



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
631 PARK AVENUE  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

April 2, 1980

Docket No. 50-334

Duquesne Light Company  
ATTN: Mr. C. N. Dunn  
Vice President  
Operations Division  
435 Sixth Avenue  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-13, "General Electric Type SBM Control Switches - Defective CAM Followers," is forwarded to you for information. No written response is required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

*Robert V. Grier*  
Boyce H. Grier  
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Information Notice No. 80-13
2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

CONTACT: S. D. Ebnetter  
(215-337-5296)

cc w/encls:

- F. Bissert, Technical Assistant Nuclear
- R. Washabaugh, QA Manager
- J. Werling, Station Superintendent
- G. Moore, General Superintendent, Power Stations Department
- J. J. Carey, Director of Nuclear Operations
- R. Martin, Nuclear Engineer
- J. Sieber, Superintendent of Licensing and Compliance, BVPS

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ENCLOSURE 1

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SSINS No.: 6870  
Accession No.:  
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DUPLICATE

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Date: April 2, 1980  
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GENERAL ELECTRIC TYPE SBM CONTROL SWITCHES DEFECTIVE CAM FOLLOWERS

Description of Circumstances:

This Information Notice alerts licensees and holders of construction permits of a potential defect in the cam followers of General Electric (GE) Type SBM control switches. Based on preliminary information, it appears that the defect is limited to switches manufactured prior to 1976 with cam followers of polycarbonate material, such as Lexan. In brief, the problem is initiated by exposing such polycarbonate material to hydrocarbons. Such exposure leads to severe cracking having a rock salt appearance which ultimately could progress to mechanical failure. It has been determined that such exposure has occurred during fabrication and could occur while performing maintenance (e.g. cleaning the contacts).

On February 22 and March 10, 1980 we were informed that SBM switches with defective cam followers had been found at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 and at the Cooper Station, respectively. Although the information was preliminary and sketchy, the problem is a long-standing one for which GE has issued "Service Information Letters" to its BWR customers. The problems associated with such switches, however, are not restricted to GE customers as evidenced by the Diablo Canyon case. Furthermore, these switches have a broad range of application. For example, the defective switches at the Cooper Station were used principally as hand control switches, most of which were located in the control room. In contrast, those at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 were used as auxiliary contacts on the 4KV and 12KV "Magna Blast" circuit breakers, with three SBM switches used per breaker: (1) a breaker mounted auxiliary switch, (2) a cell mounted auxiliary switch, and (3) a cell interlock switch.

This information is provided as notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

ENCLOSURE 2

IE Information Notice No. 80-13  
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RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Notice No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued to
80-02	8X8R Water Rod Lower End Plug Wear	1/25/80	All BWR Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
80-03	Main Turbine Electro-hydraulic Control System	1/31/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-04	BWR Fuel Exposure in Excess of Limits	2/4/80	All BWR Facilities with an OL or CP
80-05	Chloride Contamination of Safety Related Piping and Components	2/8/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP and applicants for a CP
80-06	Notification of Significant Events	2/27/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL and applicants for OL
80-07	Pump Fatigue Cracking	2/29/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-08	The States Company Sliding Link Electrical Terminal Block	3/7/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-09	Possible Occupational Health Hazard Associated with Closed Cooling Systems for Operating Power Plants	3/7/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-10	Partial Loss of Non-Nuclear Instrument System Power Supply During Operation	3/7/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-11	Generic Problems With ASCO Valves in Nuclear Applications including Fire Protection Systems	3/14/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP, Fuel Fabrication and Processing Facilities
80-12	Instrument Failure Causes Opening of PORV and Block Valve	3/31/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP