

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/79-26

Docket No. 50-341

License No. CPPR-87

Licensee: Detroit Edison Company
2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, MI 48226

Facility Name: Enrico Fermi 2

Investigation At: Enrico Fermi 2

Investigation Conducted: February 21 - March 2, 1979 and January 23, 1980

Investigator *C. E. Norelius*
J. J. Marsh

2/4/80

C. E. Norelius
Reviewed by: C. E. Norelius
Assistant to the Director

2/4/80

Investigation Summary: Investigation on February 21 - March 2, 1979 and January 23, 1980 (Report No. 50-341/79-26).

Areas Inspected: An allegation was received that a stainless steel pipe was improperly cut and installed by a work crew which was under the influence of drugs. Limited detail was provided. This investigation involved 56 investigator/inspector hours which included 42 hours onsite.

Results: Although an event bearing similarities to that alleged was identified, the degree of corroboration was insufficient to permit the conclusion that it was the subject event of the allegation. No findings in support of the allegation nor items of noncompliance were identified.

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REASON FOR INVESTIGATION

On December 4, 1978, a letter containing allegations of improper construction practices at Detroit Edison's Enrico Fermi 2 nuclear site was received by the U. S. NRC's Region III office. These allegations involved:

1. Defective installation of a stainless steel pipe by a welder. (Pipe was not identified).
2. Use of drugs onsite by personnel engaged in construction of nuclear safety related items.

The letter was signed by two individuals (Allegers A & B) who requested that their names be kept confidential.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Subsequent communication with the allegers during December (1978) and January, 1979 revealed their source of information to be third hand from a local tradesperson who had been contacted by one of the crew involved. The local tradesperson relayed the concerns to the allegers but refused to be identified to the NRC. The worker involved was unaware his comments were forwarded by the tradesperson. Attempts by the investigator to secure a specific detail regarding the allegation or to secure the identity and/or personal contact with knowledgeable persons were unsuccessful. An investigation was initiated commensurate with the limited information available.

During a separate investigation being conducted concurrently with the subject investigation at Fermi 2 in February, 1979 information regarding an event bearing a similarity to that of the allegations was developed. It differs from the allegation in several significant aspects: 1) the systems components involved the RHR rather than the main steam line; 2) the specific spool piece involved is cast carbon steel as opposed to stainless steel; and 3) the improper cut was corrected and the pipe installed through proper procedures.

A comparison of similarities and differences was continued by a more indepth evaluation of the two events conducted in August, 1979.

No degree of certainty can be placed that the two incidents are one in the same. Although strong similarities exist in certain aspects of both events equal contradictions were also identified. No finding in support of the allegation could be made nor were any items of noncompliance identified.

However, if the two events are the same the facts disclosed by NRC's investigation reveal that the system components involved were not safety related, and that proper procedures were followed in the repair and installation of the subject pipe.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Employees

T. A. Alessi, Edison QA Director
W. M. Everett, Project Superintendent
G. Carter, QA Engineer
H. A. Walker, Project QA Engineer

Daniel International Corporation

J. G. Bolt, Project QA Manager
J. T. Blixt, QC Manager
C. B. Bliesener, Administrative Assistant

Wismer and Becker

C. Keller, Project QC Manager

2. Introduction

In their letter, dated November 30, 1978, the allegers stated that a welding crew worker (unidentified) had informed a local tradesperson "...a stainless steel pipe (304) was welded in at the Fermi site by a crew (of which he was a part) that was "high on drugs." He stated that he did not take part in the drugs, but that in addition to the welder involved, the foreman or supervisor of the crew was also under the influence of the drugs (the kind of drugs was not specified). He also stated the "Frenchy cut the pipe too short," but the foreman directed that it be installed anyway. He indicated that the resulting installation was at the very least a slipshod one, and possibly defective. The contractor involved was not identified, nor was the location or function of the pipe given."

During a December 8, 1978 telephone conversation with Allegor "A", the NRC investigator was informed that it was allegor "A's" assumption that the pipe in question was in the piping system in the Residual Heat Removal Building (RHR). Allegor "A" stated it was also his assumption that the pipe in question was type 304 as "stainless steel" definitely had been mentioned, and type 304 was the most common type.

The inability of Allegers "A" & "B" to contact the local tradesperson to secure more detailed information resulted in an agreement with "B" on December 18, 1978 and again on January 11, 1979 that NRC would hold investigative effort in abeyance pending the results of "A" & "B's" efforts.

On January 15, 1979 the wife of Alleger "B" informed the NRC investigator that she had been in contact with the local tradesperson, who still refused to be identified to the NRC. "B's" wife provided additional information that "Frenchy" was a pipefitter, gave a specific name for the welder involved, established "approximately November 16, 1978" as the date of the event which she stated had occurred on the second floor of an unidentified building at the Fermi site. She also alleged that the firm involved was Wismer-Becker.

3. Investigation of Allegations

As it was apparent that the information provided on January 15, 1979 was of the maximum depth available, an onsite investigation was performed in conjunction with Investigation 50-341/79-04. During the February 15 - March 2, 1979 period the substance of Alleger "A" & "B's" concerns was evaluated.

It was discovered that Wismer-Becker had no safety-related work being accomplished in the RHR building. It was stated by Detroit Edison Q.C. personnel that most, if not all stainless steel piping work associated with safety related systems would be found in the reactor building complex.

Additional efforts to locate specific detail on the event by the checking of "Daily Foreman's Reports" and weld rod issue records for the identified welder were unsuccessful. Due to the close proximity of the Fermi 2 site to the Canadian border, attempts to locate a specific workman nicknamed "Frenchy" were, likewise, unsuccessful.

The specific welder identified by the allegers was found to have terminated his employment with Wismer-Becker. Efforts to contact him at the address and phone number provided by Wismer-Becker were unsuccessful. It was found that the phone had been disconnected and no forwarding address was available.

Subsequent to the February 15 - March 2, 1979 investigation effort (associated with both this investigation and 50-341/79-04) a sequence wherein an individual cutting a main steam pipe ~~spool~~ was eating while performing the cut and made an error, and that the individual was fired as a result was described to Region III personnel.

NRC's findings in this instance revealed that in discussions with the Foreman, Pipe Cutting Incorporated (PCI), the NRC inspector was informed that the piece of pipe being cut was not for the main steam line, but was intended for the RHR system. The pipe was required to be cut to fit through a doorway, as indicated on CDR E-11-50-6. The workman was eating a pizza while performing the pipe cut, which resulted in a poor pipe cut (not square). The improper cut was noted by his supervisor. The section of pipe was repairable. The individual performing the cut was sent back to PCI's home offices. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

No evidence was developed to show that any workers performed work while under influence of drugs in this instance.

Management Discussion

On January 23, 1980, the investigation findings were discussed with licensee management.