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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS

DEPOSITION OF KEVIN MOLLOY

Place - Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Date - Friday, September 21, 1979

Pages 1 - 58

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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THREE MILE ISLAND :
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS :
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Holiday Inn Town Motel
2nd and Chestnut Streets
Harrisburg, Pa.

Friday, September 21, 1979
1:00 p.m.

DEPOSITION OF KEVIN J. MOLLOY

APPEARANCES:

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

MALCOLM ERNST
FREDERICK HERR
ROBERT SCHAMBERGER

C O N T E N T SWITNESS:EXAMINATION

Kevin J. Molloy

3

E X H I B I T SEXHIBIT NUMBER:IDENTIFIED

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1 MR. ERNST: On the record.

2 Whereupon,

3 KEVIN J. MOLLOY

4 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn,
5 was examined and testified as follows:

6 EXAMINATION

7 BY MR. ERNST:

8 Q State your full name and title for the record.

9 A Kevin J. Molloy. I am the director of Emergency
10 Preparedness for Dauphin County, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

11 Q Mr. Molloy, did you previously receive a letter
12 from us providing you with certain important information
13 concerning this deposition?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Is this a copy of that letter?

16 A Yes, it is.

17 MR. ERNST: I will mark this Exhibit 1.

18 (Exhibit 1 identified.)

19 BY MR. ERNST:

20 Q Have you read this document in full?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Do you understand the information set forth in this
23 letter including the general nature of the NRC TMI Special
24 Inquiry, your right to have an attorney present here today as
25 your representative, and the fact that this information you

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1 provide here may eventually become public?

2 A Yes.

3 Q Is counsel representing you personally today?

4 A No.

5 Q I would like to note for the record the witness is
6 not represented by counsel today. Mr. Molloy, if at any time
7 during the course of this interview you feel that you would
8 like to be represented by counsel and have counsel present,
9 please advise me and we will adjourn these proceedings to
10 afford you the opportunity to make the necessary arrangements.

11 Is this procedure agreeable to you?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Did you bring a copy of your resume to this
14 deposition?

15 A Yes, I did.

16 MR. ERNST: I will mark this Exhibit 2.

XXX

17 (Exhibit 2 identified.)

18 BY MR. ERNST:

19 Q Is this document I have labeled Exhibit 2, which
20 consists of three pages, the top headed "Kevin J. Molloy" the
21 resume you provided?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Does this resume accurately summarize your educational
24 and employment background?

25 A Yes.

1 Q You were asked to supply any documents that you felt
2 might be pertinent to this particular inquiry that weren't
3 already in our possession at the time of this deposition. In
4 a conversation previous to this deposition, we indicated that
5 we had most of the documents, if not all, of the ones that
6 you thought were pertinent.

7 However, you did provide us with a two-page document
8 entitled, "Dauphin County Emergency Preparedness Rumor-Control
9 Calls -- Type of Questions Asked."

10 Is this the document you provided?

11 A Yes.

12 MR. ERNST: I will mark this Exhibit 3.

13 (Exhibit 3 identified.)

14 BY MR. ERNST:

15 Q Mr. Molloy, before we get into the detailed questions
16 for the deposition, I would like it understood for the record
17 that we have provided an opportunity to hear from you or other
18 county officials or local officials as to what they perceive
19 were the important events and the problems and possible
20 remedies to problems that existed during the TMI accident,
21 and such opportunity has been provided and you will get back
22 to us at some later time as to whether or not a meeting with
23 these county and local officials would be of use to this
24 inquiry or of use to the county and local officials; is that
25 correct?

1 A That is correct.

2 Q We are in this deposition relying to a large extent
3 on the previous record that has been developed by yourself
4 and others so the questions we have today are generally to
5 fill in the gaps or investigate areas where there may be some
6 question as to what was said before and what is on the record.

7 The first question I have is: What responsibility does the
8 county or you have for assuring the existence of local plans --
9 emergency plans -- and that such plans and staffing are adequate
10 and capable of being implemented?

11 A Under the new state law, the municipalities -- local
12 municipalities are required to have an organization and local
13 plans. The new state law was enacted in November of 1978.

14 Up until this time, it has not really become an effective
15 tool in the emergency preparedness program.

16 Prior to the passage of this law and the incident at TMI,
17 we did in fact have a law that required local directors and they
18 were required to do some planning. We at the county level have
19 no enforcement legislation to use against municipalities that
20 don't have any local plans.

21 Since I have been the director in the county, since April
22 of 1974, time and time again we made efforts to have interested
23 people recommended for appointment to local positions. We have
24 not met with much success. And to get written plans from the
25 local level is virtually impossible.

1 Q Your statement that is virtually impossible, is that an
2 appropriate statement for the situation before TMI or before
3 the public law was passed or presently?

4 A Under the old law. As I indicated earlier, the new
5 law requires the municipalities will, in fact, have a written
6 plan and we are in the process right now of educating the local
7 emergency preparedness people. We have several new ones
8 recently appointed. And the local government elected officials
9 as to what the law is and what their requirements are under
10 it.

11 Q Are there enforcement mechanisms for the new law
12 in this area of preparation of local plans?

13 A Without a copy of it here, I would prefer not to
14 comment at this time on any specifications.

15 Q What steps have you taken since TMI -- specific
16 steps -- to enhance or ensure the preparation of local plans?

17 A As a direct result of the Three Mile Island incident,
18 within a matter of two days after the incident, we had quite
19 a few local plans appear, written local plans.

20 What we have done since then is we have been in touch with
21 local directors and we have been encouraging them to update
22 those plans that pertained to a nuclear incident, number one,
23 and also to expand on those plans to cover other types of
24 emergency situations.

25 I have dealt with not only local directors, but also with

1 local elected officials. In turn, we have utilized the media
2 to a limited extent to try and get the public a little bit
3 more interested in the fact that their local municipalities
4 should have an effective emergency plan to cover all types
5 of emergency situations.

6 Q At the time of TMI, was there in existence a local
7 emergency coordinator or disaster coordinator, whatever the
8 proper terminology is, in existence for all of your local
9 jurisdictions?

10 A All the local municipalities have local coordinators,
11 as required by law.

12 Q How many of these are there in Dauphin County,
13 roughly?

14 A We have 40 political subdivisions.

15 Q What is PEMAs -- that is Pennsylvania Emergency
16 Management Agency -- responsibility regarding the existence or
17 adequacy of local emergency plans?

18 A Under the new law, PEMA has responsibility to come
19 up with a state disaster operations plan and to provide training
20 to the county directors to ensure there is a county plan that
21 dovetails theirs, offer whatever help they can from their various
22 groups -- their medical people, mass-care facilities people,
23 things of that nature.

24 The county, in turn, has to offer the same type of assistance
25 to the local director. The training of areas of responsibility

1 as far as training goes, the county is to train the local.
2 The state to train the county. And so forth.

3 Q Do I properly interpret the answer, then, that PEMA
4 has no responsibility for assuring the existence or adequacy
5 of local plans?

6 A I am not certain what their legal responsibilities
7 are. As I say, the law does indicate that we at the county
8 level and the local level will in fact have written plans.
9 I am sure that the state emergency management agency will
10 make sure that we do, in fact, have the plans.

11 If not, then I would assume they have the responsibility
12 to do this for us. I am not sure of the legal ramifications
13 under the law.

14 Q Not being sure of the legal ramifications, then, you
15 would assume that the county organization or your office
16 is responsible to assure that there are adequate local plans?

17 A The way I personally view it is if we have requested
18 a local municipality to come up with an effective emergency
19 plan to cover all types of incidents and we have offered
20 them assistance and things of that nature, if they can't do
21 it, we will do it for them whether they like it or not.

22 Q In your view, what kind of detail should be present
23 in local plans?

24 A Basically, you have to have -- you do a hazard
25 analysis of the community. You see what can go wrong in that

1 community. What is the subject? Do you have a chemical plant?
2 That type of situation. You check on special problem areas.
3 Nursing homes, hospitals, things of that nature. To me, much
4 more important than a written plan is a written resources
5 manual. You have to do a survey to know what resources you
6 have in the community.

7 Basically the actions taken by emergency personnel during
8 an emergency situation are nothing but common sense as far
9 as I am concerned. In order to make the efforts of the
10 emergency personnel easier, if they know where they can get
11 the resources to make the job easier, that is a big part of the
12 problem.

13 Once again, you have to have a staff at the local level. It
14 need not be as large as the county or state staff, but what
end 1 15 a local director feels comfortable with. One he can work with.

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1 Q Should you have a planned evacuation route, for
2 example, the details of which roads will be one-way and from
3 what sectors going to what end-point, things of that nature?

4 A Well, I personally have mixed emotions on that.
5 In some cases, perhaps, yes, you should. In other cases, I
6 don't really think it would be valid to have streets already
7 identified as major evacuation routes. To cite an incident,
8 assume we had a plan for Middletown that listed say Union
9 Street as a major evacuation route. Any time an incident
10 occurs, everybody goes to Union Street and heads out to the
11 shelters and so forth.

12 They have a chemical plant in Middletown. Assume that
13 they have an incident at the chemical plant and the wind
14 blows toxic fumes up Union Street. You announce to the
15 people there has been a chemical accident. We want to
16 evacuate the area.

17 The people pull out their written piece of paper that
18 says in an emergency use Union Street. That seems like you
19 are sending them right into the danger area.

20 As long as the emergency personnel know the major roads
21 that they want to utilize during a disaster situation, a
22 decision as to which streets will be utilized can be made
23 literally on the spot. In my personal opinion, that is the
24 more intelligent way to handle the situation.

25 Much the same with a nuclear power plant. This subject

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amnlRW 1 came up in 1977, during the licensing hearings, when I
2 testified in Harrisburg. I was asked the same question. We
3 were talking strictly of a five-mile zone back then.

4 You got involved with a situation of the thought was if
5 the wind is coming out of the north, you evacuate the
6 northeast quadrant or whatever. Once gain, if you list an
7 evacuation route being in that sector, and that is the one
8 you evacuate, it is ridiculous to send people into a danger
9 zone.

10 As long as the emergency personnel know the area, know
11 which routes can handle the most traffic, are the easiest to
12 get traffic control personnel on and so forth, I think that
13 is all you need.

14 Q You mentioned your testimony at the TMI licensing
15 hearings. At that time you testified that you felt the
16 state plan was adequate.

17 Subsequent to TMI, would you have any additional
18 observations on the adequacy of the state or county plans?

19 A Obviously, we have a totally different county plan
20 that came into being as a direct result of TMI. That is
21 going to have to be literally scrapped, which is what we are
22 in the process of doing now because they are saying we have
23 to plan for 20 miles.

24 In view of the fact we already started revising our
25 20-mile plan, I really can't comment on changing that too

amnLRW 1 much. We are in the process of also reviewing and updating
2 and revising the county operations plan, which is more
3 extensive. It covers more areas than we ever got involved
4 with before.

5 It is an ongoing task. We have been at it for about a
6 year. It has not been approved by the commissioners yet.
7 We have not asked for approval. It will take quite a bit of
8 time. As far as the state operations plan goes, I have no
9 problems with it at this time.

10 Q You stated that the county plan is being revised
11 to include more areas. What does that mean specifically?

12 A We are getting involved in more specifics. As an
13 example, we got involved with a flash-flood self-help
14 program. We are putting in an annex dealing with strictly
15 flash-flood responsibilities and capabilities and so forth.

16 As a result of incidents that have happened in the past,
17 mainly in other counties, we are going to get involved in
18 putting down in writing, for example, what should the county
19 director do or not do during a disaster situation in terms
20 of spending the money for emergency assistance and things of
21 that nature.

22 We are getting that ironed out between the county
23 commissioners in our office so we know what we can do
24 without getting them terribly upset.

25 Q You mentioned money. In the TMI accident, there

amnlRW 1 was no declaration of a disaster emergency, as identified and
2 described under the public law of 1978.

3 Did this lack of a declared emergency or declared
4 disaster by the governor provide any problems at the county
5 level, either from the ability to direct activities or to
6 finance additional expenditures?

7 A It caused problems, not during the incident.
8 Whatever funds were necessary to take actions to provide for
9 the safety of people, I was advised by the commissioners
10 where to go, take whatever actions were necessary at
11 whatever cost. Where it caused a problem is in view of the
12 fact there was no emergency declaration, there was no chance
13 of us receiving any type of aid.

14 It chopped our budget for the year by about 500 percent
15 in terms of overtime I paid out, meals for the people there,
16 things of that nature. That was the only bad impact.

17 But during any disaster situation, money is usually the
18 last thing that is really discussed.

19 Q So you don't feel that this was a present problem
20 during the TMI accident but now it is a problem that you
21 have to try to figure out how to cope with.

22 A That is a fair statement.

23 Q If you know you are going to have to cope with a
24 problem like this, how does it keep from entering into your
25 mind during an accident? If you had an action you would

amnlrw 1 like to take that might cost your budget \$10,000 or
2 something, but it is a like to rather than a got to --

3 A Once again, anything that we feel is necessary
4 during the time of an emergency to provide for the health
5 and safety and welfare of the residents, that is the bottom
6 line. That is what we do first. In most accident
7 situations, you don't really spend an awful lot of money
8 anyway. We were fortunate that we had never been put in a
9 situation where we know we have to spend \$100,000 to do
10 something, being a got to or like to situation. We have not
11 been put into that position.

12 The incidents we ran into so far, we always got the
13 moneyt. The same probably is to the people at the local
14 level. They, of course, don't spend as much as the county
15 but obviously the budget in some of the townships is smaller
16 than ours. They had to pay out overtime to police and
17 things of that nature.

18 They took it on the chin. The effort to recoup any funds
19 right now is being directed toward the insurance company.
20 If that is not successful, at least at the county level
21 there will be lawsuits to get some of the money back.

22 The feeling is, and the reason it is being pursued,
23 during a flood, for example, that is a natural disaster.
24 There is not much you can do about it. You can't stop the
25 rain. Here there was some human error, it appears, in this

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amnLRW 1 particular incident and it is basically felt since a human
2 caused it some human should pay for it.

3 Q Do you have a rough idea of what your additional
4 costs were in your own budget? Not other county budgets.

5 A I can only give a rough estimate. Our county
6 controller and treasurer and so forth were involved in
7 getting the statistics from the county home, where we got
8 food and things of that nature.

9 The county's total extra expenditures was around \$25,000
10 or \$26,000.

11 Q That is the total county or out of your budget?

12 A That is for the county operations. It effected
13 other departments. The sheriff's people put in overtime and
14 things of that nature. It was submitted as a total bill.
15 Formally, \$20,000 does not sound like much money. The
16 county has a budget of around \$26 million. That doesn't
17 sound like a large amount of money.

18 The county has been in financial difficulty so it is
19 quite a bit of money.

20 Q What provisions are made for staffing and
21 equipment for emergency response at the local level?

22 A What exactly do you mean by the local level?

23 Q Not the county.

24 A It would vary from municipality to municipality.
25 To take Londonderry Township, which is where the facility

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amnlRW 1 is located, they have their own volunteer fire department.
2 They have a local civil defense coordinator. He has a
3 volunteer staff of half a dozen people that assist him
4 during emergency situations.

5 The state police provide the law enforcement protection
6 for them. The Township does not have and didn't have prior
7 to the incident a written plan as such, although they have
8 been involved in many emergency situations down in that
9 area.

10 The main reason that I feel Londenderry and the other
11 municipalities don't have written plans is that every time
12 we had a situation occur in Dauphin County -- flood,
13 tornado, so forth -- we send equipment out and they can't
14 handle the situation and need help and we get it for them,
15 everything worked out extremely well.

16 The opinion is we have done it before. We know what we
17 are doing. We don't need to put it in writing.

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Q Speaking of Londonderry, then, the answer is

basically for civil defense emergency preparedness there is no additional funding or equipment. They use the existing services in that township.

A That is correct. Normally, across the country, your police and fire rescue forces are your first line of civil defense. They're the first to respond to an incident. Civil defense is mainly a coordinating agency.

Q Who is basically responsible for civil defense leadership and coordination -- two separate words -- in a multi-county accident situation like TMI?

A Under the new law, to the best of my knowledge, we get involved with a multi-county situation, basically the state is the overall -- has overall command of the situation. The local directors still retain their responsibility of providing for the health, safety, and welfare of their own residents. This has been discussed at other emergency preparedness meetings. I don't think it was totally resolved who is the leader of the band and who is in charge. All I can say is every municipality and every county, whether the governor is quote unquote, in charge, and supposed to provide leadership, they have their responsibilities and so forth.

It's a ticklish question to answer at this time because the law is so new, it hasn't had a chance to really go into

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1 effect, and it's just in my mind difficult to answer.

2 Q Do you preceive there might be a different
3 answer to this depending on whether it's a declared emergency
4 under the law or just what some people have described as a
5 planning exercise if there is not a declared emergency? Let
6 me rephrase the question.

7 PEMA, the state agency, would its responsibilities change
8 from perhaps a purely coordination role with no declared
9 disaster to perhaps a command function if there were a declared
10 disaster that affected several counties?

11 A Personally, I don't feel that PEMA's role should
12 be other than strictly a coordinating agency and assisting
13 agency. I don't think the county should be under any coor-
14 dinating assisting agency for the local municipalities,
15 whether it's a declared emergency or undeclared emergency or
16 so forth. You get involved in quite a heated discussion
17 where the locals say we're not letting the county take over.
18 They can help us but they're not going to take over. Most
19 of the counties feel the state is not going to take over
20 during a disaster situation for us. Part of the line of
21 reasoning is that I feeel that I in my county, I know it
22 much more intimately than the state or federal government and
23 I don't want them tongue in cheek telling me what to do
24 during a disaster. I should be telling them what my needs
25 are to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the

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1 residents of the community and they should be fulfilling my
2 needs as opposed to telling me what I need.

3 Q But it's still being debated, this question, as
4 to the legal implications of what the state law means?

5 A That question will be debated for many years to
6 come. I'm sure that if a legal principle is rendered by
7 the state, somewhere some county or local municipality will
8 get a legal opinion that will perhaps say something different.

9 MR. ERNST: Off the record.

10 (Discussion off the record.)

11 BY MR. ERNST:

12 Q There is now a draft annex to the disaster --
13 state disaster operations plan for nuclear incidents dated
14 July '79? Are you in general familiar with this document?

15 A I am aware that it exists.

16 Q Do you know if this is still a draft or whether
17 there is a final document of this nature in existence?

18 A I'm not certain.

19 Q Where does a document like this fit in the
20 overall state emergency plan or, to be more explicit, the
21 state disaster operations plan? I guess the question related
22 to the fact that this state plan consists of a basic plan
23 and about 27 annexes or something like that, and then this
24 draft exists, and I was wondering about the relationship as
25 you perceive it of this document to the basic state plan.

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1 A I think it's basically an addition and updating
2 to the basic plan. As a result of TMI, obviously they found
3 certain problem areas existed and they're taking steps to
4 correct those deficiencies. Also, once again, as a training
5 mechanism for the counties.

6 Q Does a plan of this nature have county input or
7 is it, like you stated with locals, if the locals provide
8 a plan, we will? Does the state just put out a document and
9 say this is it or is there interaction with the counties?

10 A In regard to that specific document, I don't
11 recall being asked for any input. On the other hand, I don't
12 recall not being asked for any specific input. Over the past
13 several months, at the state level, the counties have been
14 asked for more input on various projects that they're involved
15 in. Training and things of that nature. So we're being
16 asked for more input. I think indirectly the counties were
17 asked for the input because we had several meetings at the
18 state level at which we have discussed problems we ran into
19 during TMI and how we handled them and suggestions we would
20 have for other people. As a result of these interviews, I'm
21 sure a lot of our problems and viewpoints were addressed in
22 the document. I don't know the specifics of the document
23 so I can't tell you exactly what was or was not put in.

24 Q Does PEMA review, comment on, and/or approve
25 county emergency plans?

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1 A They're supposed to review and comment and
2 offer suggestions and so forth and approve the plans.
3 During the Three Mile Island incident, for example, the plans
4 they were coming up with, we didn't send a copy over and say
5 this is for your review. We didn't have the time during the
6 incident. However, there were situations where they would
7 call and say I noticed you have your plan. Sould you do it
8 this way? If not, why not? And so forth.

9 With the Three Mile Island incident, because of the nature
10 of the incident, they reallt didn't have any time or choice
11 between -- they did not have the time nor the choice of what
12 to approve in the plans we were coming up with.

13 Q You mentioned that PEMA was at least afforded
14 the opportunity to review and comment on these evolving plans.
15 I understand that PEMA did send a representative down at the
16 county level at sometime to provide this kind of coordination;
17 is that correct?

18 A That is correct. We had a representative from
19 the central headquarters in our office on Saturday morning.
20 That was when he showed up.

21 Q Are you aware of any other groups that were audit-
22 ing or evaluating the adequacy of the state or county or
23 local planning other than PEMA?

24 A We had federal people in that were assigned to
25 our county to assist us. I was not aware the PEMA man was

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1 there to evaluate our plan as such but rather to assist us
2 in drawing up a plan, lending us expertise.

3 Q Let me change that word with respect to PEMA.
4 PEMA was assisting. Are you aware of any groups or people
5 that were there assessing the adequacy of planning?

6 A The civil defense preparedness agency had a group
7 of people that were in our emergency operations center at
8 one time or another during the incident. I believe they were
9 from the Human Research Management Corporation, or some name
10 similar to that.

11 To this day, I am still not quite positive of what they
12 were studying. They were studying our plans. There were
13 many questions asked about it. Whether they were studying
14 us --

15 Q DCPA actually sent two people down to each county;
16 is that correct?

17 A That is correct. What I was referring to were
18 non-federal employees that belonged to a company that had a
19 grant of some type to study what we were doing.

20 MR. ERNST: Off the record.

21 (Discussion off the record.)

22 MR. ERNST: Back on the record.

23 BY MR. ERNST:

24 Q Were you aware of any evaluation of county plans
25 or county state of preparedness being made by FDAA or by

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1 Mr. Adamcik's representative or somebody of that sort.

2 A Once again, during the incident, there were
3 so many people from so many agencies that showed up, we
4 really had no idea what they were doing there. I know there
5 were people from FDAA in the area. They did stop at our EOC.
6 Exactly what they were doing, I am not sure.

7 Q Were you aware of any individual or individuals
8 from the governor's office looking at the adequacy of
9 emergency plans, like Dr. Bill Burn or anybody associated
10 with him?

11 A We didn't have anybody from the governor's
12 office come down to our emergency operations center or contact
13 us by telephone until Sunday morning, I believe, when the
14 lieutenant governor showed up along with a couple of his
15 staff. I heard there was conversation between the governor's
16 office and the state emergency management agency concerning,
17 number one, did the county have some plans; number two, were
18 they adequate, and so forth.

19 Q What were your radiological responsibilities in
20 the event of a nuclear power accident?

21 A I am not quite sure of what our responsibilities
22 are. We have always been under the impression that if an
23 event ever did occur down at the facility, that between the
24 NRC and the utility and the state Bureau of Radiological
25 Health, that they would conduct the monitoring, sift through

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1 information, and with their expertise they would come up
2 with recommendations as to what actions we should take. I
3 am not very knowledgeable in the area, but we don't have
4 the type of equipment that is available, I believe, to them,
5 and therefore, obviously could not perform a good job in the
6 first place.

7 During the incident, we did have a few of the locals
8 do some monitoring, but they did that on their own. Not at
9 our insistence. At one point -- I believe this might have
10 been Thursday -- we got a call from the state agency and the
11 gentleman on the other end of the line suggested we get the
12 monitors we had trained out running around with geiger counters
13 to give them a training exercise type situation. I told them
14 we would not do that. We felt there was enough concern with-
15 out having people playing around with geiger counters. They
16 hadn't used them that much. The last thing we needed was
17 for someone to misread an instrument which would have caused
18 a whole round of headaches. So we did not delve into that
19 area.

20 MR. ERNST: Off the record.

21 (Discussion off the record.)

er ?

22 MR. ERNST: Back on the record.

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re LRW 1

BY MR. ERNST:

2 Q You issued a Dauphin County emergency preparedness
3 plan on or about April 6, I believe, which, in essence, I
4 guess can be characterized as a 20, 10 and five-mile plan
5 that had evolved during the early days of the Three Mile
6 accident; is that correct?

7 A That is correct.

8 Q I believe you may have answered this question
9 previously -- to some extent, anyway -- but was this
10 particular plan reviewed and commented on or concurred in by
11 PEMA, and if so, when?

12 A Once again, during the incident, as we were coming
13 up with the plans, we were letting the state agency know --
14 we kept them abreast of what we were doing. They would come
15 up with comments or suggestions and so forth.

16 Since that time, we have not had any formal comments on
17 our plan. As I indicated earlier, this plan is already
18 outdated because of the fact that we are going back to
19 planning for a 10-mile zone, so we have to entirely revamp a
20 large portion of this plan.

21 Incidentally, just to get this on the record, the
22 document -- the large document with all the pages and so
23 forth that was printed and released around the 6th or 7th of
24 April, whatever that particular date was, but as of the 1st
25 of April, 12:30 Sunday morning, we have our initial draft

rc LRW 1 document together. I just wanted to make that clear.

2 Q That is a good point. that is a lot of work that
3 went into that plan.

4 A We had all the elements. We just didn't have it
5 put together in packaged form. But they were in existence.

6 Q We didn't review this plan in any great detail,
7 but in my skimming of the plan, I noted one thing that, just
8 out of curiosity, I wanted to ask about. One tab -- I
9 believe it is tab G -- talks about hospital evacuation, and
10 upon completion of hospital evacuation, emergency medical
11 care for those remaining in the evacuation zone would be
12 turned over to PEMA.

13 In tab J, under the city of Harrisburg, there was a
14 statement that after evacuation, the Hershey Medical Center
15 would remain in operation for emergency care. One could
16 imply an inconsistency in those two tabs.

17 I was wondering -- my basic thrust is not at the
18 inconsistency, but how would emergency care have been
19 provided in the event of a 20-mile evacuation?

20 A In the event of a 20-mile evacuation, it would
21 have been turned over to PEMA because we at the county level
22 would have lost all our medical facilities. Once the
23 hospitals were evacuated, our feeling was that they were
24 lost for use by medical personnel.

25 This is where the state agency -- we would advise them of

rc LRW 1 particular problems and they would tell us where to send
2 people. That is obviously an inconsistency.

3 Q It is. The Hershey Center would not have been
4 available to remain open for emergency care.

5 A Not under a 20-mile plan. I once again would
6 assume there could be some variables involved. Perhaps the
7 emergency department, for example, could remain open on a
8 very limited basis. Maybe not at Hershey Medical Center
9 since it is so close to the facility, but, for example,
10 Polyclinic, so we might have very limited medical capability
11 in the county, conditions permitting.

12 Q PEMA's responsibility in this case is not one of
13 saying I have an injured patient. Here he or she is. Take
14 care of the person. But one of saying I have an injured
15 patient. Where shall I take the injured patient?

16 A That is correct. Part of the PEMA role is to
17 know, for example, where the closest medical facility would
18 be located that we could go to to handle this type of
19 patient. They have the facilities to perform that type of
20 task.

21 MR. ERNST: Off the record.

22 (Discussion off the record.)

23 MR. ERNST: Back on the record.

24 BY MR. ERNST:

25 Q I would like to say for the record, since we have

rc LRW 1 been talking about a consistency that is one small part of
2 the plan which, in my view, seemed to be very comprehensive
3 and not inconsistent.

4 However, we always look for weaknesses in
5 investigations. There are a large number of specifics in
6 this plan. Names, telephone numbers, number and type of
7 equipment, number of people, road signs and where they would
8 be placed and what they would say, and things of that
9 nature. How long would a plan of this nature be a useful
10 document?

11 A Well, I think, first of all, one has to bear in
12 mind the conditions we were operating under when that
13 particular plan was put together. I had mentioned before a
14 resources manual. Formally that contains, for example, the
15 local CD staff people and home phone numbers, things of that
16 nature. It is obviously easier to change our resources
17 manual than it is the entire plan.

18 One of the things that we will be working on, we will
19 come up with a 10-mile plan which will void this plan to a
20 degree. We don't want specific names and phone numbers in
21 the plan itself, but rather in the resource manual.

22 This plan, I would assume some of the phone numbers in
23 there are outdated already. Perhaps two weeks after the
24 incident, they were outdated. That is one of the things we
25 are aware of that will be taken care of under the new plan.

rc LRH 1 This was done under combat conditions.

2 Q I assume, then, you envision this document as the
3 kind of document -- maybe not bound in a nice form like
4 this -- but the kind of information that would have to be
5 developed ad hoc after an emergency, but the plan
6 formulation would be in accordance with resources available
7 and things of that nature.

8 A This plan is basically a building block for our
9 next one. We learned an awful lot from this plan. We
10 learned important facts like, to cite an example, every
11 morning when I come to work, I drive past two hospitals and
12 the county prison. I never imagined we would have to
13 evacuate an entire hospital or anything of that nature. We
14 were shocked into reality and so forth.

15 There are other things of that nature in there that you
16 see everyday and don't think about. This document will give
17 us a good basic building block for our next plan we will
18 come up with. It will probably be in more intelligent order
19 than this particular document is in also. This document
20 covers just about everything, but it is not perhaps in the
21 best of order.

22 Q A plan of this nature -- again, I perhaps ask the
23 question out of ignorance, not having studied the plan in
24 great detail -- how much of the detail here would have had
25 to have been public in an understandable way to the public

rc LRM 1 in order to effectuate the plan?

2 A I think the only things that would have to be made
3 public is, number one, how will you alert the public? For
4 example, we want them to keep listening to their media and
5 the official evacuation word would come in from the
6 Governor's office or the County Commissioner's. So there is
7 notification.

8 And, in my opinion, the only other thing they needed to
9 know was where are they going to? For example, to Centre
10 County. And which routes do they take?

11 I don't think the public has to know there will be a
12 policeman at this corner directing traffic. I would say
13 perhaps 1 or 2 percent of the information contained in that
14 document is really all the public has to be aware of.

15 Q Could the route information have been made
16 available to every member of the public in an intelligible
17 form, and if so, by what mechanism?

18 A Well, number one, yes, it could, and it was. We
19 utilized the radio and television and print media to get the
20 information to the public.

21 After we had things coordinated, we told the local
22 people, for example, if you lived in this municipality, the
23 ultimate destination to arrive at would be Centre County.
24 There was the road they would use. At the local level, they
25 printed that up. We had it printed up in the newspaper,

rc LRW 1 the entire county plan. It was on radio and television.
2 The word was put out.

3 Q How about a municipality the size of Harrisburg,
4 which likely would provide more complication as to who goes
5 where and how?

6 A Basically, it was the same principle. We advised
7 Harrisburg as to where we had shelter facilities available
8 for their people.

9 Once again, that information was printed in the
10 newspaper. Harrisburg, itself, printed the local
11 information as to where they were to go and so forth.
12 Obviously, there would be more problems getting information
13 out to 68,000 people in Harrisburg as opposed to 3000 in
14 Londonderry Township.

15 Q Do you have any criteria for ordering protective
16 measures such as take cover, evacuation, use of potassium
17 iodine or food interdiction or placing cows on store feed,
18 things of that nature?

19 A We rely on, for example, the Department of
20 Agriculture, Bureau of Radiological Protection. We would
21 rely on the state agencies who are much more knowledgeable
22 in that field to provide us with information.

23 For example, the situation is such that we suggest the
24 cows be put inside the barn. We will take the action from
25 there.

rc LRW 1 Q So you see no function at the county level for
2 this kind of --

3 A If the state and Federal Governments, who have the
4 expertise, more resources and things of that nature,
5 available to them, which they do, and if they are using it
6 properly, for the county to do the same thing is reinventing
7 the wheel.

8 We at the county level have a certain role to play in
9 this type of situation. I think ours is basically the
10 evacuation type role, making sure it can be accomplished
11 properly and so forth.

12 I personally don't feel I should get involve with what
13 makes a cow sick or something of that nature.

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rlp 1
LRW

1 Q You stated in testimony before the President's
2 Commission that you could evacuate in six hours in good
3 weather. Was this from a white alert which existed, as I
4 understand it, for a good period of time, or from some other
5 stage of readiness, or does this six hours come from an
6 initiation of an event that needs an immediate evacuation?

7 A I am not familiar with a white alert or anything
8 of that nature. The six hour figure we have always maintained
9 we could evacuate a five-mile zone upon notification that
10 evacuation is to take place -- we felt we could accomplish
11 that task in about six hours.

12 For some reason or another, the number of hours that you
13 can move people in has become extremely important to a lot
14 of people. I think the time frame has to be put in the proper
15 perspective. Assume an incident happened at Three Mile
16 Island and they said we want you to evacuate the five-mile
17 area. We have indicated we can do it in six hours.

18 If we have not accomplished that task in six hours, that
19 doesn't mean we will stop doing it, conditions permitting.
20 A lot of people are losing sight of that. Sometimes the
21 numbers game is a bit ridiculous.

22 Q Thw white alert basically, as I understand it,
23 is a stand-by situation for the state police and National
24 Guard in which the requirement is that they should be able to
25 report to duty within four hours of being notified. Do you

rlp 2
LRW

1 depend to any substantial extent on the state police
2 the National Guard, or would you depend to any substantial
3 extent in the evacuation of the five-mile area within the
4 six-hour time period?

5 A The five-mile area, I don't think the National
6 Guard would play that important a role in. This is because
7 of the fact we have so many other police departments and
8 fire departments in nearby countis that can provide us with
9 the resources for traffic control and notification. Where
10 the National Guard came into play was when we went to a 20-
11 mile zone and I lost half my resources and shelter capabili-
12 ties and things of that nature. The five-mile zone, no,
13 they don't. The state police play an important role in the
14 five-mile plan obviously, but once again, I don't think that
15 if they -- assume they called for extra troops from around
16 the state and so forth, I don't think them showing up two
17 or three hours later would cause us any real great headaches.
18 The five-mile zone strictly was a movement that would take
19 places within the county utilizing mainly resources from
20 the county with some resources from Cumberland County, for
21 example. They could get here in 10 or 15 minutes, for
22 example. When we went to the 10 and 20, that is when we
23 start with the headaches.

24 Q To what extent are good physical communication
25 networks your responsibility?

rlp 3
LRW

1 A Well, we run the police, fire, and ambulance
2 communications for the county. We dispatch all the depart-
3 ments with the exception of the city of Harrisburg and state
4 police. We are responsible for maintaining the communica-
5 tions capabilities in the county.

6 Q So you don't rely upon PEMA in the area of
7 communications. You feel that is your responsibility for
8 the adequacy of county and local communications?

9 A Once again, I think, as a result of the TMI
10 incident, we obviously have need for better communications
11 in some areas. For example, we now realize -- by we, I mean
12 the local governments and county -- realize the importance
13 of having mobile communication with the local directors.
14 So we are making every effort. We filed a grant application
15 to get funds to provide radios at the local level. PEMA
16 is going to have to provide some type of communications
17 capability, mainly two-way capability between there office
18 and our office and perhaps other counties, as a back-up
19 system in case the phone is overloaded or things of that
20 nature. They play a role. Not that big a role.

21 Q What communications exist between you and PEMA
22 or the other state agencies?

23 A It was strictly between PEMA and our office.
24 Obviously, we had the phones. The land line. They have
25 the capability of transmitting on our fire frequency. Those

rlp 4
LRW

1 are the two basic.

2 During the incident, itself, they sent over communica-
3 tions gear on their frequency and so forth. Normally, we
4 don't have that. In addition, a hotline was established --
5 a direct line. We pick it up and it rings at their office.
6 That was established during the incident and disconnected
7 eventually.

8 Q Do you know why that was disconnected or whether
9 that is a good idea?

10 A Well, I would assume part of the problem is the
11 financial end of it. I think it should have remained in
12 existence for the three counties that would be affected by
13 a 5- or 10-mile evacuation, which is Lancaster, Dauphin,
14 and York counties. We should still have that.

15 Q There is a dedicated teletypewriter system, I
16 guess, isn't there?

17 A Right. We have that capability also. That's
18 not the fastest thing in the world by any stretch of the
19 imagination.

20 Q How long did it take to install that dedicated
21 phone line from the time that it was determined -- two
22 questions. When was it determined to be necessary to have
23 that phone, and how long did it take to install it?

24 A That decision was made at the state level, to
25 install the phone. The time frame -- this would be based

rlp 5
LRW

1 on -- we had extra phones installed. We usually had about
2 a day's wait. If we asked for something on Saturday, they
3 were in on Sunday to put it in. Normally about a day
4 waiting period. It could have been shorter. The decision
5 to install the phone was made from PEMA.

6 Q You don't recall how long it took to have it --

7 A No. All I knew is one day this phone appeared
8 on my desk.

9 Q Do you know how long it might take to reinstall
10 it? I guess now there must be some wiring or something in
11 place in the county office.

12 A I would assume it could be done in a matter of
13 hours. I can't say specifically.

14 Q How about communications between you and the
15 other counties?

16 A We share fire frequencies with Lancaster, York,
17 and Lebanon counties.

18 So we have that two-way capability with them. We
19 cross with Cumberland County. We are on different frequencies
20 but monitor each others frequency. We have that capability
21 to cross talk. We utilized that a couple of times during
22 the situation.

23 Q You indicated, I think, a rumor control phone
24 was -- you had indicated sometime that a rumor control phone
25 was installed. Was this a special dedicated line or a special

LRW

1 phone number or something that was advertised over the
2 media?

3 A Yes. It was a separate phone. We were getting
4 an enormous amount of calls on our regular lines. We did
5 want to answer the questions, because one of our functions
6 during this thing was to act as a calming factor for the
7 residents of the county. We felt if we set up a special
8 phone, it would take the load off our emergency lines and,
9 number two, if we called it a rumor control phone, it would
10 have a better effect on the public. So that was set up in
11 our emergency operations center.

12 Mr. Perry, who is the head of the county detectives,
13 who was assisting us, said he had taken it over and he made
14 provisions to have it manned 24 hours a day and utilized
15 senior citizens.

16 Q To what extent were you hampered in your job,
17 or perhaps in your job in the broadest sense, your understand-
18 ing, the understanding of the local people, and perhaps the
19 understanding of the people, by lack of understanding of the
20 jargon related to radiological matters or by lack of under-
21 standing of the meaning of certain terms regarding plant
22 systems or plant operations, things of that nature.

23 In other words, the technical nature of the TMI accident.

24 A We were too darn busy over Friday, Saturday,
25 and Sunday really to worry too much about technical jargon.

rlp 7
LRW

1 I don't think it really hampered us in achieving our main
2 goal, which was coming up with an evacuation plan for a
3 20-mile area. I do note there were times we were asked
4 technical questions and we referred them to the Bureau
5 of Radiological Health and so forth. It was a time-consuming
6 type thing for some of my staff members, but it didn't
7 really hamper us in any way.

8 I didn't think then, and I still don't think now, that
9 we need an engineer's knowledge of how a nuclear power plant
10 operates. We all, by now, have a basic idea of how it
11 operates. I just don't feel that we have to have a detailed
12 knowledge of the workings of a nuclear power plant.

end ✓

1 Q Is there anything you perceive that could have been
2 done in this area of communications that would have made either
3 your job somewhat easier or perhaps might have done a better
4 job in informing the public of what the true situation
5 was, realizing there was a lack of understanding among all
6 people about what the actual situation was from time to time?

7 A We got reports from the state over the teletype
8 system. They finally started getting into sending us reports.
9 They covered three areas. Basically the weather, operations
10 was the second area, and I don't recall off the top of my head
11 what the third area was.

12 Anyway, basically, the word we were getting as far as
13 what was going on at the plant was conditions are stable. No
14 change. Which means absolutely nothing. Which is one of the
15 things we were complaining about. Our county and other
16 counties.

17 Then it got to the point where I think on April 8, we
18 got a teletype which pertained to events of the 6th and 7th
19 of April which talked about the thermocouple and the IWGT and
20 other things I can't even remember. So we went from one
21 extreme to the other.

22 What would have been helpful then, and would be helpful
23 now -- I have talked to the state people -- is that we come
24 up with some type of format. Basically, what the format should
25 say -- this is just my opinion. Obviously everybody else will

1 have an opinion -- number one, everybody knows there is a core
2 in a nuclear reactor. The worst thing that can happen is it
3 gets uncovered. Number one, is it covered? Yes or no.

4 Number two, is there any leakage going on? If there is,
5 how much? What danger does it present? I think those
6 are two very simple things that basically are yes or no questions.
7 That would have been extremely helpful.

8 I didn't care what IWGT waste tank was doing or whatever,
9 but I was curious about whether that core was uncovered or
10 not.

11 I think, in the future, we have to come up with a standard
12 form that obviously can be utilized anywhere in the country,
13 but that can be readily understood by the emergency people
14 and the general public.

15 I think too much was foisted upon them during this particular
16 incident. The news media kept asking questions about the
17 different systems and all sorts of questions. I think the
18 public was trying to digest as much as they could. I still
19 don't know whether that was good or bad.

20 Q Perhaps one of the problems in that area might be
21 that if one says a core is uncovered, there can be various
22 degrees of uncoverage or various consequences, and if there are
23 releases, there can be various degrees of future potential.

24 A As I indicated before, when I cited those two things
25 as basically a yes or no situation, that was an oversimplification.

1 I am aware of that fact.

2 To me, those are the two most important things that
3 people really want to know. The average person knows that
4 that core must be covered to keep it safe. Obviously, there
5 are degrees. That is why I say those two were my personal
6 opinion.

7 I am sure other experts would have their input. But I
8 am sure we could and we must come out with some intelligent,
9 simple format.

10 Q I think we have probably covered most of this question.
11 The question was: How could PEMA have improved communications
12 with you? You did indicate that perhaps better physical
13 communications might have helped. Are there any other areas
14 where PEMA could have improved?

15 A Once again, when you talk communications, some people
16 interpret it as a radio system. Other people interpret it
17 talking back and forth, flow of information. In terms of
18 flow of information, at no time did we have any trouble with
19 the state agency.

20 Any time we requested assistance from them in terms of
21 additional manpower or things of that nature, or any time
22 they needed information, the communications channel remained
23 open. The only problem I ran into there -- I am talking in
24 the verbal sense -- was we would get calls from the general
25 public about a situation that occurred down at the plant.

1 We weren't made aware of statements made at press conferences
2 and so forth.

3 In a lot of cases, we weren't made aware of it. That, I
4 guess, was beaten to death in time. The problem has been
5 addressed. I understand that it has been pretty much
6 straightened out.

7 Q In the area of communications, when was the governor's
8 advisory to remain indoors lifted? Do you recall?

9 A I think it was Friday, around noon time. Somewhere
10 in that particular area a teletype was sent out. I don't
11 have the teletype with me in view of the fact that the
12 accident happened several months ago.

13 Q We are aware of that teletype. This was sent out
14 by PEMA.

15 A Yes.

16 Q Were you aware of any of the governor's announcements
17 made at about that time, around noon, regarding the take-
18 cover action? Regarding the possible lifting of the take-
19 cover action?

20 A I honestly don't recall.

21 Q So to the best of your knowledge, the take-cover
22 advisory was lifted at noon officially?

23 A To the best that I can recollect.

24 Q How was Dauphin County or yourself or whoever was
25 advised, advised of the governor's advisory to evacuate women

1 and children? Or pregnant women and small children?

2 A I don't remember specifically. I believe there was
3 a teletype involved and I think there was a telephone
4 conversation -- not with me but with a member of my staff --
5 because on Friday morning, we did have the Red Cross people
6 and that is when we made the decision to open up the shelter
7 at Hershey.

8 Who specifically got the phone call, I don't remember. We
9 were extremely busy on Friday morning.

10 Q Can you order roads closed or made one way? If not,
11 who can and what kind of concurrence is required?

12 A In an emergency situation -- I don't think it has
13 to be a declared emergency -- the local officials can take
14 whatever action is necessary to provide for the health, safety,
15 and welfare of the residents of the municipality.

16 What that means is, although it doesn't say anywhere in writ-
17 ing you can close a road, you can.

18 Q That is any kind of a road?

19 A This has been brought up in past emergency situations.
20 If it is a state highway, can the local people close it?
21 That is something you discuss after you close the road, if you
22 think it is necessary. If someone wants to be childish, well,
23 that is a shame.

24 Q How about the turnpike?

25 A You get involved in a whole different ball game there.

jc 6

1 That obviously goes across the state. I am talking about
2 something that runs through Middletown or Steelton or
3 something of that nature.

4 Obviously, closing the turnpike would be a state decision.

5 Q Do you know who turned on the county civil defense
6 siren at 10:00 o'clock and why?

7 A In one book that was printed since the incident,
8 I think we have been credited for that. I was specifically
9 named. We have the capability of activating all the
10 sirens in the county at the emergency operations center.

11 We normally use it on a day-to-day basis for police and
12 fire calls. When a siren goes off, if we have not activated
13 it, we can tell if it is on our system or not because we have
14 a cancel button that sends out tones that shuts the siren down.

15 I think the siren in question was located on state property
16 and it can only be activated from the state capitol complex.

17 I understand from one of the guards up there, but I am not
18 positive, when we heard it was going off, we were obviously
19 called. We hit our cancel buttons. It didn't cancel the siren
20 out. There was no way we could have activated it. The same
21 goes for the other sirens that went off in the city of Harrisburg
22 on two other occasions. We will not take credit for any of
23 those activations.

24 MR. ERNST: Off the record.

25 (Discussion off the record.)

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end 6

MR. ERNST: Back on the record.

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LRWros 1

BY MR. ERNST:

2 Q That concludes my list of specific questions
3 regarding this deposition.

4 We would be interested if you have anything else that you
5 would like to state for the record regarding any aspect of
6 TMI emergency response that might help our inquiry and might
7 focus on some of the more problems, or perhaps some of the
8 more important solutions that might be of benefit to anyone
9 else in the future that might have to go through this kind
10 of a problem.

11 A Okay. First of all, to talk about the
12 communications; we didn't discuss this earlier, but to me
13 it's important. We have a monitor in our emergency
14 operations center on the utilities frequency down at the
15 control room, down at the unit one control room. And they,
16 in turn, monitor our fire frequency. Unfortunately, the
17 system was not working perfectly when the accident
18 occurred. We moved antennas and have taken steps since
19 then.

20 That's another backup communications capability that gave
21 us with the facility. I wanted to bring that out. A lot of
22 people aren't aware of that.

23 As far as problems that we faced, our biggest problem --
24 not to beat the horse to death -- was the fact of the press
25 conferences being called and the information being given

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LRWros 1 out by Mr. Denton and the governor pertaining to the
2 situation at Three Mile Island. It caused us enormous
3 headaches.

4 We weren't told that the press conferences were being
5 held so we could have listened to them on the radio or
6 anything of that nature. We had no idea what was going on.
7 We would get calls from the general public that, this was
8 said at a press conference. Can you confirm or deny it? We
9 were in no position to. It hurt our credibility.

10 In many cases we called the state agency, PEMA, and said
11 we got a call on this. Can you confirm it? They hadn't
12 heard it either.

13 We had a chain of command for flow of information and
14 requests for assistance and so forth. If everybody played
15 by the rules, an enormous amount of headaches and
16 unnecessary grief would have been saved on our part and on
17 the part of the residents of the county.

18 The news media, the local media, acted quite responsibly
19 during this particular event. To the best of our knowledge
20 -- we didn't have much time to listen to the radio and
21 television and read the papers -- but from what we heard the
22 local media provided factual information about what was
23 going on down at the plant and in the county and so forth.
24 That was a great help.

25 The national news media, from what little I saw, and what

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LRWros 1 I have heard since then and read since then, they had better
2 do a pretty darn good review of themselves about the way
3 they report an incident of this nature, and understand that
4 what they say in Washington or New York has a huge impact on
5 the residents of an effected area.

6 They better examine their role a little bit more
7 closely. Their reporting left an awful lot to be desired.

8 Federal officials in Washington have to be careful of
9 what they do also. We heard one report that an NRC official
10 had made a statement that X number of thousands of people
11 were going to die if the core melted down, or something of
12 that nature. We heard this report came out of Washington.
13 From what I have found out later on, whether this is factual
14 or not I don't know. Nobody told me it's not.

15 Apparently there were officials in Washington and other
16 areas that were coming up with different scenerios. If this
17 were to happen, this is what would happen, and so forth.

18 Apparently a couple of times that information was given
19 to the media. The media would just come out with a
20 statement that an NRC official said boom, X number of people
21 will die or be injured or this, that, and the other thing.

22 The impact that had on the people in our area who we were
23 trying to keep calm was very, very negative. We were so
24 irate we called the White House and demanded and did receive
25 an apology, and asked if they could control as far as

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LRWros 1 statements made to the media.

2 They weren't being made maliciously, I understand that,
3 but they certainly weren't using their heads as far as we
4 were concerned.

5 We learned an awful lot of things during this particular
6 event that we had at the county level. Our operations
7 initially weren't the smoothest in the world, so we learned
8 that we obviously had quite a way to go in better preparing
9 ourselves to keep with this large a situation.

10 We have taken efforts to improve our capability and
11 performance during this type of incident. There was renewed
12 interest in emergency planning at the local level as a
13 result of the Three Mile Island interest. A renewed
14 interest interest on the part of the local directors, who we
15 have been trying to get to do something over the past
16 several years. An awakening on the part of a lot of local
17 government officials that never cared before. So there have
18 been quite a few benefits.

19 Another thing that we became quite concerned about: the
20 word panic -- this to me is important for future problems
21 that might occur -- was thrown around too much to the news
22 media by officials both at the state and federal level, and
23 even in some cases at the local levels.

24 There was no panic in this area. There just wasn't.
25 Probably some individual cases, but there just was no

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LKWros 1 panic.

2 We were upset that this word was being thrown out so much
3 that after a while if you tell somebody something for so
4 long they start to believe it. We were quite concerned that
5 the people were going to say, "They are telling me I
6 shouldn't panic. They have been saying it for three days
7 now. Obviously there is some reason why I should."

8 I guess it goes back to what I said before about the
9 people that are in a position to make statements have just
10 got to be darn careful and consider their implications. It
11 can cause an awful lot of problems.

12 That is basically about all I can think of. In the past,
13 I said probably 12,000 other things before different
14 committees. I remember some and forget others. I think
15 those are the main points I want to bring up now.

16 Q Thank you.

17 I had a couple of residuals, I guess.

18 Do you know, or has there been any study performed, from
19 whatever source, about how many people left the Dauphin
20 County area?

21 A During the incident -- I believe it was Saturday
22 night -- we asked our local directors to do a survey of
23 their community to give us an approximate number of people
24 that had evacuated the area. Our figure that we came up
25 with in the 20 mile zone just in our county alone was

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LRWros 1 about 45 to 50 percent of the population. That was a little
2 over 200,000 is the population figure for the 20 mile zone.

3 There was a study done by Elizabethtown College, located
4 in Elizabethtown in Lancaster County and it basically
5 supported the figure we had. I think their figures showed
6 it was between 40 and 45 percent that left. Our figures
7 were pretty accurate.

8 An interesting statistic, very unscientific mind you, but
9 interesting nonetheless: from noontime on Friday, which was
10 the 31st -- the 30th of March -- until Sunday at noontime,
11 we checked our records to see how many traffic accidents we
12 had. This was the time frame we felt that most of the
13 movement occurred. There were a total of 12 accidents that
14 we dispatched. Vehicular accidents. Five involving
15 injuries.

57 16 We took the same time frame about two months later and
17 that particular weekend we had 18 accidents. That was under
18 a normal weekend without this huge movement of people.

19 We went to a couple of months prior to the accident
20 during the winter months, once again the same time frame,
21 noon Friday to midnight Sunday, and there were only 12
22 accidents that weekend.

23 So I think that very unscientifically proves our point
24 that there was no mass panic and so forth.

25

1 Q The study, was that made during the weekend -- was
2 the survey made during the weekend or during the week where you
3 came up with this roughly 50 percent?

4 A As I say, we asked the directors, I believe, on
5 Saturday night or sometime Sunday, it was one of those days,
6 I don't remember specifically, how many people left the area.

7 We wanted to know for several reasons. Number one, obviously
8 the more people that left, the easier our task was. This
9 way we would know if we needed any extra National Guard troops
10 or things of that nature.

11 Q So your survey in essence was made on a Saturday-
12 Sunday time frame?

13 A Right?

14 Q And by what, knocking on doors, that kind of thing?

15 A We asked the local directors to do the survey.
16 Exactly how they did it, I am not sure. It might have been
17 their best guess based on just driving around town or looking
18 at the amount of traffic flowing out. The figures were
19 pretty much borne out by the study that was done by
20 Elizabethtown College.

21 Q You mentioned that you called the White House,
22 as I recall. I don't recall the name of the person or whether
23 he was ever identified.

24 Do you know who did call the White House?

25 A Yes. I made the phone call. My commissioner, John

1 Minnich was there with me when I called. We weren't allowed
2 to talk to the President, but got hold of a gentleman named
3 Gene Eidenberg with the President's staff.

4 Q You did call or the commissioner --

5 A I placed the phone call. After I talked to Mr.
6 Eidenberg, the commissioner took over the conversation.

7 Q I also understand there was a call Saturday night
8 or something like that to the lieutenant governor's office.
9 I think it may be on the record, but I am not sure who made
10 that call.

11 A Friday night or late Saturday night, I think it was,
12 we tried to call the governor's office. Senator George Gekas
13 and Jeff Piccola were in my office. We discussed the
14 fact we weren't getting sufficient information. They called
15 the governor's office. They couldn't get through to him.
16 They called the lieutenant governor's office. He was too
17 busy at the time to talk. They were informed that if we
18 weren't contacted by somebody, that we were going to evacuate
19 our county by 9:00 o'clock the next morning.

20 At 2:00 o'clock that morning I received a phone call
21 personally from the lieutenant governor and then he came and
22 visited the EOC that day.

23 MR. ERNST: Questions?

24 MR. SCHAMBERGER: I have one question.

1 BY MR. SCHAMBERGER:

2 Q In relation to your comment about radiological
3 monitoring, you indicated the county did virtually none.
4 Some of the locals did some.

5 Do your plans have any mechanism for utilizing any data
6 that the locals or the county might take under perhaps different
7 circumstances?

8 Is there a mechanism for feeding the information, for
9 example?

10 A The chain of command -- we would feed information
11 to the State Emergency Management Agency. They would feed it
12 to --

13 Q No question you can. Do you have any plans to do so
14 at any time under any circumstances?

15 A We are in the process of getting a radiological
16 defense office structure in the county. There was renewed
17 interest at the local levels as far as having classes and so
18 forth.

19 There has been a push in this area. Once we get trained
20 people and so forth, we obviously will come up with plans as
21 to how to handle the information they come up with and things
22 of that nature. We don't have it right now.

23 BY MR. HERR:

24 Q Let me ask one clarification question. This is on the
25 advisories on Friday morning March 30. About 10:00 o'clock,

1 the governor advised people to stay indoors. About noon the
2 governor advised pregnant women and small children to evacuate.

3 Was Dauphin County notified before these advisories were
4 made public by the governor in the news conferences that this
5 action was about to be taken so you could begin your
6 preparations, or were you notified again by the ringing
7 telephones from the public?

8 A To the best of my knowledge, at one point in time
9 we received a phone call concerning the pregnant women and
10 preschool children. Whether it was prior to or after the
11 press conference, I don't remember. I didn't have an
12 opportunity to listen to the radio Friday morning.

13 Once again, I had absolutely no idea of what the governor
14 was doing. I do recall a teletype coming in. It sticks in my
15 mind we were aware of certain things prior to the teletype
16 coming in.

17 Q This wasn't a case where you were starting to get
18 calls from pregnant women saying where should I go and you
19 were saying what are you talking about?

20 A We were getting calls from pregnant women on
21 Thursday, after Dr. Sternglass went on the local radio
22 station and advised pregnant women and preschool children to
23 evacuate on Thursday afternoon.

24 We were getting calls from pregnant women as early as
25 Thursday afternoon. Had there been a lot of calls from

1 pregnant women on Friday morning, it probably would not have
2 struck us as being that strange.

3 BY MR. ERNST:

4 Q In conclusion, let me say this is an ongoing
5 investigation. Although I have completed the questions I
6 have for you today, it is possible we may need to ask questions
7 in the future.

8 We will, however, make every effort to avoid having to do
9 so. I will now recess this deposition rather than terminate
10 it, but I do wish to thank you very much for your time and
11 effort in being here today. Thank you.

xxx

12 (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the taking of the
13 deposition was concluded.)

and 8

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