

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1
ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT AO-269/73-7
CORE FLOOD TANK DISCHARGE VALVE MOTOR OPERATOR BREAKERS

Description of the Incident

On October 7, 1973 and during preparation for startup of Oconee Unit 1, it was discovered that the breakers to the motor operators on CF-1 and -2, the core flood tank discharge valves, had been locked in the closed position. Technical Specification 3.3.3(c) and Operating Procedure OP/1/A/1104/01, "Core Flooding System," require that these breakers be locked in the open position and tagged to prevent inadvertent isolation of the core flood tanks when the reactor coolant system is above 800 psig. Regulatory Operations, Region II, was verbally notified of the incident on October 7, 1973.

Corrective Action

The breakers for CF-1 and CF-2 were locked open immediately and tagged. Operating Procedure OP/1/A/1102/01, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup," has been modified to specifically require that the motor operator breakers for CF-1 and -2 be locked open and tagged, in addition to the existing requirement to visually verify that these valves are fully open. The Operating Engineer has instructed the Shift Supervisors to review this incident with all operating personnel on shift.

Safety Analysis

During the period that the motor operator breakers for the core flood tank discharge valves were in the locked closed position, the core flood tank discharge valves CF-1 and -2 were fully open, and both core flood tanks were operational as required by Technical Specification 3.3. In addition to the requirement for visual verification that CF-1 and -2 are fully open, there are two independent position detectors on these valves to keep the control room operator informed of their position. In the event that these valves had been inadvertently closed, the operator would be aware of this condition immediately and could take the necessary corrective action. The safe operation of the unit was not impaired by this incident.

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