

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | S | C | N | E | E | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

01 | L | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | At 2039, during normal operation it was observed that Power Range Detector (NI-5) was spiking. RPS Channel A, which it serves, was placed in manual bypass. An investigation was commenced to determine the cause of the spiking. No cause was determined by 1000 on March 6, 1978 when the spiking had ceased and further investigation was ceased. Redundant trip channels B, C, and D are still available so that no adverse effects on public health and safety will result from continued operation.

09 | I | A | E | X | I | N | S | T | R | U | X | Z | 7 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 3 | L | 0 | X | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | The channel was bypassed to prevent spurious trips due to the spiking NI channel. No exact cause for the spiking has been determined, as yet, but investigation will resume at either the next refueling outage or the next recurrence of the spiking.

15 | E | 1 | 0 | 0 | N/A | A | Operator Observation | 15 | Z | Z | N/A | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Z | N/A | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | N/A | 19 | Z | N/A | 20 | N | N/A

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DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report Number: RO-287/78-8

Report Date: April 4, 1978

Occurrence Date: March 5, 1978

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel A  
Bypassed Due to Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)-5  
Spiking

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100 percent Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

On March 5, 1978, at 2039, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel A was placed in Manual Bypass. A spiking problem in Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) Power Range Detector, NI-5, necessitated the bypass of the channel. An investigation of the spiking was initiated at 2200 and continued until 1000 on March 6, 1978 when the spiking had ceased. No further spiking has recurred and RPS Channel A has been left in the manual bypass mode.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

At this time the cause of the spiking has not been determined. The RPS Cabinet itself has been eliminated as a possibility but, the cause could lie anywhere from the cabinet to the detector itself. Further investigation will continue at either the next occurrence of the spiking or during the next refueling outage.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The Reactor Protection System has four channels and normally trips on a two-out-of-four logic. With one RPS channel bypassed the remaining trip logic is two-out-of-three which is the minimum required by Technical Specifications (T.S. 3.5.1). There is, therefore, sufficient redundancy assured with one channel bypassed. Thus, the health and safety of the public are not endangered by continued operation in this mode.

Corrective Action:

No other corrective action can be taken until the cause is determined. The bypassing of the RPS channel prevents spurious RPS channel trips due to spiking in the NI channel.