

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 F L Q R P 3 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 - - 5

02 L 0 5 0 - 0 3 0 2 7 0 8 0 4 7 8 8 0 8 3 0 7 8 9

03 On 4 August 1978 a telecopy of the B&W Report on Reactor Vessel Weld Material

04 was received. The report informed Florida Power Corporation and CR-3 staff

05 that atypical weld material may have been used in the construction of the

06 CR-3 Reactor Vessel. No redundant system. Public health and safety is not

07 a factor, as the revised operating curves, assuming atypical weld material

08 is present, are based on the same criteria as the original operating

09 curves and have been extrapolated to 5 EFF.

10 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUCCEED COMPONENT CODE COMP SUCCEED VALVE SUCCEED

11 C A 11 B 12 B 13 V E S S E L 14 A 15 7 16

17 LEAD REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR 7 8 10 3 7 11 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 15 1 16 1 17 1 18 1 19 1 20 1 21 1 22 1 23 1 24 1 25 1 26 1 27 1 28 1 29 1 30 1 31 1 32 1 33 1 34 1 35 1 36 1 37 1 38 1 39 1 40 1 41 1 42 1 43 1 44 1 45 1 46 1 47 1 48 1 49 1 50 1 51 1 52 1 53 1 54 1 55 1 56 1 57 1 58 1 59 1 60 1 61 1 62 1 63 1 64 1 65 1 66 1 67 1 68 1 69 1 70 1 71 1 72 1 73 1 74 1 75 1 76 1 77 1 78 1 79 1 80 1 81 1 82 1 83 1 84 1 85 1 86 1 87 1 88 1 89 1 90 1 91 1 92 1 93 1 94 1 95 1 96 1 97 1 98 1 99 1 100 1

11 B&W reported that weld filler wire used in construction of vessels

12 was unknowingly intermixed in a shipment from a supplier. Three weld

13 areas of concern are: closure head-to-flange; outlet nozzle-to-nozzle belt;

14 and beltline region. To ensure Reactor Vessel integrity, we have administrat-

15 ively employed revised pressure-temperature heatup, cooldown and inservice

16 leak and hydrostatic test curves.

17 FACILITY STATUS 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

18 H 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

19 Z 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

20 Z 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

21 Z 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

22 Z 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

23 Z 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

24 Z 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

25 Z 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

26 Z 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

27 Z 0 0 0 0

(SEE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION SHEET)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. Report No.: 50-302/78-037/01T-1
2. Facility: Crystal River Unit #3
3. Report Date: 30 August 1978 (11 August 1978 report revised)
4. Occurrence Date: 4 August 1978
5. Identification of Occurrence:

B&W reported atypical weld material may have been used in construction of CR-3 Reactor Vessel.

6. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Mode 6 refueling.

7. Description of Occurrence:

On 4 August 1978, a telecopy of the B&W Report on Reactor Vessel Weld Material was received. The report informed Florida Power Corporation and CR-3 staff that atypical weld material may have been used in the construction of the CR-3 Reactor Vessel. Three weld areas of concern are: closure head-to-head flange; outlet nozzle belt; and beltline region.

8. Designation of Apparent Cause:

B&W has reported that weld filler wire, atypical of that used in the construction of nuclear pressure vessels, was unknowingly intermixed in a shipment of typical weld material from a supplier.

9. Analysis of Occurrence:

Public health and safety is not a factor as the revised operating curves, assuming the atypical weld material is present, are based on the criteria of the original operating curves and have been extrapolated to 5 EFY.

10. Corrective Action:

To ensure Reactor Vessel integrity, we have administratively employed revised pressure temperature heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic test curves. These will be employed until a revision to Tech. Spec. has been received.

11. Failure Data:

First occurrence of this type of event.