bcc to DAC:ADM:
CENTRAL FILES
PDR:HQ
LPDR
~~TIC~~
NSIC

STATE

Omaha Public Power District

1623 HARNEY : OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68102 : TELEPHONE 536-4000 AREA CODE 402

November 9, 1979

Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011

Reference: Docket No. 50-285
IE Bulletin 79-13, Revision 2, October 17, 1979

Dear Mr. Seyfrit:

In response to the above-referenced bulletin, non-destructive testing of certain steam generator nozzle-to-piping welds was performed, and piping supports and snubbers associated with the main feedwater system piping were examined, during the Fort Calhoun Station outage which commenced on October 31, 1979. The results of these examinations are provided by attachment to this letter.

Sincerely,

W. C. Jones
Division Manager
Production Operations

WCJ/KJM/BJH:jmm

Attachment

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection
Washington, D. C. 20555

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

8002150 351

ATTACHMENT

Feedwater System Examinations in Response to IE Bulletin 79-13, Revision 2

Item 1.a.

Perform radiographic examination, supplemented by ultrasonic examination as necessary to evaluate indications, of all feedwater nozzle-to-piping welds and of adjacent pipe and nozzle areas (a distance equal to at least two wall thicknesses). Evaluation shall be in accordance with ASME Section III, Subsection NC, Article NC-5000. Radiography shall be performed to the 2T penetrameter sensitivity level, in lieu of Table NC-5111-1, with systems void of water.

Response

Radiographic examinations were performed on November 2 and 3, 1979. The radiography was performed on the steam generator nozzle-to-safe end welds and on the safe end-to-piping welds (4 welds, total) for a distance of at least two wall thicknesses each side of the welds. The radiography was performed and evaluated according to the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-13 as stated in Item 1.a. The results of the examinations show that no cracking or unacceptable code discontinuities exist in the weld locations.

Item 1.b.

If cracking is identified during examination of the nozzle-to-piping weld, all feedwater line welds up to the first piping support or snubber and high stress points in containment shall be volumetrically examined in accordance with 1.a. above. All unacceptable code discontinuities, other than cracking, shall be subject to repair unless justification for continued operation is provided.

Response

No cracking or unacceptable code discontinuities were found.

Item 1.c.

Perform a visual inspection of feedwater system piping supports and snubbers in containment to verify operability and conformance to design.

Response

On November 3, 1979, all main feedwater supports in containment were visually examined. All supports conformed with their original design, with the exception of three. The as-built condition of these three was analyzed and the supports were found to be capable of performing their design function. Surveillance tests performed in accordance with Technical Specification 3.14, Shock Suppressors (Snubbers), confirmed the operability of all feedwater piping system snubbers in containment.