ENCLOSURE

HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT, ALL UNITS
UNACCEPTABLE QA DOCUMENTATION FOR
GLAZER STEEL MATERIAL
10CFR50.55(e) SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL REPORT
NCR HNP-A-058

On July 17, 1979, TVA informed NRC-OIE Inspector, W. B. Swan, of a potentially reportable condition under 10CFR50.55(e) regarding questionable QA documentation on steel received from Glazer Steel and Aluminum (Glazer), Knoxville, Tennessee. This report supplements the final report sent to you February 14, 1980, as per the request made by NRC-OIE Inspector R. W. Wright in his call with J. F. Cox and S. R. Stout on February 26, 1980.

Generic Implications

TVA has investigated the situation regarding material supplied by Glazer for TVA nuclear use and has determined that there is no basis for a generic concern about the material previously supplied by Glazer to other (than Hartsville) TVA nuclear plants. This position is based primarily on the fact that the Glazer material supplied to the other sites has either had sufficient documentation provided upon arrival at each site such that it has been approved for use at the site or it has been rejected because of insufficient documentation. Furthermore, Glazer does not manufacture the material they supply to TVA and over 90 percent of all material supplied by Glazer has been via direct shipment from the steel mill to the TVA plantsites.

TVA tested all questionable material (i.e., all material for which documentation was questionable) at Hartsville which had been shipped from the Glazer Knoxville warehouse, of which all but one bundle came from Florida Steel Corporation, Charlotte, North Carolina (Florida Steel). The questionable material amounted to less than seven percent of all the Glazer material on hand. This testing was discussed on February 14, 1980, report. The tests showed some of the Florida Steel material (7/8- and 1-inch rods) to have a sulfur content slightly higher than allowed in ASTM A.36 although the CMTR's showed the sulfur levels to be acceptable. All other material properties checked, including chemical analyses, yield stress, ultimate stress, and elongation fell within the limits of ASTM A.36. Our position is that this slightly excessive sulfur content is caused by chemical differences within heats at the Florida Steel Charlotte Mill, not from problems identified with the Glazer QA system. The slightly higher sulfur levels in rod of this type would not affect the structural integrity or safety of operations of any of the TVA nuclear plants because this type rod is not used in welded QA applications. This type rod is used in threaded form supports and threaded hanger attachments (wherein the increased sulfur will improve the machinability for threading).

TVA had one other problem with chemistry of material (in this case rebar) produced at the Charlotte Mill of Florida Steel. This deficiency was reported to OIE Inspector R. W. Wright on October 17, 1979, which was after the date that the high-sulfur rod was produced