Total tritium oxide (in curies) discharged, and concentration at the Keowee Hydro Unit tailrace averaged over a year.
- (3) Total volume (in gallons) of liquid waste released into the Keowee Hydro Unit tailrace.
- (4) Total volume (in gallons) of Keowee Hydro dilution water used.
- (5) The maximum concentration released (averaged over the period of a single release).
- (6) Estimated total radioactivity (in curies) released, by nuclide (other than tritium), based on representative isotopic analyses performed.

- (7) Percent of applicable limits released, based on nuclide identification performed.

b. Gaseous Releases

- (1) Total radioactivity (in curies) released.
- (2) Estimated total radioactivity (in curies) released, by nuclide (other than tritium), based on representative isotopic analyses performed of:
  - (a) noble gases
  - (b) halogens
  - (c) particulates with half-lives greater than eight days
  - (d) tritium oxide

c. Solid Waste

- (1) The total amount of solid waste packaged (in cubic feet).
- (2) The dates of shipment and disposition (if shipped off-site).
- (3) Estimated total radioactivity (in curies):
  - a. Packaged
  - b. Shipped

6.6.4.6 Environmental Monitoring

- (1) For each medium sampled during the six-month period, the following information shall be provided.
  - a. Number of sampling locations
  - b. Total number of samples
  - c. Number of locations at which levels are found to be significantly greater than local backgrounds.

d. Highest, lowest, and the average concentrations or levels of radiation for the sampling point with the highest average and description of the location of that point with respect to the site.

- (2) If levels of station contributed radioactive materials in environmental media indicate the likelihood of public intakes in excess of 3 percent of those that could result from continuous exposure to the concentration values listed in Appendix B, Table II, Part 20, estimates of the likely resultant exposure to individuals and to population groups, and assumptions upon which estimates are based shall be provided. (These values are comparable to the top of Range I, as defined in FRC Report No. 2.)
- (3) If statistically significant variations in off-site environmental concentrations with time are observed, and are attributed to station releases correlation of these results with effluent releases shall be provided.

19.

#### 6.6.5 Special Reports

Special test reports shall be prepared and submitted to the Director, Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC, Washington, D. C. 20545, as follows:

- a. A report\* within 60 days of completion of one year of commercial operation covering:
  - (1) An evaluation of unit performance to date in comparison with design specifications.
  - (2) A reassessment of the validity of prior accident analyses in light of measured operating characteristics, which may affect consequences; and system, component, and personnel performance which may affect accident probabilities.
  - (3) A progress and status report on all items identified in the operating license review as requiring further effort.

\*This report may be incorporated in the Semi-Annual Operations Report due at that time.

- b. The initial reactor building integrated leak rate test shall be the subject of a summary technical report and shall be submitted within 90 days to the Director, Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC, Washington, D. C. 20545, and shall include analyses and interpretations of the results which demonstrate compliance in meeting the leak rate limits specified in the Technical Specifications. Other containment leak rate tests that fail to meet the acceptance criteria shall be the subject of a special summary report.

19.

- c. A report covering single loop operation, permitted by Specification 3.1.8, within 90 days after completion of testing. This report shall include the data obtained as noted in 3.1.8. together with analyses and interpretations of these data which demonstrate:
- (1) Coolant flows in the idle loop and operating loop are as predicted in FSAR Supplement 7, Tables 1-1 and 1-2.
  - (2) Relative incore flux and temperature profiles remain essentially the same as for four pump operation at each power level taking into account the reduced flow in single loop operation.
  - (3) Operating loop temperatures and flows are obtained which justify the revised safety system setting prescribed for the temperature and flow instruments located in the operating loop (which must sense the combined core flow plus the cooler bypass flow of the idle loop).
- d. The results of the initial reactor building structural tests (as specified in FSAR Section 5.6.1.2 including the Structural Instrumentation Report contained in Amendment No. 25, dated December 30, 1970) shall be reported within 90 days following completion of the test.
- e. A reactor building structural integrity report shall be submitted within 90 days of completion of each of the following tests covered by Technical Specification 4.4\* (the integrated leak rate test is covered in 6.6.4.7b above): \*May be included in Semi-Annual Operations Report.
- (1) Annual Inspection
  - (2) Tendon Stress Surveillance
  - (3) End Anchorage Concrete Surveillance
  - (4) Liner Plate Surveillance
- f. Inservice Inspection Program
- g. Report to be submitted upon completion of program on fuel surveillance per Specification 4.14.

6.7 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS

Specification

6.7.1 The radiation protection program shall be organized, with the following exceptions, to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.

- a. Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.103(c)(1) and (3), allowance may be made for the use of respiratory protective equipment in conjunction with activities authorized by the operating license for this station in determining whether individuals in the Restricted Area are exposed to concentrations in excess of the limits specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column 1, of 10 CFR 20, subject to the following conditions and limitations:
  1. Notwithstanding any exposure limit provided herein, the licensee shall, as a precautionary procedure, use process or other engineering controls, to the extent practicable, to limit concentrations of radioactive materials in air to levels below those which delimit an airborne radioactivity area as defined in 20.203(d)(1).
  2. When it is impracticable to apply process or other engineering controls to limit concentrations of radioactive materials to levels below those which delimit an airborne radioactivity area as defined in 20.203(d)(1), and respiratory protective equipment is used to limit the inhalation of airborne radioactive material, the licensee may make allowance for such use in estimating exposures of individuals to such materials provided:
    - (a) Intake of radioactive material by any individual within any period of seven consecutive days will not exceed that which would result from inhalation 1/2/3/ of such material 40 hours per week, at uniform concentrations specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column 1 of 10 CFR Part 20.

1/ Since the concentration specified for tritium oxide vapor assumes equal intakes by skin absorption and inhalation, the total intake permitted is twice that which would result from inhalation alone at the concentration specified for H<sup>3</sup>, S in Appendix B, Table I, Column 1 for 40 hours

2/ For radioactive materials designated "Sub" in the "Isotope" column of the table, the concentration value specified is based upon exposure to the material as an external radiation source. Individual exposures to these materials shall be accounted for as part of the limitation on individual dose in 20.101. These materials shall be subject to applicable precautionary procedures of Paragraph 6.7.1.a.1 above.

3/ For modes of intake other than inhalation, such intakes must be controlled, evaluated, and accounted for by techniques and procedures as may be appropriate to the circumstances of the occurrence with proper consideration of critical organs and limiting doses.

- (b) Respiratory protective equipment is selected and used so that the peak concentrations of airborne radioactive material inhaled by an individual wearing the equipment do not exceed the pertinent values specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column 1 of 10 CFR Part 20. For the purposes of this subparagraph, the concentration of radioactive material that is inhaled when respirators are worn may be initially estimated by dividing the ambient airborne concentration by the protection factor specified in Table 6.7-1 attached hereto for the respiratory protective equipment worn. If the intake of radioactivity is later determined by other measurements to have been greater than that initially estimated, the greater quantity shall be used in evaluating exposures; if it is less than that initially estimated, the lesser quantity may be used in evaluating exposures.
- (c) The licensee advises each respirator user that he may leave the area at any time for relief from respirator use in case of equipment malfunction, physical or psychological discomfort, or any other condition that might cause reduction in the protection afforded the wearer.
- (d) The licensee maintains a respiratory protective program adequate to assure that the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 above are met.

Such a program shall include:

- (1) Air sampling and other surveys sufficient to identify the hazard, to evaluate individual exposures, and to permit proper selection of respiratory protective equipment.
- (2) Written procedures to assure proper selection, supervision, and training of personnel using such protective equipment.
- (3) Written procedures to assure the adequate fitting of respirators; and the testing of respiratory protective equipment for operability immediately prior to use.
- (4) Written procedures for maintenance to assure full effectiveness of respiratory protective equipment, including issuance, cleaning and decontamination, inspection, repair, and storage.
- (5) Written operational and administrative procedures for proper use of respiratory protective equipment including provisions for planned limitations on working times as necessitated by operational conditions.

- (6) Bioassays and/or whole body counts of individuals, and other surveys, as appropriate, to evaluate individual exposures and to assess protection actually provided.
- (7) Records sufficient to permit periodic evaluation of the adequacy of the respiratory protective program.
- (e) The licensee uses equipment approved by the U. S. Bureau of Mines under its appropriate Approval Schedules as set forth in Table 6.7-1 below. Equipment not approved under U. S. Bureau of Mines Approval Schedules may be used only if the licensee has evaluated the equipment and can demonstrate by testing, or on the basis of reliable test information, that the material and performance characteristics of the equipment are at least equal to those afforded by U. S. Bureau of Mines approved equipment of the same type, as specified in Table 6.7-1 below.
- (f) Unless otherwise authorized by the Commission, the licensee does not assign protection factors in excess of those specified in Table 6.7-1 below in selecting and using respiratory protective equipment.
- (g) These specifications with respect to the provisions of 20.103 shall be superseded by adoption of proposed changes to 10 CFR 20, Section 20.103, which would make this specification unnecessary.

6.7.2 Exposure of individuals to concentrations of Argon-41 in the reactor building may be controlled in accordance with the dose limits and requirements of Section 20.101, instead of 20.103(b).

TABLE 6.7-1

## PROTECTION FACTORS FOR RESPIRATORS

DESCRIPTION	MODES <sup>1/</sup>	PROTECTION FACTORS 2/	GUIDES TO SELECTION OF EQUIPMENT
		PARTICULATES AND VAPORS AND GASES EXCEPT TRITIUM OXIDE <sup>3/</sup>	BUREAU OF MINES APPROVAL SCHEDULES* FOR EQUIPMENT CAPABLE OF PROVIDING AT LEAST EQUIVALENT PROTECTION FACTORS *or schedule superseding for equipment of type listed
I. <u>AIR-PURIFYING RESPIRATORS</u>			
Facepiece, half-mask <sup>4/</sup> <sup>7/</sup>	NP	5	21B 30 CFR 14.4(b)(4)
Facepiece, full <sup>7/</sup>	NP	100	21B 30 CFR 14.4(b)(5); 14F 30 CFR 13
II. <u>ATMOSPHERE-SUPPLYING RESPIRATOR</u>			
1. <u>Airline respirator</u>			
Facepiece, half-mask	CF	100	19B 30 CFR 12.2(c)(2) Type C(i)
Facepiece, full	CF	1,000	19B 30 CFR 12.2(c)(2) Type C(i)
Facepiece, full <sup>7/</sup>	D	500	19B 30 CFR 12.2(c)(2) Type C(ii)
Facepiece, full	PD	1,000	19B 30 CFR 12.2(c)(2) Type C(iii)
Hood	CF	<sup>5/</sup> See note	<sup>6/</sup>
Suit	CF	<sup>5/</sup> See note	<sup>6/</sup>
2. <u>Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)</u>			
Facepiece, full <sup>7/</sup>	D	500	13E 30 CFR 11.4(b)(2)(i)
Facepiece, full	PD	1,000	13E 30 CFR 11.4(b)(2)(ii)
Facepiece, full	R	1,000	13E 30 CFR 11.4(b)(1)
III. <u>COMBINATION RESPIRATOR</u>			
Any combination of air-purifying and atmosphere-supplying respirator		Protection factor for type and mode of operation as listed above	19 B CFR 12.2(e) or applicable schedules as listed above

<sup>1/</sup>, <sup>2/</sup>, <sup>3/</sup>, <sup>4/</sup>, <sup>5/</sup>, <sup>6/</sup>, <sup>7/</sup>, [These notes are on the following pages]

1/ See the following symbols:

CF: continuous flow  
D : demand  
NP: negative pressure (i.e., negative phase during inhalation)  
PD: pressure demand (i.e., always positive pressure)  
PP: positive pressure  
R : recirculating (closed circuit)

2/ (a) For purposes of this specification the protection factor is a measure of the degree of protection afforded by a respirator, defined as the ratio of the concentration of airborne radioactive material outside the respiratory protective equipment to that inside the equipment (usually inside the facepiece) under conditions of use. It is applied to the ambient airborne concentration to estimate the concentration inhaled by the wearer according to the following formula:

$$\text{Concentration Inhaled} = \frac{\text{Ambient Airborne Concentration}}{\text{Protection Factor}}$$

(b) The protection factors apply:

- (i) only for trained individuals wearing properly fitted respirators used and maintained under supervision in a well-planned respiratory protective program.
- (ii) for air-purifying respirators only when high efficiency [above 99.9% removal efficiency by U. S. Bureau of Mines type dioctyl phthalate (DOP) test] particulate filters and/or sorbents appropriate to the hazard are used in atmospheres not deficient in oxygen.
- (iii) for atmosphere-supplying respirators only when supplied with adequate respirable air.

3/ Excluding radioactive contaminants that present an absorption or submersion hazard. For tritium oxide approximately half of the intake occurs by absorption through the skin so that an overall protection factor of not more than approximately 2 is appropriate when atmosphere-supplying respirators are used to protect against tritium oxide. Air-purifying respirators are not recommended for use against tritium oxide. See also footnote 5/ below, concerning supplied-air suits and hoods.

4/ Under chin type only. Not recommended for use where it might be possible for the ambient airborne concentration to reach instantaneous values greater than 50 times the pertinent values in Appendix B, Table I, Column 1 of 10 CFR, Part 20.