NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
0 1	LICENSEE CODE (2)	V A N A S 1
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8
	EVENT DATE (8)	0 2 1 5 8 0
	REPORT DATE (9)	0 3 1 4 8 0

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On February 15, 1980, the 1H emergency diesel generator tripped on overspeed during
0 3 a manual start to verify diesel operability. The diesel generator tripped again during
0 4 the safety injection on February 23, 1980 and during subsequent testing on March 2, 6,
0 5 10 and 11. Since, after each trip, the redundant 1J diesel generator was started and
0 6 proved operable within the hour and again every 8 hours thereafter while the 1H diesel
0 7 was down, the health and safety of the general public was not affected. These events
0 8 are reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
	E B	E	B	M O T O R X	Z	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 0	—	0 3 2	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
C	C	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	N	A	W 2 9 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The diesel tripped on overspeed because of a defective oil booster servomotor which
1 1 prevented the governor from gaining control of the fuel rack before the trip setpoint
1 2 was reached. The oil booster servomotor was replaced with a servomotor from a Unit 2
1 3 diesel and the 1H diesel generator was satisfactorily tested.
1 4

1 5	FACILITY STATUS (28)	% POWER (29)	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	E	1 0 0	NA	B	Surveillance Testing

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER (37)	TYPE (38)	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER (40)	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE (42)	DESCRIPTION
	Z	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED (44)	DESCRIPTION (45)
	N	NA

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NRC USE ONLY

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Description of Event

On February 15, 1980, the 1H emergency diesel generator tripped on overspeed after being manually started to verify diesel operability. The 1H diesel generator tripped again during the safety injection on February 23, 1980 and during subsequent testing on March 2, 6, 10, and 11. The diesel trips on March 10 and 11, 1980 occurred as a result of high crankcase pressure rather than the overspeed problem. The high crankcase pressure trip is blocked during automatic start. These events are contrary to T.S. 3.8.1.1 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The consequences of these events were limited because after each of the diesel trips, redundant diesel generator 1J was started and verified operable within the hour and again every 8 hours thereafter during the periods the 1H diesel was declared inoperable. The high crankcase pressure trip is blocked during automatic start. As a result, the health and safety of the general public were not affected by the inoperability of the 1H diesel generator following the trips. The overspeed trip problem is not generic to diesel 1J or the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators.

Cause of Event

The diesel tripped on overspeed because the oil booster servomotor was not bleeding off fast enough after the starting air cut off which prevented the governor from attaining control of the fuel rack before the trip setpoint was reached. Governor settings were also suspected as a contributing cause. The cause of the diesel tripping on high crankcase pressure on March 10 and 11, 1980 has been attributed to the crankcase pressure switch having been set too low which was preventing crankcase vacuum from being established in the time allowed before the shutdown circuits were energized. Past high crankcase pressure diesel trips were thought to have been corrected by the installation of a jumper to raise the crankcase pressure switch setpoint from 0.6 inches to 1.34 inches.

Immediate Corrective Action

The defective oil booster servomotor was replaced with an identical servomotor from one of the Unit 2 diesels and then the 1H diesel generator was satisfactorily tested. After the oil booster servomotor was replaced, the governor settings required minor adjustment. To correct the high crankcase pressure trip problem, the crankcase pressure switch for the 1H diesel was replaced with a new switch having a higher setpoint range. The switch setpoint was set at 2 inches and the 1H diesel was tested with satisfactory results. The 1J diesel crankcase pressure switch will also be replaced and set at 2 inches so that all the pressure switch setpoints in both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 diesel generators coincide.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No scheduled corrective action is required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions are required.