

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

April 18, 1979

The

Docket No. 50-289

Metropolitan Edison Company ATTN: Mr. J. G. Herbein Vice President - Generation P. O. Box 542 Reading, Pennsylvania 19640

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Bulletin No. 79-06A Revision No. 1, is forwarded to you for information. No written response is required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

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Director

Enclosures: IE Bulletin No. 79-06A Revision No. 1

cc w/encls: E. G. Wallace, Licensing Manager J. J. Barton, Project Manager L. L. Lawyer, Manager - Generating Operations G. P. Miller, Manager - Generating Station - Nuclear J. L. Seelinger, Unit 1 Superintendent W. E. Potts, Unit 1 Superintendent - Technical Support I. R. Finfrock, Jr. Mr. R. Conrad G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Miss Mary V. Southard, Chairman, Citizens for a Safe Environment

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

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REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT

IE Bulletin 79-06A identified actions to be taken by the licensees of all pressurized water reactors designed by Westinghouse.

Item No. 3 of the actions to be taken, as stated in the original bulletin, was:

"3. For your facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident with pressurizer pressure for automatic initiation of safety injection into the reactor coolant system. trip the low pressurizer level setpoint bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety injection would be initiated regardless of the pressurizer level. In addition, instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection when the pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation setpoint whether or not the level indication has dropped to the actuation setpoint."

Information from licensees and Westinghouse has identified that implementation of this action would preclude the performance of surveillance testing of the pressurizer pressure bistables without initiating a safety injection.

In order to permit surveillance testing of the pressurizer pressure bistables, the low pressurizer level bistables that must operate in coincidence with the low pressurizer pressure bistables may be restored to normal operation for the duration of the surveillance test of that coincident pressurizer pressure channel. At the conclusion of the surveillance test of each pressurizer pressure channel, the coincident pressurizer level channel must be returned to the tripped mode defined in Action Item 3 of IE Bulletin 79-06A.

As a result, Item 3 should be revised as follows:

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