



HELPING BUILD ARKANSAS

ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

9TH & LOUISIANA STREETS • LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72203 • (501) 372-4311

August 14, 1974

United States Atomic Energy Commission
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region II
230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. Norman Moseley
Director

Subject: Arkansas Power & Light Company
Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 1
License No. DPR-51
RO:II:MSK
50-313/74-10

Gentlemen:

We have reviewed your report dated July 23, 1974, and the following is our position on violations cited in that report:

I.A.1.a "Procedure Review of Special Processes"

We have brought this to the attention of the Quality Control Engineer, Technical Support Engineer, and the Plant Safety Committee. We are now fully aware of the requirements. In the future, all procedures covered by procedure 1004.07, "Control of Special Processes," will be reviewed by cognizant supervisors as per 1004.07 before getting final approval by the Plant Superintendent for implementation. Therefore, we do not foresee a recurrence of this type of problem in the future. Procedure 1701.01, "Repair of Incore Instrument Tubes," has now been reviewed by the Quality Control Engineer and Technical Support Engineer and no deficiencies have been noted.

I.A.1.c "Failure to Log Significant Annunciations"

As per a new revision to 1005.01, "Administrative Control Manual," Section 6.1.5.C.1.f.7, only those annunciations determined to be significant by a licensed operator will be logged in the Station Log.

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August 14, 1974


The reactor building evacuation alarm that occurred twice as mentioned in Details II, Paragraph 3(c) was caused by spurious radiation alarms and did not involve personnel evacuation. Any annunciators caused by spurious alarms are not logged. As such, these two RB evacuation alarms were not logged.

This violation has been brought to the attention of the Operations Supervisor and other cognizant personnel and we do not foresee a recurrence of this type of problem in the future.

I.A.2.b "Failure to document inspection of socks placed over the ends of incore tube nozzles to catch cuttings during flushing"

At the time we felt that no useful analysis could be made of the cuttings contained by these socks; that is, there was not a way to correlate the shavings in the sock with metal taken off in the core. However, we are aware of this generic requirement, and in the future we will comply with this requirement.

Very truly yours,



J. D. Phillips
Senior Vice President

JDP:lt