



TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-28

DATE OF EVENT: March 6, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Loss of Control Room indication for CV5072, Containment Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 1982.7 and Load (Gross MWE) = 669.

Description of Occurrence: On March 6, 1980, at 0918 hours it was noted by a Control Room operator that there was no control room indication for CV5072, a containment vacuum relief isolation valve. Investigation by operations personnel found BE1139 open. BE1139 is the main breaker for CV5072. With BE1139 open, Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) would not be able to close the valve to its safety position.

This placed the unit in the Action Statement "A" of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 states that containment isolation valves shall be operable with isolation times of 15 seconds in modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Action Statement "A" states, restore the inoperable valve to operable status within four hours or be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and in cold shutdown within the following thirty hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: This occurrence is attributed to construction personnel error. Someone apparently bumped into this breaker and did not realize it was now open. The breaker is located in a heavily traveled hallway on the 585' level outside the #3 mechanical penetration room. There have been contractors working in the hallway which has made it even more congested. It is very possible that someone brushed up against the breaker while stepping around people or hit it while climbing a ladder.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The non-return valve (NRV5082) for this penetration would have prevented any outward flow from the containment vessel to the annulus. There is a check valve that would have sealed the penetration in the event of pressurization of containment. Also during the time in which CV5072 was de-energized, there was no need to isolate that containment penetration.

Corrective Action: Breaker BE1139 was closed on March 6, 1980, at 0929 hours by operations personnel. This action removed the unit from Action Statement "A" of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.

On March 11, 1980, the construction manager issued a memo to construction personnel reminding them to be more careful around equipment and to report any accidental contact to the control room for their verification.

Station Superintendent met with supervisors and stewards of construction crafts, instituting daily tailgate sessions to remind them of possible problems.

Failure Data: Other similar failures are documented in Licensee Event Reports NP-33-80-16 (80-018), NP-33-77-38 and NP-33-77-45, all of which concern disconnect switches.

LER #80-020