DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

February 6, 1980

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: RII:WPA
50-269/79-39
50-270/79-36

Dear Sir:

With regard to Mr. C. E. Murphy's letter of January 1, 1980 which transmitted the subject inspection report, Duke Power Company does not consider the information contained therein to be proprietary.

Please find attached responses to the cited items of noncompliance.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker Jr. by KS

Wi[illegible] O. Parker, Jr.

KRW:scs

Attachment

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Inspection Report 50-269/79-39, 50-270/79-36

ITEM

As required by 10 CFR 73.55(d) Access Requirements (1) states in part the licensee shall control all points of personnel access into a protected area ... search of all individuals shall be made at such points, ... the search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices shall be conducted either by a physical search or by use of equipment capable of detecting such devices. Paragraph 3.2.1.5 Search and Administrative Control Hardware, of the Oconee Nuclear Station Security Plan, states in part, "All personnel and packages shall be searched for firearms, explosives and incendiary devices prior to entry into the protected area ... the personnel search program shall consist of the following:

(5) Conducting a "Hands-On" search of 5% (selected randomly) of all Duke Power Company employees who are not regularly employed at the site.

(6) Subjecting all outer garments such as coats and heavy sweaters of each individual who is not a regular employee at the site to search.

Contrary to the above, on December 4, 1979, the inspector observed two individuals who were wearing visitors badges enter the protected area without benefit of a "Hand-On" search nor search of their outer garments.

This is an infraction.

RESPONSE

Although the two individuals mentioned in the infraction were not subjected to a physical "hands-on" search, they were processed through operable metal and explosive detectors. The security force members involved in the incident were counselled on the necessity to properly implement established security procedures. Station management will continue to monitor implementation of the Station Security Plan.

ITEM

As required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix "B" Criterion V as implemented by Duke Power Company Topical Report 1A Section 17.2.5 and Oconee Technical Specification Section 6.4.1 activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings ... and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions procedures or drawings.

(1) Duke Power Company Procedure MP/0/A/3019/01 Paragraph 11.3 Note 3 requires that "Any attachments (extra pipes, cable trays, extra steel, etc.) must be shown on the support restraint design drawing.

Contrary to the above, Hanger Numbers 51A-0-479A-H21C, S1A-0-479A-H18C and 2-53B-2-0-436E-R3 had attachments that were not shown on the surveillance "as-built" design drawings.

(2) Duke Power Company Procedure Specification No. OS-0020.00-00-003 Paragraph 4.4.2 requires that wedge anchors shall have the proper test torque applied to ensure expansion of the anchor.

Contrary to the above, Hanger 1-07A-400B-DE014 Plate A was found to have three wedge anchors that had been torqued to less than the required test torque value.

This is an infraction.

RESPONSE

Part 1

Station investigation revealed that, with the exception of Hanger 2-53B-2-0-436E-R3, attachments to hangers not shown on "as-built" drawings were the result of a deficient inspection by one team leader. This team leader was subsequently removed from all further Bulletins 79-14 and 79-02 activities and the hangers in question were inspected again. All surveillance team leaders were assembled and station management re-emphasized the importance of obtaining accurate and complete information on piping and hangers inspected. Team leader responsibilities were reiterated. All hanger discrepancies identified in the infraction were corrected and drawing revisions instructions were forwarded to Design Engineering.

Part 2

The inspector was initially interested in the hole configuration beneath the wedge anchor nuts on the hanger inspected. He requested that the torque be tested while removing the nuts from the wedge anchors. The torque values read were less than the required value. Subsequently, on-site calibration testing and the manufacturer confirmed that the Proto Model 6014-3 torque wrench used will not function properly in a counter-clockwise direction without special adjustment. Therefore, the torque values read for the inspector while loosening the anchor nuts were inaccurate. Consequently, Part (2) of the infraction is considered to be invalid.