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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

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Docket No. 50-461 Docket No. 50-462

Illinois Power Company ATTN: Mr. W. C. Gerstner Executive Vice President 500 South 27th Street Decatur, IL 62525

Gentlemen:

Due to an oversight, the attached "Enclosure A" to IE Information

Notice No. 80-20 was omitted from our letter dated May 8, 1980.

Sincerely,

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Helen Pappas, Chief Administrative Branch

Enclosure: Attachment A to IE Information Notice No. 80-20

cc w/encl: Central Files Director, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/DOR PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Mr. Dean Hansell, Office of Assistant Attorney General

Enclosure A

DAVIS-BESSE EVENT OF APRIL 19, 1980

STATUS OF DAVIS-BESSE 1 PRIOR TO LOSS OF POWER TO BUSSES E-2 AND F-2:

- Refueling mode with RCS temperature at 90°F and level slightly below vessel head flange. Head detensioned with bolts in place. Manway cover on top of OTSG removed. Tygon tubing attached to lower vents of RCS hot leg for RCS level indication. Decay heat loop 2 in service for RCS cooling.
- All non-nuclear instrument (NNI) power and Static Voltage Regulator YAR supplied from 13.8 KV Bus B via HBBF2. 13.8 K Bus A energized but not connected. RPS and SFAS Channels 1 and 3 being supplied from YAR.
- 3. Equipment Out of Service
 - a. Source Range Channel 2 Surveillance
 - b. Emergency Diesel Generator 1 Maintenance.
 - c. Decay Heat Loop 1 Maintenance.
- 4. Breakers for containment spray and HPI pumps racked out.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

TIME	EVENT	CALLSE / COMMENTE
2:00 p.m.	Loss of power to Busses E-2 and F-2 (non-essential 480 VAC)	Ground short on 13.8 KV breaker HBBF2 which caused breaker to open. This interrupted power to busses E-2 and F-2 which were supplying all non-nuclear instrument (NNI) power, channels 1 and 3 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Safety Features Actuation Signal (SFAS), the computer, and much of the control room indicators.
2:00 p.m.	SFAS Level 5 (recirc lation mode) actua- tion.	Two out of four logic tripped upon loss of Busses E-2 and F-2. Actuation caused ECCS pump suction valves from containment sump to open and ECCS pump suction valves from Borated Water Storage Tank to close. During valve travel times, gravity flow path existed from BWST to containment sump.
2:02 p.m.	Decay Heat (low pressure safety in- jection) flow secure by operator	Operator turned off only operating DH pump to avoid spillage of RCS water to d containment via the tygon tubing for RCS level indication and open SG manway.
2:33 p.m.	Partial restoration of power	Power to Bus E-2 and SFAS channels 1 and 3 restored along with one channel of UNI. This restored all essential power for ECCS.

TIME	EVENT	CAUSE/COMMENTS
2:44 p.m.	Attempt to reestab- lish DH flow	Started DH pump 1-2 then stopped it when it was determined that air was in suction line. Pump secured to prevent damage.
3:34 p.m.	Source Range Channel 2 energized.	
4:00 p.m. to 4:06 p.m.	Restoration of Busse (480 VAC) F-2, F-21, F-22, and F-23	s Busses restored sequentually as efforts progressed to isolate ground fault.
4:25 p.m.	DE flow restored	DH pump 1-2 started after venting. RCS temperature at 170°F. DH flow bypassing cooler Incore TC's being taken and maximum is 170°F.
4:46 p.m.	Containment sump pump breakers opened	Precautionary measure to assure containment sump water from BWST remained in containment. Incore TC's range from 161 to 164°F.
5:40 p.m.	Computer returned to service.	Incore TC's range from 158 to 160°F.
6:24 p.m.	DH flow directed through cooler	RCS cooldown established at less than 25°F per hour. RCS temperature at 150°F. Incore T range from 151 to 158°F.
9:50 p.s.	Power completely restored	RCS temperature at approximately 115°F.

STATUS OF DAVIS-BESSE 1 AFTER RECOVERY FROM LOSS OF POWER TO BUSSES E-2 AND F-2:

- Refueling mode with RCS temperature at 115^oF and level slightly below vessel he flange. Head detensioned with bolts in place. Manway cover on top of OTSG removed. Tygon tubing attached to lower vents of RCS hot leg for RCS level indication. Decay heat loop 2 in service for RCS cooling.
- Bus E-2 being supplied from 13.8 KV Bus A via breaker HAAE2 and Bus F-2 being supplied from 13.8 KV Bus B via breaker HBBF2.
- 3. Decay heat loop filled, all tags clear. Maintenance work restricted so restoration of system will be less than two hours.
- 4. ECCS pump suction valves (DH-9A and DH-9B) from containment sump closed and breakers racked out. This will prevent the suction of air into the decay

- 2 -

heat loop during a level 5 actuation (recirculation mode) when there is no water in the sump.

5. Equipment Out of Service:

Emergency Di sel Generator 1 - maintenance

6. Breakers for containment spray and HPI pumps racked out.