



SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. Report No.: 50-302/77-89
2. Facility: Crystal River Unit #3
3. Report Date: 9 August 1977
4. Occurrence Date: 15 July 1977
5. Identification of Occurrence:

Containment isolation valve DHV-41 would not open from the control room contrary to Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.

6. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Mod. 1 power operation.

7. Description of Occurrence:

At 1400, while performing the quarterly cycling of valves surveillance procedure SP-370, Decay Heat Valve DHV-41 would not open from the control room. Maintenance was initiated and DHV-41 restored operable.

8. Designation of Apparent Cause:

The cause of this event was due to a shift of the torque switch setting.

9. Analysis of Occurrence:

In the event of an Engineering Safeguard actuation, there were minimal safety implications as a result of this occurrence. The alternate long term cooldown path via the pressurizer spray system was operable and available, and valve DHV-41 could have been operated at its local station, since it is located outside Containment.

10. Corrective Action:

The torque switch contacts were burnished and the switch reset to ensure opening of the valve.

11. Failure Data:

This was the second occurrence of this event. Refer to LER 77-9, dated 9 February 1977.