

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	V	A	N	A	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
LICENSEE CODE						LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE					CAT	58					

01	L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	3	8	7	0	3	3	0	8	0	8	0	4	2	5	8	0	9	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE					REPORT DATE									

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | On March 30, 1980, during the performance of a Unit 2 preoperational test, the

03 | control room bottled air system (shared with Unit 1) was inadvertently actuated

04 | and the pressure depleted below the Technical Specification limit of 2300 psig.

05 | Since the bottled air system was recharged and restored to operable status within

06 | the 7 day ACTION statement of T.S. 3.7.7.1, the health and safety of the control

07 | room personnel and the general public were not affected. This event is reportable

08 | pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

09	S	G	11	D	12	Z	13	V	A	L	V	E	X	14	F	15	D	16				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25				
SYSTEM CODE			CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE					COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE								
17	8	0	21	22	0	3	6	23	0	3	27	L	30	0	32							
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.			OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.											
18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	22	Y	23	N	24	A	25	X	9	9	9	26
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS			ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRO-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER					

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | The air banks depressurized because the test procedure did not instruct the

11 | performer to manually isolate the system prior to initiating the SI signal nor

12 | did it mention to reset the automatic dump valve SOV's upon reset of the SI signal.

13 | Corrective action was to recharge the bottled air system to its required Technical

14 | Specification limit within the allowed time of the appropriate ACTION statement.

15	E	28	1	0	0	29	NA	30	A	31	Operator Observation	32		
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19		
FACILITY STATUS		% POWER			OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY					DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
16	Z	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36	NA	37	NA	38		
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		PERSONNEL EXPOSURES			LOCATION / USE							
17	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39						
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION										
18	0	0	0	40	NA	41								
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER		DESCRIPTION												
19	Z	42	NA	43										
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE		DESCRIPTION												
20	N	44	NA	45										
ISSUED PUBLICITY		DESCRIPTION												

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit #1
Docket No. 50-338
Report No. LER 80-36/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 1

Description of Event

On March 30, 1980, with the unit at 100% power, the control room bottled air system (shared with Unit 2) was inadvertently actuated and depressurized below the Technical Specification limit of 2300 psig when a Safety Injection Signal was initiated during the performance of a preoperational test on Unit 2. This event is contrary to T.S. 4.7.7.2.a and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The purpose of the control room bottled air system is to provide compressed dry air for pressurization and occupant breathing during emergency situations. With insufficient air pressure present, the system would be unable to maintain the control room and relay rooms at a positive interior pressure to assure outward leakage when the outside air is contaminated. Because the air banks were immediately recharged and the system was restored to operable status within the 7 day time limit allowed by the ACTION statement of T.S. 3.7.7.1, the health and safety of the control room personnel and the general public were not affected. There are no generic implications associated with this event.

Cause of Event

The bottled air system was depressurized as a result of a defective Unit 2 test procedure. The procedure in question called for the initiation of a Safety Injection Signal; however, did not instruct the performer to isolate the bottled air system prior to initiation of the signal nor did it instruct him to reset the automatic dump valve control SOV's following the reset of the initiated SI Signal.

Immediate Corrective Action

The bottled air pressurization system was recharged to its required Technical Specification limit within the time allowance of the appropriate ACTION statement.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No scheduled Corrective Action is required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Because the Unit 2 procedure is a preoperational test which is to be performed only once, no further actions are required.