

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME: 01 F L C R 2 3 | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 | EVENT TYPE: 0 3

CONT: 01 | CATEGORY: - - | REPORT TYPE: L | REPORT SOURCE: L | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 - 0 3 0 2 | EVENT DATE: 0 7 1 5 7 7 | REPORT DATE: 0 8 0 9 7 7

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 | During the performance of the quarterly cycling of valves surveillance procedure
03 | Decay Heat Valve DHV-4 would not open from the control room contrary to Tech Spec 3.6.3.1.
04 | Redundancy was maintained with valve DHV-41. Second time occurrence, refer LER 77-9.
05 | A request for Engineering evaluation and assistance has been initiated.
06 | (LER 77-90)

SYSTEM CODE: C F | CAUSE CODE: E | COMPONENT CODE: V A L V E | PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER: A | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: W 0 3 0 | VIOLATION: N

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 | The cause of this event is unknown as subsequent testing was performed with satisfactory
09 | valve operation. Upon receipt of the Engineering evaluation, corrective action to pre-
10 | clude recurrence will be initiated.

FACILITY STATUS: E | % POWER: 0 9 2 | OTHER STATUS: NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: NA

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA | LOCAT'N OF RELEASE: NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER: 0 0 0 | TYPE: Z | DESCRIPTION: NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER: 0 0 0 | DESCRIPTION: NA

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 | NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE: Z | DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY

17 | NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 | SEE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

8002280744

NAME: W. P. Stewart *WP* | PHONE: 813/866-4159

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. Report No.: 50-302/77-90
2. Facility: Crystal River Unit #3
3. Report Date: 9 August 1977
4. Occurrence Date: 15 July 1977
5. Identification of Occurrence:

Containment isolation valve DHV-4 failed to open contrary to Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.
6. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Mode 1 power operation.
7. Description of Occurrence:

At 2315, while performing the quarterly cycling of valves surveillance procedure SP-370, valve DHV-4 would not open from the control room. Redundant valve DHV-41 was de-activated in the closed position and DHV-4 was removed from service for maintenance. During the maintenance testing of DHV-4, the valve operated satisfactorily. A request for Engineering assistance, 3-B-15-d dated 25 July 1977, has been initiated and problem is now being investigated.
8. Designation of Apparent Cause:

The cause of this event is unknown at this time.
9. Analysis of Occurrence:

In the event of an Engineering Safeguard actuation, the Decay Heat drop line could not have been used, in that DHV-4 is located in the Reactor Building and could not have been opened. The alternate long-term post-accident cooling path was operable and available.
10. Corrective Action:

Upon receipt of recommendation from the Engineering Department's evaluation, corrective action to preclude recurrence will be initiated.
11. Failure Data:

This was the second reportable occurrence of DHV-4 failing to open. Refer to LER 77-9, dated 9 February 1977.