315-342-3840

8004290 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: 1 0 3 10 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 -CON'T SOURCE L 6 0 5 10 10 10 13 13 7 0 13 2 7 8 10 8 0 4 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) Visual inspection of more than 6000 electrical fire seals required by TS 4.12.F revealed 350 seals missing or requiring resealing. No significant hazard existed. See attachment for details. 0 | 6 0 6 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE VALVE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE 18 REVISION REPORT SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE LER RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO. 0 3 0 10 NUMBER PRIME COMP. COMPONENT HOURS (22) SUPPLIER FORM SUB. 18 Z Z (21) LY 23 N (24) Z 19 19 19 0 0 0 0 0 1 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27 Initial installation missing in most cases. Fire watch was stationed until new seals were installed. No additional action required. See attachment for details. METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) % POWER B (31) Surveillance Test 80 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) TYPE NUMBER PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION Z (42) PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45 SSUED N (44) NA 69

W Verne Childs

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 80-030/03L-0

Page 1 of 1

During normal operation while conducting operations surveillance test F-ST-76L, titled "Electrical Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Visual Inspection," to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specifications Paragraph 4.12.F, 350 fire barrier penetration seals were found to be either missing or requiring resealing. The actual inspection of the more than 6000 penetrations and corrective action extended over a period of several weeks. In each case, as the need for resealing of a penetration was identified, the personnel performing the inspection acted as the fire watch required by Technical Specifications, until the corrective action was complete. The event did not represent a significant hazard to the public health and safety.

A review of documentation related to the requirements for sealing of electrical penetrations indicates that sealing was not required by the NRC at the time the operating license was issued. Subsequent to the issue of the operating license, and following the 1975 fire at the Browns Ferry Plant, a procedure for sealing penetrations was developed and implemented. It is believed that during this post-construction installation, the above noted missing seals were not properly installed. In most cases the missing seals were not located directly at the fire barrier (wall or floor) but were located a number of feet from the penetration at the end of an electrical conduit which penetrates the fire barrier and travels some distance beyond to a termination adjacent to a cable tray. This physical separation probably resulted in the installation error. Since the inspection is now complete and the seals installed, no additional corrective action is required.