

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | 0 | H | D | B | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | N | P | F | - | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | - | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 9

02 | (NP-33-80-11) On 1/16/80 at 0900 hours during the performance of ST 5\16.11, a gap was
03 | found around a 1 1/2" conduit which penetrated a fire wall. On 1/19/80 a 4" hole with a
04 | 2" conduit was found in the south wall of #2 electrical penetration room. On 2/11/80
05 | a gap was found in a wall where five 2" conduits go from the #2 electrical penetrator
05 | room to the cable spreading room. A gap was also found around the ventilation duct
07 | from Room 603A to the turbine room. The action statement of T.S. 3.7.10 was entered
08 | until the holes were temporarily sealed. Fire detection devices were operable.

09 | A B 11 D 12 Z 13 Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 Z 15 Z 16
17 | 8 0 0 0 8 Y 3 L 1

18 | H G 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9 26

10 | The cause of these occurrences can be attributed to a procedural deficiency which did
11 | not address the temporary sealing of holes or the gap around the conduit through a
12 | hole, especially if the conduit or pipe is not installed immediately after the core
13 | drill is completed. The holes were temporarily sealed with Kao-wool. A memo was
14 | issued warning against breaching of fire barriers. Procedures have been modified.

15 | E 28 1 0 0 29 NA 30 B 31 test observation 32

16 | Z 33 Z 34 NA 35 NA 36

17 | 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 39

18 | 0 0 0 40 NA 41

19 | Z 42 NA 43

20 | N 44 NA 45

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-11

DATE OF EVENT: January 16, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Pipe and conduit penetrations through fire barriers not sealed properly.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2772, and Load (Gross MWE) = 920.

Description of Occurrence: On January 16, 1980 at 0900 hours during the performance of ST 5016.11, Fire Protection System Barrier Surveillance Test, test personnel found a gap around a 1½" conduit which penetrated a fire wall above the normal entrance to Room 236. The space should have been sealed with grout or silicone sealant or temporarily sealed with Kao-wool. This placed the unit in violation of Technical Specification 3.7.10 which requires all penetration barriers protecting safety related areas be functional at all times. A fire watch was established per the action statement until the penetration was temporarily sealed with Kao-wool.

On January 19, 1980 at 1120 hours, test personnel discovered a 4" hole with a 2" conduit in it through the south wall of the #2 electrical penetration room. The gap was immediately packed with Kao-wool, and thus no fire watch was established.

On February 11, 1980 at 1550 hours, test personnel found a gap in the wall where five 2" conduits go from the #2 electrical penetration room to the cable spreading room. Also found was a 6" gap around a ventilation duct going from the control room records and storage area (Room 603A) to the turbine room. A fire watch was established until the openings were sealed with Kao-wool.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the first occurrence was procedure deficiencies in that the appropriate procedures did not address the temporary replacing of seals after conduit or pipe installation especially if the conduit or pipe is not installed immediately after the core drill is completed.

The cause of the second and third occurrences was improper initial installation by construction personnel.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The fire detection devices in the rooms would have provided early warning of fires in their areas.

Corrective Action: A memo was issued to all station personnel warning against breaching of fire barriers. The applicable maintenance instruction (MI-M-87) has been modified to address the described deficiencies. ST 5016.11, Fire Protection System Barrier Surveillance Test was completed February 20, 1980.

LER #80-008

A new procedure ST 5016.13, Visual Inspection of Fire Barrier Penetrations, has been written. It will provide for inspecting all new fire barrier penetrations as well as any old penetrations that have been worked on and resealed and now require reinspection. It will be attached to all maintenance work orders which involve the above. This procedure will also be used to update the list of penetrations for ST 5016.11, the Fire Barrier Penetration 18 Month Test.

Failure Data: There have been three similar reportable occurrences, see Licensee Event Reprints NP-33-78-137, NP-33-79-61, and NP-33-79-63.

LER #80-008