NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

EXHIBIT A

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | F L C R P 3 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | - - (5)
LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 - 0 3 0 2 (7) | 0 8 0 4 7 8 (8) | 0 8 3 0 7 8 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On 4 August 1978 a telecopy of the B&W Report on Reactor Vessel Weld Material
03 was received. The report informed Florida Power Corporation and CR-3 staff
04 that atypical weld material may have been used in the construction of the
05 CR-3 Reactor Vessel. No redundant system. Public health and safety is not
06 a factor, as the revised operating curves, assuming atypical weld material
07 is present, are based on the same criteria as the original operating
08 curves and have been extrapolated to 5 EFPY.

09 SYSTEM CODE: C A (11) | CAUSE CODE: B (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: B (13) | COMPONENT CODE: V E S S E L (14) | COMP SUBCODE: A (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 7 8 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 7 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1 | REPORT TYPE T | — | REVISION NO. 1

ACTION TAKEN: G (18) | FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: B 0 1 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 B&W reported that weld filler wire used in construction of vessels
11 was unknowingly intermixed in a shipment from a supplier. Three weld
12 areas of concern are: closure head-to-flange; outlet nozzle-to-nozzle belt;
13 and beltline region. To ensure Reactor Vessel integrity, we have administrat-
14 ively employed revised pressure-temperature heatup, cooldown and inservice leak and hydrostatic test curves.

15 FACILITY STATUS: H (28) | % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: D (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Notification from NSSS

16 ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
17 NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES
18 NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
19 TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY
20 ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA | NRC USE ONLY

POOR ORIGINAL

8002270645

NAME OF PREPARER J. Cooper PHONE (904) 795-6486

(SEE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION SHEET)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. Report No.: 50-302/78-037/01T-1

2. Facility: Crystal River Unit #3

3. Report Date: 30 August 1978 (11 August 1978 report revised)

4. Occurrence Date: 4 August 1978

5. Identification of Occurrence:

   B&W reported atypical weld material may have been used in construction of CR-3 Reactor Vessel.

6. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

   Mode 6 refueling.

7. Description of Occurrence:

   On 4 August 1978, a telecopy of the B&W Report on Reactor Vessel Weld Material was received. The report informed Florida Power Corporation and CR-3 staff that atypical weld material may have been used in the construction of the CR-3 Reactor Vessel. Three weld areas of concern are: closure head-to-head flange; outlet nozzle belt; and beltline region.

8. Designation of Apparent Cause:

   B&W has reported that weld filler wire, atypical of that used in the construction of nuclear pressure vessels, was unknowingly intermixed in a shipment of typical weld material from a supplier.

9. Analysis of Occurrence:

   Public health and safety is not a factor as the revised operating curves, assuming the atypical weld material is present, are based on the criteria of the original operating curves and have been extrapolated to 5 EFPY.

10. Corrective Action:

    To ensure Reactor Vessel integrity, we have administratively employed revised pressure temperature heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic test curves. These will be employed until a revision to Tech. Spec. has been received.

11. Failure Data:

    First occurrence of this type of event.

/rc