

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | P | A | T | M | I | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 37 CAT 58

CONT
0 1 | R | E | P | O | R | T | S | O | U | R | C | E | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 9
7 8 60 81 98 99 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During piping reanalysis errors were discovered in the seismic analysis of
0 3 | the common decay heat suction piping associated with valves DH-V1 and DH-V2.
0 4 | When subjected to OBE loads, the piping associated with these valves may exceed
0 5 | code allowable stresses. This is reportable per Technical Specification 6.9.2A(9).
0 6 | _____
0 7 | _____
0 8 | _____

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE: C F (11) CAUSE CODE: B (12) CAUSE SUBCODE: A (13) COMPONENT CODE: Z Z Z Z Z Z (14) COMP SUBCODE: Z (15) VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: 18 0 | EVENT YEAR: 8 0 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 0 4 | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 1 | REPORT TYPE: T | REVISION NO.: 0
ACTION TAKEN: Z (18) FUTURE ACTION: F (19) EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) HOURS: 0 0 0 (22) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) NPRO-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: Z (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The cause of the event is analysis error. The affected piping seismic analysis
1 1 | will be corrected and appropriate hardware changes will be made if required.
1 2 | _____
1 3 | _____
1 4 | _____

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS: X (28) % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) OTHER STATUS: NRC Order (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: IE Bulletin 79-14 Inspection (32)

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: N/A (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE: N/A (36)

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) TYPE: Z (38) DESCRIPTION: N/A (39)

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) DESCRIPTION: N/A (41)

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: D (42) DESCRIPTION: Piping may be subjected to stresses exceeding Code allowables. (43)

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED: N (44) DESCRIPTION: N/A (45) NRC USE ONLY

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NARRATIVE REPORT

LER 80-004/011-0

I. Explanation of Occurrence

While performing piping reanalysis of non-conformance identified by inspections required by NRC IE Bulletin 79-14, errors were discovered by the Architect-Engineer in the seismic analysis of the common decay heat suction piping associated with valves DH-V1 and DH-V2. Specifically, an incorrect center of gravity was assumed for valves and their motor operators. When subjected to Operating Basis Earthquake loads, the piping associated with valves DH-V1 and DH-V2 may exceed Code allowable stresses as a result of insufficient restraint provided by the original design. This event is considered reportable per Technical Specification 6.9.2.A (9).

II. Cause of Occurrence

The cause of this occurrence is classified as a design/analysis error in that an incorrect valve center of gravity was selected as input data for the piping seismic analysis.

III. Circumstances Surrounding Occurrence

This error was discovered by the Architect-Engineer while verifying the conformance of the analysis to the "as-built" piping condition as required by IE Bulletin 79-14.

The plant was in long-term cold shutdown with core cooling being provided by the Decay Heat Removal System taking suction from the Reactor Coolant System through the DH-V1/DH-V2 suction piping. The initial error was discovered during the evaluation of DH-V2 piping on 03/06/80. The follow-up analysis of DH-V1, which is an identical valve to DH-V2, discovered similar reportable conditions on 03/10/80 and, therefore, was not included in the report telecopied on 03/07/80.

IV. Corrective Action To Be Taken To Prevent Recurrence

Because the unit is in a cold shutdown mode, no immediate corrective action is required. Emergency Procedure 1202-35, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, addresses inoperability of the normal Decay Heat Removal suction piping and provides adequate guidance to the operator for this event. Long-term corrective action will consist of correcting the affected piping seismic analysis. If the corrected analysis shows the affected piping exceeds Code allowable stresses when subjected to OBE loads, then appropriate hardware changes will be provided. Because this piping is in service to remove decay heat, these corrective actions will be taken as soon as practical before 06/30/80. The IE Bulletin 79-14 reanalysis is continuing and will reveal similar analysis errors if they exist; analysis errors similar to this event will be reported within 30 days of discovery as updates to this Event Report.

V. Component Failure Data

Not applicable, as no components have failed. This event report considers potential piping failure.