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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
631 PARK AVENUE
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

April 14, 1979


Docket No. 50-289

Metropolitan Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. J. G. Herbein
Vice President - Generation
P. O. Box 542
Reading, Pennsylvania 19640

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Bulletin 79-08 is forwarded to you for information. No written response is required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,


Boyce H. Grier
Director

Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No. 79-08
with Enclosures

cc w/encls:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20055

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EVENTS RELEVANT TO BOILING WATER POWER REACTORS IDENTIFIED DURING
THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT

Description of Circumstances:

On March 28, 1979 the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 experienced core damage which resulted from a series of events which were initiated by a loss of feedwater transient. Several aspects of the incident may have general applicability to operating boiling water reactors. This Bulletin requests certain actions of licensees of operating boiling water reactors.

Actions to be taken by Licensees:

For all boiling water reactor facilities with an operating license, complete the actions specified below:

1. Review the description of circumstances described in Enclosure 1 of IE Bulletin 79-05 and the preliminary chronology of the TMI-2 3/28/79 accident included in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-05A.
 - a. This review should be directed toward understanding: (1) the extreme seriousness and consequences of the simultaneous blocking of both trains of a safety system at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 plant and other actions taken during the early phases of the accident; (2) the apparent operational errors which led to the eventual core damage; and (3) the necessity to systematically analyze plant conditions and parameters and take appropriate corrective action.
 - b. Operational personnel should be instructed to (1) not override automatic action of engineered safety features unless continued operation of engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions (see Section 5a of this bulletin); and (2) not make operational decisions based solely on a single plant parameter indication when one or more confirmatory indications are available.

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