

March 17, 1980
TLL 117


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attn: Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit I (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50
Docket No. 50-289
Response to NRC Letter Concerning the February 26, 1980
Incident at Crystal River Unit No. 3

Enclosed please find the responses to items 6 and 7 of your letter of March 6, 1980 to all operating B & W reactor licensees concerning the February 26, 1980 incident at Crystal River. These responses are preliminary in nature and may be revised as a result of continued evaluation and better understanding of the Crystal River event.

Sincerely,


J. G. Herbein
Vice President
Nuclear Operations

JGH:CFM:hah

Attachments

cc: J. T. Collins

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LIST

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
AND
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT I

Operating License No. DPR-50
Docket No. 50-289

This letter is submitted in support of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission request concerning the February 26, 1980 incident which occurred at the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Station. The responses to items 6 and 7 of the NRC's letter of March 6, 1980 are attached. Further, all statements contained in these responses have been reviewed and all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

By J. C. Verlein
Vice President

Sworn and subscribed to me this 17th day of March, 1980.

By Cathy L. Grey
Notary Public

CATHY L. GREY, Notary Public
Londonderry Twp., Dauphin County, Pa.
My Commission Expires Oct. 24, 1983

S 8/06/2000 BRS

ITEM

6. Address each CR-3 proposed corrective action in terms of applicability to your plant.

RESPONSE

6. CR-3 Planned Corrective Actions, as given in Enclosure 2 of NRC letter dated March 6, 1980, are being addressed as follows:

IMMEDIATE CR-3 CORRECTIVE MEASURES:

- (1) Thorough testing of the NNI system to determine the cause of failure is Crystal River specific, and no action is being taken at TMI-1.
- (2) The ICS/NNI design for TMI-1 is such that the PORV will not open on loss of power to ICS/NNI or loss of power internal to the ICS/NNI.
- (3) The ICS/NNI design for TMI-1 is such that the pressurizer spray valve will fail as is and is normally closed on loss of any of the power feeds to or within the ICS/NNI.
- (4) Positive indication of the PORV and Reactor Coolant System Safety Valves is being provided as described in the TMI-1 Restart Report, Section 2.1.1.2, and will be implemented before restart.
- (5) Procedural control of the ICS/NNI instrument switches will be implemented to minimize the number of instrument losses due to any partial power loss. This will be accomplished by preselecting instrument switch positions for normal conditions.
- (6) The TMI-1 operators will be trained to respond to ICS/ NNI power failures as described in Response to Item 2 of TLL-114 dated March 13, 1980.
- (7) The TMI-1 ICS/NNI is supplied from a 120 VAC vital bus as described in Response to Item 2 of TLL-114 dated March 13, 1980.
- (8) TMI-1 does not have the type of events recorder used at Crystal River. TMI-1 relies rather on the originally supplied plant computer, plus a new "Modcomp" computer. These computers will be used continuously, and upon breakdown, corrective maintenance will be performed.
- (9) A study is underway to determine the best means of providing indication redundancy for certain essential plant parameters and to determine which parameters are essential (See Response to Item 2 of TLL-114).

AT NEXT REFUELING CR-3 CORRECTIVE MEASURES:

- (1) Suitable indication will be provided at TMI-1 to allow the operator to determine which ICS/NNI power supply has been lost such that appropriate corrective action can be taken.
- (2) A review of fuse locations will be conducted to determine if faster access to essential ICS/NNI fuses at TMI-I is needed.
- (3) Automatic start of the TMI-1 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pumps is independent of the ICS/NNI.

LONG-TERM CR-3 CORRECTIVE MEASURES:

- (1) As described in our response to IE Bulletin 79-27, further review of the electrical distribution system for the ICS/NNI is being conducted to determine whether the reliability of the power supplies can be improved and to determine the best method of providing essential instrument redundancy (See response to IMMEDIATE (2) and (9) above).
- (2) As part of the TMI-1 fire protection upgrading, a remote shutdown panel is being installed. This effort is currently scheduled for completion by May 31, 1981.
- (3) See response to LONG-TERM (1) above.

ITEM

7. Expand your review under IE Bulletin 79-27 to include the implications of the CR-3 event. Inform us of your schedule for completion of this expanded review as discussed on March 4, 1980.

RESPONSE

7. Our review of IE Bulletin 79-27 has been expanded as discussed in response to Items 2 and 6 of our March 13 letter (TLL-114) and is scheduled for completion by September 30, 1980 or as otherwise indicated above.