

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-266/80-04; 50/301-80-03

Docket No. 50-266; 50-301

License No. DPR-24; DPR-27

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company
231 West Michigan
Milwaukee, WI 53203

Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Point Beach Site, Two Creeks, WI

Inspection Conducted: February 19 and 20, 1980

Inspector: *J. D. Smith*
J. D. Smith3-6-80Approved By: *R F Warnick*
R. F. Warnick, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 23-10-80Inspection SummaryInspection on February 19 and 20, 1980 (Report No. 50-266/80-04;
50-301/80-03)Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection on February 19 and 20, 1980, to review plant operations, non-routine event follow-up and independent inspection. The inspection involved 15 inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.Results: Of the three areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in two areas. One item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Infraction - Minimum number of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps not capable of automatic operation during two unit operation - Paragraph 3b)

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *G. A. Reed, Manager, Nuclear Power Division
- *J. Greenwood, Assistant to the Manager
 - T. F. Deddins, Maintenance Superintendent
 - J. Reisenbuechler, Instrument and Control Engineer
 - G. Maxfield, Technical Assistant - Operations
- *F. Zeman, Office Supervisor

The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the operations and maintenance section.

*Denotes those attending the exit interview on February 20, 1980.

2. Plant Operations

a. Plant Tour

- (1) The inspector performed a plant tour. The housekeeping was good.
- (2) Selected valves in the auxiliary feedwater, residual heat removal, and core spray systems were checked for proper alignment and no discrepancies were noted.

b. Manager's Supervisory Staff Meeting Minutes

The subject minutes for meetings 79-56 through 80-03 were reviewed. No items of concern were identified.

3. Reportable Occurrences

The following reportable occurrences were reviewed by examination of logs, records, and through discussions with plant personnel. Occurrences were reviewed for completion of reporting requirements, compliance with Technical Specifications, investigation and determination of cause, proposed corrective measures, and/or completion of corrective action.

- a. RO 50-266/79-22 - On December 26, 1979 the Unit 1 "B" safety injection pump failed to start during an operational test. Proper valve and electrical lineup was verified, however, further investigation revealed that the power supply breaker bar was approximately one inch open from its fully closed position. The mechanical indicator indicated the breaker

was closed. The breaker was closed and the pump was satisfactorily tested. Dependence on the mechanical indicator for determining breaker status has been supplemented by a recent revision (Rev. 21) to procedure OP-1A. This procedure "Cold Shutdown to Low Power Operation" has been revised to individually verify proper Pump discharge pressure by "jogging" the pump following racking-in of its respective breaker. This will preclude potential reoccurrence of this nature. This event is considered closed.

- b. RO 50-266/80-01 - Isolated Pressure Transmitters on the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. On February 2, 1980 while performing a routine calibration of the pressure transmitters for the two motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps it was discovered that the instrument sensing line isolation valves were closed. These transmitters open and control the feedwater pump discharge valves, therefore, these valves would not have opened automatically when the feedwater pumps started. This reduced the number of immediately operable auxiliary feedwater pumps from four (4) to two (2) for a period greater than the permitted twenty-four hour time limit in Technical Specification 15.3.4. (With both units at power, three out of the four pumps must be operable. During the event both units were at power). This is an item of noncompliance.

Potential consequences of this event were minimal in that one steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, (with 200% capacity), remained for each unit. Flow indication, discharge valve position and the capability of the operator to open the discharge valves from the control boards remained operable through the event.

Investigation into this event revealed that on January 26, 1980, while performing a pressure indicator calibration a technician inadvertently closed the subject instrument isolation valves which at the time were heavily snubbed (nearly closed) and left the valves closed.

Though practiced on a limited basis on some of the non-safety instruments, the practice of "snubbing" instrument valves on the safety instruments is not allowed or endorsed in any plant procedures. Investigation into this event indicates that this was an isolated occurrence and the probability of reoccurrence is minimal.

To preclude reoccurrence the licensee has taken several corrective actions. Staff personnel have been reminded of the policy of not snubbing any safety instruments. In-line snubbers (dampeners) have been installed for the pressure

transmitters for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, and will be installed on the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. The instrument isolation valves for the discharge pressure transmitters on all the auxiliary feedwater pumps will be added to checklist "CL-13E, Auxiliary Feedwater System Checklist." A design change is being prepared that will allow the subject instrument isolation valves to be locked open, they will then be added to "PC 8 Steam and Electric Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Valve & Lock Checklist."

c. RO 50-301/79-08

At 2:00 p.m. on December 10, 1979, during normal operation of Unit 2, "C" charging pump was taken out of service per a scheduled requirement for pump motor brush replacements. At 2:30 p.m. on the same date, the Unit 2 "A" charging pump was required to be taken out of service due to observed leakage in the discharge manifold area. This reduced the number of available charging pumps for this unit to one, the minimum number permitted by Technical Specifications. Efforts were immediately taken to expedite maintenance and returning Unit 2 "C" charging pump to service and this was accomplished at 4:08 p.m. on December 10, 1979. Throughout the period, the Unit 2 "B" charging pump was operable.

The licensee reported that there was minimal liquid leakage (three to five gallons) to the rad system drains and the waste processing system. According to the licensee their experience indicates noble gas activity released from such leakages is not measurable.

The Unit 2 charging pumps are all variable capacity, Ajax Iron Works Type T-125, reciprocating piston, three cylinder models. Investigation indicated that the valve seat (Ajax part No. P-5717C-2; 316 SS) on the discharge check valve of the Unit 2 "A" charging pump was leaking. The licensee believes the cause of valve seat failure was normal fatigue. The leaking valve seat was replaced.

4. Independent Inspection - In response to a potential generic problem discovered elsewhere in Region III, the inspector examined the licensee's procedure for testing main steam stop valves and their associated position indication and closure time. The licensee's procedures comply fully with the Technical Specification requirements.
5. Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 20, 1980.