

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/80-01

Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Licensee: Toledo Edison Company  
Edison Plaza,  
300 Madison Avenue  
Toledo, Ohio 43652

Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1

Inspection At: Oak Harbor, OH

Inspection Conducted: January 2-4, 7-11, 14-18, 21-25, 29-31,  
February 1, 1980

Inspector: *RFW for*  
L. A. Reyes

2-20-80

Approved By: *RFWarrick For*  
T. N. Tambling, Acting  
Chief, Reactor Projects  
Section 2-2

2-20-80

Inspection Summary

Inspection on January 2-4, 7-11, 14-18, 21-25, 29-31, February 1, 1980  
(Report No. 50-346/80-01)

Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection of follow up on previous inspection findings, plant operations, physical protection (security organization, physical barriers, access control, communications), follow up of licensee event reports, follow up of IE Bulletins, follow up of IE Circulars and General Station Training. The inspection involved 185 inspector-hours onsite by the Resident Inspector.

Results: Of the ten areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were found in nine areas; one item of apparent noncompliance was identified in the other area (deficiency-improper switch lineup in the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System-Paragraph 3).

8004100022

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

T. Murray, Station Superintendent  
\*B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent  
\*P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer  
S. Quennoz, Technical Engineer  
\*D. Miller, Operations Engineer  
D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist  
J. Hickey, Training Supervisor  
L. Simon, Operations Supervisor  
C. Daft, Operations QA Manager  
G. Grime, Nuclear Security Manager  
\*D. Hoffman, Administrative Coordinator

\*Denotes those present at the exit interview on February 1, 1980.

The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and health physics staff.

### 2. Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-346/79-28-02). The inspector reviewed the revised procedure, "Steam Generator Tube Leak," EP1202.57 and determined that appropriate evidence has been included to; 1) determine under what conditions to activate the Emergency Plan, 2) to minimize releases during cooldown, 3) to establish radiation monitoring requirements, 4) to establish the frequency of grab samples and 5) to quantify release rate from various turbine building paths and safety valves.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-346/79-29-01). The flow sensing lines were backfilled to insure no gases were trapped in the tubing or in the gentile internals. The loop 2 flow gentile tube was examined by a B&W technical representative with the aid of a boroscope but no obvious defects were noted. An accurate secondary system heat balance was performed and the following flow information was acquired:

Dates	Power Level %	Indicated Flow GPM	Actual Flow GPM
1/8/80	72.77	400,189	406,832
1/10/80	99.83	398,500	402,268

Minimum flow requirements by TS for 4-reactor coolant pump operation is 396,880 GPM.

The procedure for filling and venting the RCS, SP1103.02, was revised to provide instructions to backfill the flow sensing lines every time the RCS has been drained to prevent the entrapment of gases in the tubing or gentile internals.

### 3. Plant Operations

The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examinations of control room log books, locked valve log book, shift foreman log book, containment purge log, special operating orders, monthly activity log, and jumper and lifted wire logs for the month of January. The inspector observed plant operations during six off-shifts during the month of January. The inspector also made visual observations of the routine surveillance and functional tests in progress during the period. This review was conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and Administrative Procedures.

The inspector conducted a tour of the reactor building and turbine building throughout the period and noted that the monitoring instrumentation was recorded as required, radiation controls were properly established, fluid leaks and pipe vibrations were minimal, seismic restraint oil levels appeared adequate, equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control room records, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness were adequate, and fire hazards were minimal. The inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that plant and component status and problem areas were being turned over to relieving shift personnel.

#### Technical Specification 4.7.7.1

Table 3.7.3 list the safety related snubbers for which the surveillance requirements of TS 4.7.7.1 have to be implemented. Additional hydraulic snubbers have been identified to be safety related but are not included in Table 3.7.3. The licensee has submitted Facility Change Request 80-013 to include the additional hydraulic snubbers in the Technical Specifications. In the interim a list of these snubbers has been distributed to all holders of Technical Specifications with instructions to treat them as T.S. items. NRR Project Manager has been notified of these discrepancies.

#### Technical Specification 4.7.1.2.a

Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 requires the steam generator auxiliary feedwater systems to be operable in Modes 1, 2 and 3. Technical Specification 4.7.1.2.a delineates part of the surveillance requirements to verify the operability of the pumps. These requirements are completed while the Unit is in Mode 4 in order to be able to proceed to Mode 3. While in Mode 4 the steam supply pressure available does not meet the 800 psig requirements of the Technical Specifications. The licensee has submitted Facility Change Request 80-011 to request a change to the Technical Specifications to clarify the surveillance requirements. In the interim the licensee is continuing to perform the surveillance requirements before proceeding to Mode 3 with the steam supply available (approximately 235 psig) and then the test is repeated in Mode 3 as soon as a steam supply pressure of 800 psig is available.

## Control Room Emergency Ventilation System

On January 24, 1980, while conducting a tour of the auxiliary building the inspector found switch HA5261A in cabinet CDE11C in the local position. The inspector also found two additional local/remote switches in the local position. These two additional switches are used as spares at the present time. Switch HA5261A removes control power from the Control Room EVS #1 intake valve when in the local position. This switch lineup would have prevented the operation of the Control Room EVS #1 in the make-up mode from the Control Room. This is an item of noncompliance of the deficiency level.

The inspector noticed that at the time the switch misalignment was identified there were several construction activities being performed by contractor personnel. The switches identified by the inspector are not spring loaded so an inadvertent contact by a person or equipment could have resulted in the misalignment. The licensee is in the process of removing the handles of all local/remote switches until the switches are replaced with spring loaded switches.

No additional noncompliances or deviations were identified.

### 4. Physical Protection - Security Organization

The inspector verified by observation and personnel interview (once during each operating shift) that at least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical security activities of the security organization was onsite at all times; verified by observation that the security organization was properly manned for all shifts; and verified by observation that members of the security organization were capable of performing their assigned tasks.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

### 5. Physical Protection - Physical Barriers

The inspector verified that certain aspects of the physical barriers and isolation zones conformed to regulatory requirements and commitments in the physical security plan (PSP); that gates in the protected area were closed and locked if not attended; that doors in vital area barriers were closed and locked if not attended; and that isolation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

### 6. Physical Protection - Access Control (Identification, Authorization, Badging, Search, and Escorting)

The inspector verified that all persons and packages were identified and authorization checked prior to entry into the protected area

(PA), all vehicles were properly authorized prior to entry into a PA, all persons authorized in the PA were issued and displayed identification badges, records of access authorized conformed to the PSP, and all personnel in vital areas were authorized access; verified that all persons, packages, and vehicles were searched in accordance to regulatory requirements, the PSP, and security procedures; verified that persons authorized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within a PA or vital area; verified that vehicles authorized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within the PA; and verified by review of the licensee's authorization document that the escort observed above was authorized to perform the escort function.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Physical Protection - Communications

The inspector verified by observation (during each operating shift) that communications checks were conducted satisfactorily at the beginning of and at other prescribed time(s) during the security personnel work shift and that all fixed and roving posts, and each member of the response team successfully communicate from their remote location; and verified that equipment was operated consistent with requirements in the PSP and security procedures.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Review and Followup on Licensee Event Reports

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications. LERs 79-28, -84, -90, -95, -96, -97, -107, -109, -110, -111, -113, -116, -117, -118, -119, -120, -121, -122.

LERs 80-001 and 80-002

The licensee reported that as a result of an inadvertent Safety Feature Actuation System (SFAS), Level 2 (high pressure injection) during plant heatup (Mode 3), the three operating reactor coolant pumps were manually tripped per emergency procedure as required by Bulletin 79-05c. Tripping of reactor coolant pumps is contrary to the current technical specifications which have not been amended to reflect new requirements. After verifying the reactor coolant system was stable and no leaks existed the pumps were restarted. The inadvertent SFAS trip was due to the failure of the operator to reset the low pressure bistable prior to the auto reset of the low pressure block. The trip occurred as system pressure increased from 1600 to 1750 psig. No water was injected into the primary system as system pressure was greater than the shut off head of the high pressure injection pumps.

During the SFAS actuation demineralized water valve DW6831B did not indicate closed and its safety actuation monitor (SAM) light was not indicating properly. The valve was declared inoperable and an investigation was initiated. The licensee determined the position indication switch for DW6831B was out of adjustment. The licensee repaired the indication switch before the unit proceeded to Mode 2. Procedures PP1102.02 and EP1202.06 were revised to include additional guidance on the 1650 psig SFAS trip.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. IE Bulletin Followup

For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response. IE Bulletins 79-25 and 79-26.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10. IE Circular Followup

For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken. IE Circulars 79-23 and 79-24.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11. General Station Training

The inspector verified by direct questioning of two new, two existing, and two temporary employees that administrative controls and procedures, radiological health and safety, industrial safety, controlled access and security procedures, emergency plan, and quality assurance training were provided as required by the licensee's technical specifications; verified by direct questioning of two craftsmen and two technicians that on-the-job training, formal technical training commensurate with job classification, and fire fighting training were provided; and verified by direct questioning of one female employee that female employees are provided instructions concerning prenatal radiation exposure.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

12. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection February 1, 1980 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.